kms522

I am continuing to maintain my prediction of 2%, though there have been some developments of NATO support to Ukraine in the media (Zelenskiy and Italian prime minister held a conference about security cooperation and a visit to Kyiv from the US House of Reps Committee on Foreign Affairs), there has not been any sign of direct response to this in the form of any increased aggression from Russia.

Old:

Inside view: Discussion with classmates brought the new consideration to mind that the number 25 indicates a deliberate attack, which would require a direct NATO/Russia violent conflict, which both countries want to avoid (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm). However, discussion of weapons sales and Ukraine EU membership are continuing to build, which could motivate Russia to become more aggressive, resulting in deliberate attack on NATO troops in NATO territory. For this reason, I am giving a baseline of 2% likelihood of a deliberate attack in NATO territory (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/19/a-whole-new-level-of-war-if-nato-arms-ukraine-russia-warns).

It is as low as 2% because, as of today, there have only been 2 deaths in NATO territories due to the War in Ukraine, which was later attributed to Ukrainian air-defense missiles. Therefore, to date there has not been any fatalities involving Russian security forces. The current level of military aggression/offensive operation of Russia in Ukraine has not been significantly escalating, therefore it is unlikely that a number as high as 25 deaths would occur in the next 60 days.

In addition to my previous justifications, I would like to add a new outside view. According to the book "Boston Riots", poverty, unemployment, and poor living conditions are also main causes of riots and protests. I was previously only looking at it from a political view. Sandeep also brought a similar point up in class. However, Russia has been able to avoid the worst of the predicted economic impact of UN sanctions, and their economy has not contracted as much as expected (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russias-2022-economic-anomaly). That being the case, I am still confident in my prediction that there is only 3% likelihood of more than 400 riots or protests occuring.

Old:

Inside view: it is unlikely that protests will spike over the current historical peak of 203 within the given timeframe because we see that protests in the months after April 2022 were significantly lower. The second highest month, Sept, still only saw 141 protests and riots, but most months were much lower with the lowest month, Dec, only seeing 17 protests.

According to the same data set with a slightly adjusted timeframe, Russia has had a total of 438 events from March 2022 to today. These totals further support that it is unlikely that a single month will have over 400 protest events.

Another reason we will likely not see a spike in protest events over 400 is the protest suppression employee by Russian security forces. Protests have been declining on average (non-linear) since April 1 2022 and will likely continue to do so (https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-mobilization-protests-arrests/6757592.html)

Another reason we will likely not see a spike over 400 is that there are less Russians - migration out of Russia, especially since Putin's announcement of mobilization, has increased. Numbers as high as 700,000 fleeing the country have been reported (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/where-have-russians-been-fleeing-since-mobilisation-began-2022-10-06/).With that being said, some of the most vocal opponents of the war who may take up their pickets to protest are no longer in the country.

Outside view: a team mate did suggest that I look outside of Russia for trends on large-scale rioting, specifically in Autocratic countries. The impact of the COVID zero-tolerance policy riots in China are examples of this happening recently. Iran also saw public outrage against government policies which resulted in 3 straight months (sept - nov) of more that 400 protests and riot events. Even though these numbers don't take into account the ratio of populations, it shows that these events can happen on an unprecedented large scale, even in countries that have harsh repercussions for protests/riots.

A classmate also brought up the impact of the year anniversary. It could be the case that large scale protests and riots are ignited at the year anniversary, which may see a spike in riots, possibly over the current highest month. For this reason I have subtracted 3% from my base rate and added it to the 400-600 events category.

I have lowered my rate to 4% (+1%) based on a new article I found that said that Putin's lowest approval rating was 61% (linked below), this would make it only an 11% drop in his most recent historical low and the previous 20% I was factoring in previously, so I have gone up to 4% probability.  

Inside view: Due to the fact that Putin's approval rating has not dropped below 50% since 1999 (https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/) my base rate is 0%.

According to this statista data, Putin's current approval rating is 80%. The lowest it has gone down during the war in September 2022 at 77% according to a Newsweek article - https://www.newsweek.com/putin-approval-ratings-suffer-first-fall-since-start-ukraine-war-russia-1747743. But I did find an article that mentioned an approval rate as low as 61% in summer 2021 (https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/vladimir-putin-home). Therefore, Putin's approval rating continuing to drop as domestic situation in Russia becomes more strained would be possible. For this reason, I have added 2% probability to my baseline of 0% due to the history of his approval rate dropping in response to a negative stimulus.

The risk of an approval drop could increase if the war is lost in Ukraine, but Putin has never lost a military engagement, so the likelihood of his loss is low in terms of historical data, which means the likelihood of a dramatic drop in approval rating due to a defeat is low. (https://www.newsweek.com/2022/03/11/putin-has-never-lost-war-here-how-hell-win-ukraine-1682878.html).

In conclusion for the inside view, the approval rating is not in a linear decline because of the war (though it did see some decline), and a month is a short timeframe for approval to fall 30% (from the current 80% to 50%).

Outside view: It is still only a 3% probability because I am considering that the war is unlikely to end in the next months, and wartime approval rating of country leaders tend to trend upward (https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2020/jan/04/trump-iran-suleimani-president-approval-ratings).

It has also been seen by other wealthy, populous countries in the world that the approval rating of a leader dips below 50%, for example many US presidents historically. However, this is not necessarily a transferable situation to Russia today so I am not giving it much weight in my prediction.

