ScottEastman

Staying at 0 (<0.5%). Israel did not strike an enrichment facility but did strike Parchin, which is/was part of the Iranian nuclear weapons design program. Khamenei has vowed retaliation. Even if the retaliation is through proxies, weak, or not in the immediate future, this is not a time where the Iranian leadership can domestically afford to be seen submitting to international authority. There are no credible peace talks in the works that would require Iran to submit to inspections as part of a grand bargain.

Iran is "threatening a crushing response" to Israel's latest direct attack but appears to be considering  proxies. Iran's S300 air defense radars have been destroyed, as well as significant damage to its ballistic missile production capabilities. Israel also struck Parchin, a site that was not enriching uranium, but that was/is part of nuclear weapons development. If Iran declares war on Israel, it will be a war that they can't win. How would Iran define victory? Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis are already in a state of war with Israel, but at least Hamas and Hezbollah are extremely degraded. Declaring war would give Israel the green light for sustained and more debilitating attacks against Iran. 

I don't know whether Iran would rather have a more moderate Harris administration, or a return to a belligerent Trump administration, which would provide a clear enemy, but we are past the point where Iran's moves will impact the US election. A war would likely impact shipping in the Persian Gulf and drive up the cost of oil, but has lost some of its political relevance post-US election. 

President Pezeshkian has made somewhat conciliatory statements towards the West despite the continuing aid and direction of Iran's proxies against the Israel. Though Khamenei is the Supreme Leader, allowing Pezeshkian to run, win, and make moderate statements, is a shift in policy. A declaration of war would be a way to rally the country at the cost of devastating an already weak economy and dwindling proxy power, for little chance of gain. 

Iran is already in a weakened state, and that is likely to get worse with tit for tat attacks with Israel, but its neighbors are unlikely to seize the opportunity to attack Iran while it is down. Their is a Kurdish separatist movement in Northern Iran and throughout the region including Iraq, Turkey, and Syria, but since the Kurds are not a nation state, a conflict with them would not count as a war with another country. Balochistan in Pakistan which borders Iran, also has a separatist movement, but will not result in a declaration of war with Iran. 

Israel and/or the US are unlikely to gain from an official declaration of war against Iran unless they are committed to toppling the leadership. Iran is too big, too far, too populous and relatively homogenous for Israel to conquer and administer it. 

**I understand that we all view questions from different perspectives and the "correct" probability is not possible to know, but forecasts at or near 100% should give great pause, considering the base rate for actual declarations of war and the impossibility, at least between Israel and Iran of fully conquering or even invading the other. 

Decreasing for the passage of time, and continuing tensions between China, the US, Taiwan, and the Philippines. 

Israel has destroyed the radar systems of the existing S-series missile systems in Iran, with no losses to Israeli aircraft. This is extremely bad marketing for Russia and leaves Iran blind. Why would Russia want to send their latest systems to Iran and have them also destroyed? Why would Iran want to pay the money for them, knowing they can be destroyed at will, even without direct US intervention? I have similar views regarding the Su-35. Technologically Israel and the US are not near peers. Iran does not face credible security threats from its neighbors Iraq, Armenia, Azerbaijan, or Turkmenistan. Pakistan and Turkey have strong militaries but are unlikely to attack Iran. In January Pakistan and Iran had a border skirmish (Baloch separatists), but is resolved quickly. 

The US is once again pushing for a ceasefire after the death of Hamas leader Sinwar, but neither Netanyahu nor Hamas wants to stop now. The terms that each side is asking for as a preconditions are unrealistic.  the US can't/won't put enough pressure on Israel to force a ceasefire and Hamas is unwilling to release the remaining hostages and admit how many are already dead. 

No chance between now and the end of the year with the operation/wars continuing against Hamas and Hezbollah. Even with the deaths of Nasrallah and Sinwar, none of the sides are willing to stop in the near future. none of the countries listed in this question will recognize Israeli statehood as long as active military operation against Palestinians are ongoing. 

Israel is likely to attack Iran very soon. Even if the attack is limited to military targets, Iran is likely to respond. Israel's attack is likely to be much larger than their April 19, 2024 attack against Iranian defensive radars in Isfahan. That attack was considered by many in Israel to not be a robust enough response and deterrent to the previous Iranian missile attack on Israel. The October 1st Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel was more wide spread and will result in a much more forceful response. Supposedly the US has persuaded Netanyahu to limit the response to Iranian military sites and avoid nuclear development sites and oil/gas infrastructure. Even with these caveats, a kinetic Iranian response is likely and I don't see any signs of Iran changing their policy. If the the escalatory cycle is increased, Israel and even the US with B2s may hit Iranian enrichment facilities, but this is not going to lead to the IAEA reporting a reduction in uranium enrichment percentage. 

Even if Trump becomes president, his ties to SA and Israel will not lead to normalization in such a short period of time. It is polyannish to believe that the death of Sinwar will lead to a quick peace in Gaza. The invasion of Southern Lebanon is not likely to end soon. With ongoing conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, and to a lesser degree in the West Bank, the conditions for normalization don't exist.