Mauricio-Tellez-Sanchez

I am still keeping my updated tracker from two weeks ago–there has been a slight upswing in the price of brent crude oil over the last 2 weeks (around a $5 increase)[https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/future/brn00?countrycode=uk] but previous information shows that such variances are well within the normal range of movement.
Using OPEC data of the average price of brent crude oil over the past 25 years, I am reasonably confident that the price of crude oil is relatively stable and will continue to hover around the $80-$84 price point over the next 8 weeks (https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/40.htm). Recent violent developments in the area (the blockade of the Red Sea, the Gaza war, etc.) have not shown any impact on the price of brent crude, which has slowly reached a 6-month high of $84.

A potential increase in price to above $90 is possible, with OPEC and and energy organizations expecting an increase in oil consumption during the 2024-25 period (https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-prices-edge-higher-opec-demand-estimate-while-cold-hits-us-output-2024-01-18/). These predictions of increased demand could strengthen the value of crude oil past the $90 mark.

Given these trends, a base rate of 70% for the price of crude oil remaining below $90 is highly accurate, as is the 25% base rate for a surge above $90. A sudden surge in price is unlikely, given that crude oil prices have not increased about $100 since 2022, which is why the base rate for any price about %100 is less than 5% (https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/40.htm). I remain convinced of my prediction after my forecast discussion/revision session, especially given the closeness of our predictions.

After consulting with my partner, we both have virtually the same numbers, although they decided to give the last few guesses a 0%, something I wouldn't do.

The United States and Israel stand as the two largest factions who would
1) benefit greatly from a strike on Iranian military facilities and
 2) have the capacity to do so.

The Institute for Science and International Security reports that the threat of Iranian nuclearization is at an all-time high of “Extreme Danger” (https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/the-iran-threat-geiger-counter-reaching-extreme-danger). A nuclear Iran would end decades of US hegemony as the major nuclear-armed military force in the Middle East, and force America and her allies to negotiate with the Republic on much more favorable terms. Furthermore, Iran’s increased campaign of probing attacks on Western defenses in the Middle East showcase a rising Iranian willingness to openly defy its enemies. Targeting Iranian conventional weapons or nuclear weapon producing facilities within Iran would send a strong warning to the Islamic Republic that it’s actions will not go unpunished, going further than the ongoing historic mass strikes on its proxies (https://www.npr.org/2024/02/02/1228132782/us-biden-iran-drone-response-strike)

The US and Israeli have a wide range of options to deter or prevent an Iranian nuclear development/further conventional aggression. Conventional strikes (i.e. drone or missile strikes) have the potential to start an open war, something both sides have said they wish to avoid (https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-iran-war-biden-retaliation-hezbollah-houthis-iraq-syria-rcna136313). Given this, it seems likely that any retaliatory strike would probably be covert, akin to the Stuxnet virus Israeli intelligence devised to thwart Iranian nuclear enrichment programs for years (https://www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/stuxnet). A covert strike would give both nations plausible deniability, ensuring that damage to the regime is maximized while any bad PR fallout is minimized.

The base rate for striking Iran seems to be quite high, around 70% likely. That being said, the covert operation seems like the best approach, a tactic that my partner and I came to the conclusion would be best practice for the IDF/Mossad.
Since our last round of predictions, there have been 2 major incidents that made me shift my certainty from 80% to 70%. These are: the Rafah bombardments and a cooling of US-Iranian tensions. The Rafah bombings last week, when paired with a possible invasion of the area, indicate the IDF is nearing the end of its stated objective of occupying Gaza. Despite worldwide condemnation, it is becoming increasingly likely that the IDF will engage in combat operations within the region (https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/continued-israeli-airstrikes-flatten-parts-of-rafah-amid-slow-progress-for-gaza-cease-fire). This will be a complex, costly operation that might reduce the appetite of Israeli intelligence to engage in weakening operations.
As for the increasing military tensions between Iran and the US, those seemed to have cooled off somewhat over the past two weeks. Insider reports from within the Iranian government seem to show a shift away from antagonizing the US (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-armed-groups-dial-down-us-attacks-request-iran-commander-2024-02-18/). However, the widespread and decentralized nature of Iran’s proxy groups makes them difficult to rein in, so it is likely that we will see attacks against US/allied bases in the Middle East continue in some fashion for the time being.