I have not changed my forecasted percentage this week, and I am focusing on thinking outside of my confirmation bias so I am purposefully not adding to this category to challenge myself. 

Old: I have lowered my forecast probability (-2%) due to gaining further insight on the significance of each percentage. This 3% percentage confidence is standardized with my other 3% confidence levels in other forecasts.

Inside view: Due to the fact that Putin's approval rating has not dropped below 50% since 1999 (https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/) my base rate is 0%.

According to this statista data, Putin's current approval rating is 80%. The lowest it has gone down during the war in September 2022 at 77% according to a Newsweek article - https://www.newsweek.com/putin-approval-ratings-suffer-first-fall-since-start-ukraine-war-russia-1747743. Therefore, Putin's approval rating continuing to drop as domestic situation in Russia becomes more strained would be possible. For this reason, I have added 3% probability to my baseline of 0% due to the history of his approval rate dropping in response to a negative stimulus.

The risk of an approval drop could increase if the war is lost in Ukraine, but Putin has never lost a military engagement, so the likelihood of his loss is low in terms of historical data, which means the likelihood of a dramatic drop in approval rating due to a defeat is low. (https://www.newsweek.com/2022/03/11/putin-has-never-lost-war-here-how-hell-win-ukraine-1682878.html).

In conclusion for the inside view, the approval rating is not in a linear decline because of the war (though it did see some decline), and a month is a short timeframe for approval to fall 30% (from the current 80% to 50%).

Outside view: It is still only a 3% probability because I am considering that the war is unlikely to end in the next months, and wartime approval rating of country leaders tend to trend upward (https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2020/jan/04/trump-iran-suleimani-president-approval-ratings).

It has also been seen by other wealthy, populous countries in the world that the approval rating of a leader dips below 50%, for example many US presidents historically. However, this is not necessarily a transferable situation to Russia today so I am not giving it much weight in my prediction.

I am continuing to maintain my prediction of 2%, though there have been some developments of NATO support to Ukraine in the media (Zelenskiy and Italian prime minister held a conference about security cooperation and a visit to Kyiv from the US House of Reps Committee on Foreign Affairs), there has not been any sign of direct response to this in the form of any increased aggression from Russia. 

Old:

Inside view: Discussion with classmates brought the new consideration to mind that the number 25 indicates a deliberate attack, which would require a direct NATO/Russia violent conflict, which both countries want to avoid (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm). However, discussion of weapons sales and Ukraine EU membership are continuing to build, which could motivate Russia to become more aggressive, resulting in deliberate attack on NATO troops in NATO territory. For this reason, I am giving a baseline of 2% likelihood of a deliberate attack in NATO territory (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/19/a-whole-new-level-of-war-if-nato-arms-ukraine-russia-warns).

It is as low as 2% because, as of today, there have only been 2 deaths in NATO territories due to the War in Ukraine, which was later attributed to Ukrainian air-defense missiles. Therefore, to date there has not been any fatalities involving Russian security forces. The current level of military aggression/offensive operation of Russia in Ukraine has not been significantly escalating, therefore it is unlikely that a number as high as 25 deaths would occur in the next 60 days.

In addition to my previous justifications, I would like to add a new outside view. According to the book "Boston Riots", poverty, unemployment, and poor living conditions are also main causes of riots and protests. I was previously only looking at it from a political view. Sandeep also brought a similar point up in class. However, Russia has been able to avoid the worst of the predicted economic impact of UN sanctions, and their economy has not contracted as much as expected (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russias-2022-economic-anomaly). That being the case, I am still confident in my prediction that there is only 3% likelihood of more than 400 riots or protests occuring. 

Old:

Inside view: it is unlikely that protests will spike over the current historical peak of 203 within the given timeframe because we see that protests in the months after April 2022 were significantly lower. The second highest month, Sept, still only saw 141 protests and riots, but most months were much lower with the lowest month, Dec, only seeing 17 protests.

According to the same data set with a slightly adjusted timeframe, Russia has had a total of 438 events from March 2022 to today. These totals further support that it is unlikely that a single month will have over 400 protest events.

Another reason we will likely not see a spike in protest events over 400 is the protest suppression employee by Russian security forces. Protests have been declining on average (non-linear) since April 1 2022 and will likely continue to do so (https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-mobilization-protests-arrests/6757592.html)

Another reason we will likely not see a spike over 400 is that there are less Russians - migration out of Russia, especially since Putin's announcement of mobilization, has increased. Numbers as high as 700,000 fleeing the country have been reported (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/where-have-russians-been-fleeing-since-mobilisation-began-2022-10-06/).With that being said, some of the most vocal opponents of the war who may take up their pickets to protest are no longer in the country.

Outside view: a team mate did suggest that I look outside of Russia for trends on large-scale rioting, specifically in Autocratic countries. The impact of the COVID zero-tolerance policy riots in China are examples of this happening recently. Iran also saw public outrage against government policies which resulted in 3 straight months (sept - nov) of more that 400 protests and riot events. Even though these numbers don't take into account the ratio of populations, it shows that these events can happen on an unprecedented large scale, even in countries that have harsh repercussions for protests/riots.

A classmate also brought up the impact of the year anniversary. It could be the case that large scale protests and riots are ignited at the year anniversary, which may see a spike in riots, possibly over the current highest month. For this reason I have subtracted 3% from my base rate and added it to the 400-600 events category.