VidurKapur

In my previous rationale, I said: "If Trump wins, you can imagine that he'll try to quickly broker a ceasefire deal in the Middle East and get his friends in Saudi Arabia together with his friends in Israel. However, there are some fundamental hurdles that might still need to be overcome (whether it's the status of Hamas in Gaza or something of a roadmap for a Palestinian state as a precondition for resuming the process), so it's not all about personal relationships."

Trump has now won the election, so I'm increasing my forecast by a couple of percentage points (but not by more than that as I thought he was the slight favourite to win in the first place).

There is very little to suggest that this is on the cards, and time is running out. Confirming my forecast.

As of today, there have already been 12 cases of disinformation (the last being on 11 November, though there is probably a reporting lag). Extrapolating out to the rest of the period, this gets us to about 89 cases (and potentially more, accounting for the reporting lag). Significantly updating away from the lowest two bins.

If the Russia-Ukraine war ends by October-November 2025, which seems more likely now that Trump is set to be President, Germans may be slightly less likely to feel the need to say that Ukraine is an ally when asked in a survey. On the other hand, if Trump forces a harsh deal on Ukraine, the percentage of Germans who say that Ukraine is an ally might increase.

Overall, I am confirming my forecast.

Trump's election doesn't change my forecast too drastically as I had priced it in (and the possibility of the war ending in 2025) to some extent. If the war does end, it will more likely than not reduce the perceived threat posed by Russia on net, but Trump's election might make Germans more worried about European security too. 

On the other side of the ledger, the next German federal election is probably going to be held in February 2025 (rather than September 2025, as we were assuming). This might mean that polarization on the Russia-Ukraine war will dissipate somewhat by the time the survey for the 2026 security report is conducted in the autumn of 2025. 

Overall, I am confirming my forecast. 

Increasing my probability estimate that the percentage coming from the Americas region will be more than or equal to 28%, based on the September data.

The victory of the Trump-Vance ticket in the recent Presidential election increases the probability that some NATO countries on the Russian border will be left undefended by the United States. However, Britain and France are nuclear powers that are still committed to NATO, and Trump's election isn't a huge update for me because I thought he was the slight favourite. Confirming my forecast (taking rounding into account).

Confirming my forecast. Trump's election, combined with the appointment of Brian Hook (a foreign policy hawk) to lead the State Department transition team, is (if anything) going to mean that Iran is even more cautious about any leaks. 

With Trump's election, Microsoft might decide that the political risk of keeping the Research Lab open is now too high. However, the Biden-Harris Administration has also been hawkish on China, particularly in the domain of artificial intelligence. With one and a half months left to go, I'm confirming my forecast.

I am substantially reducing my probability estimate that Russia will invade Georgia before 1 April 2027, due to the ruling party's victory in the recent Georgian parliamentary election. The party is likely to further consolidate its power and crack down on the pro-EU opposition, and is increasingly friendly to Russia.

A Russian invasion of Moldova or Armenia seems slightly more likely now due to the victory of the Trump-Vance ticket in the recent US Presidential election. In the worst-case scenario, the defence of Ukraine will completely collapse and Putin will be able to take the entire country, and could then move onto Moldova.