After consulting with my partner, I think our biggest point of difference is the manner in which such an attack would occur. I think we both acknowledge that is it very likely such an attack would not be covered in the news, especially if it is covert, though we both have changed out opinions slightly over the last week.

Israel is faced with both immense international institutional and public pressure to come to a peace agreement with Hamas.

Israel is nearing the complete destruction of all major infrastructure and Hamas bases within Palestine, while at the same time mounting the largest death rate of any 21st century country according to OxFam (https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/daily-death-rate-gaza-higher-any-other-major-21st-century-conflict-oxfam). The ICJ recently ruled in South Africa v Israel that Israel must ensure it is taking every measue possible to rpevseve civilain life in Palestine as it investigates its potentially geoncidal actions (https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/01/gaza-icj-ruling-offers-hope-protection-civilians-enduring-apocalyptic). Internationally, Israel has seen its largest drop in global support in its history, with only 1 nation (the United States) seeing a small drop in public support, from 18% to 16% (https://time.com/6559293/morning-consult-israel-global-opinion/), meaning even in allied countries Israel’s Gaza War is highly unpopular.
The Israeli government's current position is that it will indefinitely maintain a security hold on Gaza post-war (https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hamas-war-gaza-hospitals-al-shifa-palestinians-rcna124737). This would be incredibly difficult, as nearly 2/3rds of Gazans now support Hamas’ Oct. 7th attack–civilian and Hamas resistance to any Israeli occupation would be intense (https://www.npr.org/2024/02/08/1229749527/in-gaza-anger-grows-at-hamas).

This is why I hold that my base rate of 60% for a ceasefire in Gaza is accurate. It reflects growing pressure from both international institutions and people in the country, and would be an alternative to the immense difficulties of a prolonged occupation of the strip. I did drop down another 4% from my previous estimate, but this is only to account for the potential fallout of Israel's continued bombing of Rafah that just occurred (https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/12/world/middleeast/rafah-bombing-hostage-rescue-gaza.html). In the weeks since our last round of forecasting, a potential invasion of Rafah is becoming more and more likely (https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-788647). Such an action would be incredibly difficult to pull off, and in all likelihood civilian casualties are about to greatly increase. This will make it more difficult to negotiate with Hamas, as inflicting more suffering on the Palestinians left in Gaza will make them more likely to side with the group, not to mention that fact that far-right party members are pushing for settlement expansion in Gaza. After meeting for our week 3 pair, I found that we had similar enough views on the subject that I felt comfortable keeping my base rate.

Israel is faced with both immense international institutional and public pressure to come to a peace agreement with Hamas.

Israel is nearing the complete destruction of all major infrastructure and Hamas bases within Palestine, while at the same time mounting the largest death rate of any 21st century country according to OxFam (https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/daily-death-rate-gaza-higher-any-other-major-21st-century-conflict-oxfam). The ICJ recently ruled in South Africa v Israel that Israel must ensure it is taking every measue possible to rpevseve civilain life in Palestine as it investigates its potentially geoncidal actions (https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/01/gaza-icj-ruling-offers-hope-protection-civilians-enduring-apocalyptic). Internationally, Israel has seen its largest drop in global support in its history, with only 1 nation (the United States) seeing a small drop in public support, from 18% to 16% (https://time.com/6559293/morning-consult-israel-global-opinion/), meaning even in allied countries Israel’s Gaza War is highly unpopular.
The Israeli government's current position is that it will indefinitely maintain a security hold on Gaza post-war (https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hamas-war-gaza-hospitals-al-shifa-palestinians-rcna124737). This would be incredibly difficult, as nearly 2/3rds of Gazans now support Hamas’ Oct. 7th attack–civilian and Hamas resistance to any Israeli occupation would be intense (https://www.npr.org/2024/02/08/1229749527/in-gaza-anger-grows-at-hamas).

