Maxwell-Haseman

Russian elite are meek, and Putin's strength will likely increase in the short-term after this. I truly think he was caught off guard--him and Prigozhin go way back--but this does not necessarily imply a lack of ability to be "on guard" and rapidly increase repression and security measures. He maintained power in the 2000's amidst heavy losses in Chechnya, and he is stronger now than he was then. 23 years in power is a lot longer than the 10 months until May.

Granted, western pundits may be clinging too much to the idea of Putin's power as an absolute truth, because its the only thing that makes sense amidst the seemingly unpredictable political dynamics of the country. But I think that Russian society is committed to that same idea itself, and for largely the same reasons.

I don't believe that Prigozhin had any more idea of how his mini-coup would play out than the rest of us watching on our phones. If this event showed us anything, it's that even the Russian elite do not have a firm understanding of the political dynamics of the country, which adds greater risk and uncertainty to attempts to usurp Putin. 

"The truth is, these are not very bright guys, and things got out of hand."--The President's Men

Other forecasts are overestimating the degree to which the activities of Russian federal agencies are related (ie, the mission will not be significantly impacted by the war in Ukraine or perceived domestic instability). Previous delays in the mission were likely due to an increased concern over potential failure rather than an increase in troubles with the actual technology, as the international embarrassment they would have experienced would have been magnified in the case of a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer (which has not materialized). Additionally, the last time they amended a specific date for the launch, they did so more than a month and a half in advance (the closer to the date of the launch you amend it, the greater the international embarrassment). In comparison, the date of this launch was announced just two months beforehand, so amending it now would mean a brand new, unexpected error in final preparations, as it would not follow their past patterns of "planned" amendments to the launch date. 

Given the extensive history of failures of Russian space missions over the last three decades, one might expect that Russia would understand that the consequences of failure in terms of cost to international reputation outweigh the chances of the mission's success.

Yet just as Russia's ignorant sense of pride led them to invade Ukraine, so to will it allow for the launch. 

40% chance of launch, 60% chance of success = 24%

In the initial months after the full-scale invasion, Ukraine regained only 5% (from 22% to 17%) of its land. In reality, it was more like 3% due to Ukrainian counteroffensive, as Russia only ever had any real control over 20% of the territory. So given that this gain of 3% occurred with Russian troops extremely disorganized and not dug-in to defensive positions, it's difficult to imagine that they exceed this in a similar time frame this summer and fall. However, of the three centers of Ukrainian counter-offensive operations, success in Vremivka is by far the most likely. If this occurs, Ukraine could cut off supply lines to the entire southern occupation, theoretically allowing them to regain a full 6.3% of their territory. This is the most likely scenario for regaining more than 5% of territory, but that being said, it is still not that likely. However, I don't believe that Ukraine has fully begun their full-scale counteroffensive yet, so I am not particularly discouraged by current lack of progress.