@lygodesma has brought forward the forthcoming presidential election in Tunisia (scheduled for Oct 6), and @DKC has followed up on this below.
Interestingly enough, the 2021 Tunisian "self-coup" by president Saied is not included in the (widely used) Powell & Thyne's data (at least as compiled by VoA). Since such self-coups do count for resolution here, this initially worried me - could it be the case that we may have missed similar cases in our base rates? But at least according to the Wikipedia self-coup page, this does not seem to be the case: they seem to be rare, and the only other such self-coup of interest here seems to be in Sudan (2021), which, contrary to the Tunisian one, is indeed included in the VoA list.
So, is the forthcoming presidential election in Tunisia a real risk for a coup, hence for positive resolution here?
It seems to me that the only scenario where this could be the case is if another candidate wins the presidential election, and the incumbent president refuses to cede power; but this seems a remote scenario. What seems to be the most probable case is a sham election which will simply allow the incumbent president to remain in office; here is the conclusion of an analysis by the Arab Reform Initiative (Tunisia: A Sham Presidential Election, Sep 6):
The presidential election [...] will be a sham election, like those organized by the toughest dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. Indeed, for three years, he has created a climate of terror in the country, imprisoning his opponents and hanging a sword of Damocles over the heads of journalists. Today, as the presidential election approaches, his regime has stepped up its repressive measures, arresting or disqualifying candidates and even going as far as denying basic principles of the rule of law to cling on to power. The President's probable victory on 6 October will enable him to remain at the helm of the country, but his legitimacy will remain fragile. Unfortunately, Tunisia's democratic parenthesis seems increasingly closed, barring an unexpected popular surge.
Although, to the best of my knowledge, the opposition has not (yet?) called for an election boycott, notice that this is exactly what happened in the 2022-2023 parliamentary election, where turnout lingered at only ~11% (this did not stop the subsequent formation of a parliament).
So, my understanding is that such a scenario (incumbent president winning a sham election and remaining in power) will not trigger the question criteria for a successful coup (it sounds more like a continuation of the existing one). Nevertheless, I will pump my existing forecast from 40% (which was based only on base rates and the outside view) slightly up to 45%, but I see this as more a result of the situation uncertainty rather than an increased confidence that Tunisia might resolve the question positively...
As always, feedback and criticism are most welcome.
@lygodesma has brought forward the forthcoming presidential election in Tunisia (scheduled for Oct 6), and @DKC has followed up on this below.
Interestingly enough, the 2021 Tunisian "self-coup" by president Saied is not included in the (widely used) Powell & Thyne's data (at least as compiled by VoA). Since such self-coups do count for resolution here, this initially worried me - could it be the case that we may have missed similar cases in our base rates? But at least according to the Wikipedia self-coup page, this does not seem to be the case: they seem to be rare, and the only other such self-coup of interest here seems to be in Sudan (2021), which, contrary to the Tunisian one, is indeed included in the VoA list.
So, is the forthcoming presidential election in Tunisia a real risk for a coup, hence for positive resolution here?
It seems to me that the only scenario where this could be the case is if another candidate wins the presidential election, and the incumbent president refuses to cede power; but this seems a remote scenario. What seems to be the most probable case is a sham election which will simply allow the incumbent president to remain in office; here is the conclusion of an analysis by the Arab Reform Initiative (Tunisia: A Sham Presidential Election, Sep 6):
Although, to the best of my knowledge, the opposition has not (yet?) called for an election boycott, notice that this is exactly what happened in the 2022-2023 parliamentary election, where turnout lingered at only ~11% (this did not stop the subsequent formation of a parliament).
So, my understanding is that such a scenario (incumbent president winning a sham election and remaining in power) will not trigger the question criteria for a successful coup (it sounds more like a continuation of the existing one). Nevertheless, I will pump my existing forecast from 40% (which was based only on base rates and the outside view) slightly up to 45%, but I see this as more a result of the situation uncertainty rather than an increased confidence that Tunisia might resolve the question positively...
As always, feedback and criticism are most welcome.