This is why I hold that my base rate of 60% for a ceasefire in Gaza is accurate. It reflects growing pressure from both international institutions and people in the country, and would be an alternative to the immense difficulties of a prolonged occupation of the strip. I did drop down another 4% from my previous estimate, but this is only to account for the potential fallout of Israel's continued bombing of Rafah that just occurred (https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/12/world/middleeast/rafah-bombing-hostage-rescue-gaza.html). In the weeks since our last round of forecasting, a potential invasion of Rafah is becoming more and more likely (https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-788647). Such an action would be incredibly difficult to pull off, and in all likelihood civilian casualties are about to greatly increase. This will make it more difficult to negotiate with Hamas, as inflicting more suffering on the Palestians left in Gaza will make them more likely to side with the group, not to mention that fact that far-right party members are pushing for settlement expansion in Gaza.

The United States and Israel stand as the two largest factions who would
1) benefit greatly from a strike on Iranian military facilities and
 2) have the capacity to do so.

The Institute for Science and International Security reports that the threat of Iranian nuclearization is at an all-time high of “Extreme Danger” (https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/the-iran-threat-geiger-counter-reaching-extreme-danger). A nuclear Iran would end decades of US hegemony as the major nuclear-armed military force in the Middle East, and force America and her allies to negotiate with the Republic on much more favorable terms. Furthermore, Iran’s increased campaign of probing attacks on Western defenses in the Middle East showcase a rising Iranian willingness to openly defy its enemies. Targeting Iranian conventional weapons or nuclear weapon producing facilities within Iran would send a strong warning to the Islamic Republic that it’s actions will not go unpunished, going further than the ongoing historic mass strikes on its proxies (https://www.npr.org/2024/02/02/1228132782/us-biden-iran-drone-response-strike)

The US and Israeli have a wide range of options to deter or prevent an Iranian nuclear development/further conventional aggression. Conventional strikes (i.e. drone or missile strikes) have the potential to start an open war, something both sides have said they wish to avoid (https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-iran-war-biden-retaliation-hezbollah-houthis-iraq-syria-rcna136313). Given this, it seems likely that any retaliatory strike would probably be covert, akin to the Stuxnet virus Israeli intelligence devised to thwart Iranian nuclear enrichment programs for years (https://www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/stuxnet). A covert strike would give both nations plausible deniability, ensuring that damage to the regime is maximized while any bad PR fallout is minimized.

The base rate for striking Iran seems to be quite high, around 70% likely. That being said, the covert operation seems like the best approach, a tactic that my partner and I came to the conclusion would be best practice for the IDF/Mossad.
Since our last round of predictions, there have been 2 major incidents that made me shift my certainty from 80% to 70%. These are: the Rafah bombardments and a cooling of US-Iranian tensions. The Rafah bombings last week, when paired with a possible invasion of the area, indicate the IDF is nearing the end of its stated objective of occupying Gaza. Despite worldwide condemnation, it is becoming increasingly likely that the IDF will engage in combat operations within the region (https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/continued-israeli-airstrikes-flatten-parts-of-rafah-amid-slow-progress-for-gaza-cease-fire). This will be a complex, costly operation that might reduce the appetite of Israeli intelligence to engage in weakening operations.
As for the increasing military tensions between Iran and the US, those seemed to have cooled off somewhat over the past two weeks. Insider reports from within the Iranian government seem to show a shift away from antagonizing the US (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-armed-groups-dial-down-us-attacks-request-iran-commander-2024-02-18/). However, the widespread and decentralized nature of Iran’s proxy groups makes them difficult to rein in, so it is likely that we will see attacks against US/allied bases in the Middle East continue in some fashion for the time being.

