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Forecast updated to account for team discussion:

I am sticking with my forecast here after discussing the question once again with my group. There remains only a remote chance of this event occurring as discussed in my original forecast this week and in prior weeks. Priya also drew our attention to a recent report that showed that many of the people who have remained in Russia since the outbreak of the war actually approve of the war, thus reinforcing the notion that public polls are unlikely to show Putin's approval rating dropping below 50% in the next month. Jay also noted that he had found research showing that few world leaders have experienced a drop in their approval ratings as significant as Putin would need to experience, reinforcing the unlikelihood of this event from an outside view perspective.

Forecast updated to account for team discussion:

I am modifying my forecasting up extremely slightly after discussing this question with my peers and taking into account the events of the past week. This is because we discussed additional reasons that this event remains extremely unlikely. Most notable among these was President Biden's visit to Ukraine, which demonstrated resolve from the US and NATO and likely served as a deterrent to Russian aggression against NATO—at least through 1 April 2023. I am modifying my forecast up two percentage points because I believe I overcorrected week-over-week, but this event still remains very unlikely in my view.

Forecast updated to account for team discussion:

After discussing this question with my group, I am keeping my forecast as is. Our discussion largely focused on additional reasons for which the protest environment in Russia is even more challenged today that it has been in the past. Specifically, there were more developments from the past week that reinforce the likelihood that the high-water mark for protests/riots will be between 200 and 400. For instance, there have been reports that the US and other G7 countries are considering a new package of sanctions against Russia. However, given the fact that much of Russian society appears to direct anger at the international community over sanctions rather than at its own political leadership, it is unlikely that these sanctions will lead to an explosion of new protests.

I am keeping my forecast at the same level as last week because I believe it is even more unlikely now that Putin's approval rating drops below 50% in the next month. The main reason is the news that China is considering providing military aid to Russia (as discussed for the question on fatalities in a NATO member state). If China does indeed provide military aid to Russia, then Russia is more likely to perform better in its military objectives against Ukraine, which would in turn put Russia in a better position and put upward pressure on Putin's approval rating domestically. 

I am adjusting my forecast down somewhat given the recent statements from US officials in the past week that China is seriously considering providing lethal aid to Russia. If this were to occur, it would likely mean that Russia would have access to more, better military hardware, potentially including precision-guided missiles, thereby making it less likely that Russia accidentally misses a target in Ukraine and hits a NATO member state killing 25 or more people. It would also mean that Russia would be less likely to escalate the war and take any action that would bring in NATO, as it would be better situated to prolong the war to its advantage. Even if China does not provide Russia with military aid, however, this outcome remains very unlikely for the reasons discussed in prior week.

Taking into account developments from the past week, I am adjusting my forecast slightly to increase the probability of the highest number of ACLED recorded protests/riots will be more than or equal to 200 but less than 400. The main reason is the degree of repression that Putin has overseen since the start of the war, which was recently described in detail in this piece in the Financial Times. This piece makes clear just how difficult it is to express disapproval of the government publicly. Additionally, it also appears likely that Putin will be more aggressive about cracking down on dissent as we approach the anniversary of the start of the war. These factors, together with the other reasons I've described in past weeks, lead me to believe that there is only a remote chance that the number of protests/riots exceeds 400 before 1 April 2023. 

Forecast updated to account for team discussion:

I am sticking with my forecast here after discussing the question with my teammate. I believe there is only a remote chance of this event occurring for all the reasons I laid out in my initial forecast, particularly the West's inability to penetrate the Russian media and information environment. My teammate also noted that past trends indicate that Putin's approval rating tends to rise when Russia launches a military offensive, as NATO has recently noted is occurring. The only reason I am not forecasting a lower probability (at 0%) is given best practices around estimations.

Forecast updated to account for team discussion:

I am revising my forecast up slightly after discussing with my teammate. We both anticipated that this event would be very unlikely to occur. My teammate made the point, however, that key allies of Putin, such as in Chechnya, have called on Putin to invade Poland, ratcheting up tensions. Additionally, he noted that media reports indicate that Russia is running out of precision-guided missiles, meaning that Russia is turning to less precise missiles, which could accidentally fly into NATO territory. Therefore, there is a small but not insignificant chance that this event could occur.

Forecast updated to account for team discussion:

After conversing with my teammate, I am revising my original forecast slightly. We discussed and agreed that the 203 ACLED recorded protests/riots in April 2022 would continue to be the high-water mark for this statistic through 1 April 2023. We were largely in agreement in our justifications for this conclusion, especially taking into consideration events from the past week. One supporting piece of evidence that we discussed was the fact that the number of protests/riots in the ACLED database for the month of February 2023 so far was in the single digits, suggesting that there was very little chance the calendar month record would exceed the 203 protests/riots recorded in April 2022.

Updated forecast taking into account events of past week:

Outside view: Putin's approval rating has not dropped below 50% since 1999, according to polling data from Statista and Levanda (an independent Russian independent, nongovernmental polling and sociological research organization). Additionally, although it dropped slightly after the announcement of mandatory military conscription in Russia, it has recovered in recent weeks and stands at 82% as of the end of January 2023.

Inside view: As discussed last week, there are many other reasons that Putin's approval rating is very unlikely to drop below 50%: many people who oppose the war have fled Russia, the state continues to control the information environment, and people don't have the ability to publicly express their disapproval. On top of these reasons, reporting in the past week shows that the West is struggling to penetrate the information space in Russia, providing further indication that Putin's approval rating is unlikely to drop.