ScottEastman

Kharkiv: Russia and Ukraine are making only minimal gains against each other in Russia's Kursk oblast where Ukraine controls ~1300 square kilometers. We are transitioning into the rainy season where progresses will become even more difficult. Ukraine has had time to bolster its defenses on the border near Kharkiv. Russia can attack it from a distance with missiles and drones, but there is no sense to make a land attack against a city of significantly more than a million (1.4 million pre-war) in the winter. 

Kyiv is too far away and not within the realm of reason in this time period. The initial attempts by Russia to take it in the beginning of the major war failed. Now Ukraine's defenses are well established and Russia doesn't have the ability to successfully send paratroopers or another mass column without getting annihilated. 

Odesa: Russia would first need to pass Mykolaiv, a city with a pre-invasion population of nearly 500 thousand, and then continue another ~130km on a road with multiple bridges. Russia does not have a navy that can operate near Odesa without getting destroyed. 

Evan a potential Trump victory with the possibility of him announcing a withdrawal of support for Ukraine will convince Ukraine to give up these cities. 

I agree with the comments posted by @DKC regarding why Iran won't let the IAEA in for inspections. This will be exacerbated by the upcoming Israeli ground invasion of Lebanon. 

Increasing slightly from 4 to 5% due to the recent Israeli attacks against Hezbollah (pagers, 2 -way radios, Nasrallah...), Hamas leader in Lebanon Fateh Sherif Abu el-Amin, and air strike against the Houthis in Yemen. Hezbollah is in disarray having lost much of their leadership and absorbing regular strikes on their missiles, rockets, and drone capacity. 
Iran Gen. Abbas Nilforushan was killed during the strike on Nasrallah. The strike on Nasrallah and Nilforushan used multiple time delayed deep penetrating (bunker buster) bombs to reach them deep underground in an urban area. It showed both ability and will. The strike against the Houthis that occurred in the last 24 hours was conducted by Israeli low observable F35 stealth multirole combat aircraft that were aerial refuelled during the operation. It is notable that the Israelis included a CNN reporter in an aerial refuelling plane during the operation. Both the deep penetration attacks and long range attack (similar distance from Israel to Tehran or the Fordow nuclear fuel enrichment facility, send a clear message. Iran may want and even need to respond, but a declaration of war gives the green light for Israel to attack Iran at will and with a clear justification. Neither side can occupy the other and Israel has a vastly superior air capability, so what is the gain for Iran to declare war, other than rallying the domestic population and appearing to be strong and resolute? 

This is unlikely to occur (president elected) but like @Rene and @MrLittleTexas I agree that the escalation by Israel introduces enough uncertainty to make a near zero forecast less sure. Though unlikely, a war could be relatively short, and in the aftermath, an attempt to unify the country and tackle rebuilding may help push the parliament to move on electing a president. The procedure is relatively simple in that the president is elected upon receiving a 2/3 vote in the first round or a simple majority in the second or subsequent rounds. If the will exists, it is not a lengthy process. 

Iran may surpass 90%, but if they did, why would they permit the IAEA to discover it? If Iran had not already perfected all steps necessary to make a nuclear bomb, they would be inviting an immediate attack from Israel and possibly the US. Russia may have an increased need for strengthening the alliance with Iran after the recent successful Ukrainian drone attack on the arsenal in Tver, which was recorded as a 2.8 seismic event. This will increase the need for more ammunition and from Iran, North Korea, and other willing countries. This could change Russia's calculations about how much to help Iran's nuclear program but is unlikely to encourage Iran to tell all to the IAEA. 

Confirmed previous forecast

Dropping from 3 to 2 in light of the pager and two-way radio attacks against Hezbollah and what appears to be an escalation towards major war in Lebanon. I am staying above the crowd at 1% because this question only needs the acknowledgement of talks for it to close. I think that Trump has considerably less than a 50% chance of winning, but if he does and Netanyahu is still in power and the conflicts/wars with Hamas and Hezbollah have subsided, the beginning of talks are not inconceivable by March of 2025. 

Russia increasingly needs air defense not just near the frontlines in Ukraine, but also much deeper within Russia, as Ukraine has repeatedly struck targets even beyond Moscow. There is still a debate about permission for Ukraine to use StormShadow/SCALP long range cruise missiles, and possibly longer range ATACMS into Russia. There are rumors that permission will be given but the  end of September. This would increase the number of regions that Russia would need to try to protect. There is video of a Storm Shadow flying undetected over an S300 or S400 system on the way to strike the Balbek airbase, but also video showing a downed Storm Shadow. Both videos have a propaganda element to them, but indicate that the S400 is not perfect but may reduce the number of missiles and drones that reach their targets. 

If Israel and/or the US decide to attack facilities in Iran, they are likely to use 5th generation low observable planes and missiles that that would likely outmatch the capabilities of the S400 and possibly the S500, as well as the Su-35. If they proved the Russian systems to be ineffective, it would further damage Russian arms sales. There is also the possibility that a system or plane would manage to shoot down a Western plane or missile, like happened with the F117 in Serbia. Even though it was just one plane, it was a propaganda coup that is used to this day. 

Reuters reported "Militant group Hezbollah promised to retaliate against Israel after accusing it of detonating pagers across Lebanon on Tuesday, killing at least eight people and wounding nearly 3,000 others who included fighters and Iran's envoy to Beirut." This will lead to a large expansion of the war with Hezbollah. Though Hamas is a separate entity with the same sponsor, this will not aid in setting conditions for a cease fire in <2.5 months. There is pressure on the Israeli government to release the hostages, but a pause in the conflict with Hamas when war is escalating with Hezbollah, would be seen as Hamas aiding Israel in their efforts in the North. Netanyahu is a fan of Trump and not of Democrats, regardless of his protestations. An escalating conflict denies Biden, and therefore Harris, the ability to use the conflict as a political tool to show positive results for their diplomatic efforts. 

Dropping from 1% to zero based the intransigence by both Israel and Hamas at reaching a ceasefire in Gaza, but also due to the attack today against Hezbollah by exploding pagers that appears to have injured at least 2,750 people according to Lebanon's health ministry. This is a sign of Israel expanding their operations. 

Last night Israel expended their goals against Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon to allow the return of the residents of Northern Israel to their homes. This is unlikely to be accomplished without a large-scale  ground attack into Lebanon. While these operations continue, there will be no possibility of normalizing diplomatic relations. Even after major hostilities cease, diplomacy will take time.