I am still keeping my updated tracker from two weeks ago–there has been a slight upswing in the price of brent crude oil over the last 2 weeks (around a $5 increase)[https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/future/brn00?countrycode=uk] but previous information shows that such variances are well within the normal range of movement.
Using OPEC data of the average price of brent crude oil over the past 25 years, I am reasonably confident that the price of crude oil is relatively stable and will continue to hover around the $80-$84 price point over the next 8 weeks (https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/40.htm). Recent violent developments in the area (the blockade of the Red Sea, the Gaza war, etc.) have not shown any impact on the price of brent crude, which has slowly reached a 6-month high of $84.

A potential increase in price to above $90 is possible, with OPEC and and energy organizations expecting an increase in oil consumption during the 2024-25 period (https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-prices-edge-higher-opec-demand-estimate-while-cold-hits-us-output-2024-01-18/). These predictions of increased demand could strengthen the value of crude oil past the $90 mark.

Given these trends, a base rate of 70% for the price of crude oil remaining below $90 is highly accurate, as is the 25% base rate for a surge above $90. A sudden surge in price is unlikely, given that crude oil prices have not increased about $100 since 2022, which is why the base rate for any price about %100 is less than 5% (https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/40.htm). I remain convinced of my prediction after my forecast discussion/revision session, especially given the closeness of our predictions.

Using OPEC data of the average price of brent crude oil over the past 25 years, I am reasonably confident that the price of crude oil is relatively stable and will continue to hover around the $80-$84 price point over the next 8 weeks (https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/40.htm). Recent violent developments in the area (the blockade of the Red Sea, the Gaza war, etc.) have not shown any impact on the price of brent crude, which has slowly reached a 6-month high of $84.

A potential increase in price to above $90 is possible, with OPEC and and energy organizations expecting an increase in oil consumption during the 2024-25 period (https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-prices-edge-higher-opec-demand-estimate-while-cold-hits-us-output-2024-01-18/). These predictions of increased demand could strengthen the value of crude oil past the $90 mark.

Given these trends, a base rate of 70% for the price of crude oil remaining below $90 is highly accurate, as is the 25% base rate for a surge above $90. A sudden surge in price is unlikely, given that crude oil prices have not increased about $100 since 2022, which is why the base rate for any price about %100 is less than 5% (https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/40.htm). I remain convinced of my prediction after my forecast discussion/revision session, especially given the closeness of our predictions.

The United States and Israel stand as the two largest factions who would 1) benefit greatly from a strike on Iranian military facilities and 2) have the capacity to do so.

The Institute for Science and International Security reports that the threat of Iranian nuclearization is at an all-time high of “Extreme Danger” (https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/the-iran-threat-geiger-counter-reaching-extreme-danger). A nuclear Iran would end decades of US hegemony as the major nuclear-armed military force in the Middle East, and force America and her allies to negotiate with the Republic on much more favorable terms. Furthermore, Iran’s increased campaign of probing attacks on Western defenses in the Middle East showcase a rising Iranian willingness to openly defy its enemies. Targeting Iranian conventional weapons or nuclear weapon producing facilities within Iran would send a strong warning to the Islamic Republic that it’s actions will not go unpunished, going further than the ongoing historic mass strikes on its proxies (https://www.npr.org/2024/02/02/1228132782/us-biden-iran-drone-response-strike)

The US and Israeli have a wide range of options to deter or prevent an Iranian nuclear development/further conventional aggression. Conventional strikes (i.e. drone or missile strikes) have the potential to start an open war, something both sides have said they wish to avoid (https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-iran-war-biden-retaliation-hezbollah-houthis-iraq-syria-rcna136313). Given this, it seems likely that any retaliatory strike would probably be covert, akin to the Stuxnet virus Israeli intelligence devised to thwart Iranian nuclear enrichment programs for years (https://www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/stuxnet). A covert strike would give both nations plausible deniability, ensuring that damage to the regime is maximized while any bad PR fallout is minimized.

The base rate for striking Iran seems to be quite high, around 80% likely. That being said, the covert operation seems like the best approach, a tactic that my partner and I came to the conclusion would be best practice for the IDF/Mossad.