VidurKapur

The UN is still making an effort to bring a ceasefire to Yemen, but the Special Envoy is not saying anything concrete (he is merely expressing his wishes). Confirming my forecast.

A couple of weeks ago, there were some rumours that Putin was in poor health (and even that he had suffered a cardiac arrest) because of a visit to the hospital, but it seems like speculation and the sources aren't very credible. Confirming my forecast.

Six months from now takes us to May 4, 2025. That's around three and a half months into the new President's term. I'm increasing my forecast that this happens by a percentage point due to the passage of time. If Trump wins, you can imagine that he'll try to quickly broker a ceasefire deal in the Middle East and get his friends in Saudi Arabia together with his friends in Israel. However, there are some fundamental hurdles that might still need to be overcome (whether it's the status of Hamas in Gaza or something of a roadmap for a Palestinian state as a precondition for resuming the process), so it's not all about personal relationships.

Updating my forecast upward due to Nvidia's market cap closing in on Apple's. But it still seems unlikely that, on this particular day, Nvidia will be the world's most valuable company.

As with the previous iteration of this question, there doesn't seem to be much of an "election effect" - the October 2020 to September 2021 period (in which the last election was held) had fewer recorded German language disinformation cases than the October 2021 to September 2022 period. I suppose you could argue that there were slightly more in the latter period due to the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war.

A base rate analysis isn't going to be too helpful because we only have four years' worth of data, but it would suggest that we should assign a 25% probability to each of the first four bins and then 0% to the last bin.

However, I think the probability that there are fewer than 60 disinformation cases is a bit lower than 25%, because we've already had 4 so far (extrapolating from this would take us to just over 48  cases for the entire year, and there may be a reporting lag, as @PeterStamp says), and I still assign some weight to the possibility that there will be a spike in cases due to the German election in 2025, especially as the Russia-aligned AfD are currently polling in second place so have a real shot of doing exceptionally well.

Overall, my confidence intervals are fairly wide, and I will continue to update as new data come in.

The latest Politbarometer poll suggests that 65% of Germans think that military support for Ukraine should be maintained or increased, while 31% think that it should be decreased. That's, on net, +34 support for at least maintaining military support.

However, the poll isn't directly comparable to that of the Munich Security Report. And not all who back military support for Ukraine will think Ukraine is an ally, while not all who think it should be scaled back think Ukraine isn't an ally or is even an enemy.

Nevertheless, I am shifting a few percentage points in favour of the net perception being above 20%, in part because I am updating toward others' views too.