I am slightly reducing based on great feedback from @NukePirate (here) and @geoffodlum (feedback in team discussion + his forecast here). I created a judgmental poll to learn more how our team reads the situation.
To do that I collected some statements from my own forecast and other comments - would you like to share how likely do you think they are true? Here is my judgmental poll as a google form:
https://forms.gle/RGEmDAmBxVet8xE46
If you don't have a clue about one of them, you can skip the question - only the one about one's current forecast is set as required to answer.
Results will be visible here: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1WtzZ58z-Fb8OBOJidJDJpSngIyYgy5sAt_CnbrIHg44/edit?usp=sharing
Here is my list of statements to be assessed (they are not necessary my own views):
The kiloton-to-kilogram efficiency of North Korea’s nuclear warheads is likely comparable to US weapons developed in the 1960s and 1970s (0.1-3 kt/kg)
Russian expertise is enhancing North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, including yield and design improvements.
New designs of nuclear weapons require testing to ensure reliability and performance.
North Korea is working on a new nuclear design with a yield higher than 250 kilotons.
Russian support is accelerating North Korea’s progress in nuclear development.
China really (not just officially) wants North Korea to refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests.
North Korea is determined to conduct another nuclear test at some point in the future.
Past warnings about nuclear tests were not necessarily false alarms but reflect a gradual development process.
China would impose significant pressure on North Korea if test preparations were discovered.
North Korea could successfuly use techniques similar to India’s to conceal nuclear test preparations from international observation, including from China and the US.
North Korea’s current geopolitical strategy makes a nuclear test within the next six months advantageous from their perspective
North Korea is working on new nuclear weapon designs.
The probability of a nuclear test increases over time.
North Korea relies heavily on its nuclear program to maintain international relevance.
North Korea is in a stronger position now due to support from Russia and China, reducing the need for saber-rattling.
The absence of visible test site activity, a reliable indicator of no imminent test.
In the short term (at least 6 months) North Korea will focus on missile launches or other provocations rather than nuclear tests.
North Korea’s collaboration with Russia makes a nuclear test less likely in the short term (at least 6 months).
I also asked a fellow forecaster and nuclear physicist if he could answer some technical questions we have, I hope to get a better understanding soon based on this work and possible further feedback.
I think, if Trump decides to pull out the US forces currently supporting SDF, which he wanted to do in the past and which RFK claims he wants to do again, the situation may deteriorate quickly for the SDF forces. I know there are only about 900 American troops there, but without them, both Assad's forces and Turkey could attack the SDF without constraint and much fear of repercussions.
But even if Trump would like to pull out the US troops (they currently are also a target for attacks by Iran-backed Syrian militias), he may be persuaded not to by his advisors, who see the US troops presence in Syria as important.
This article summarizes it well:
"Various voices say that Trump will pull the US military out of north-eastern Syria. On 8 November, Robert F. Kennedy Jr told political commentator Tucker Carlson that Trump intends to withdraw American military forces from northern Syria so they do not become “cannon fodder”.
Four days later, Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler noted in an interview that “Trump gave instructions to withdraw troops from Syria three times during his presidency”. He expressed his belief that “Trump will strongly focus on this and withdraw American troops from Syria and the region”.
Yet, even if Trump would like to see the US military withdraw from Syria, some experts question how or if this would occur mindful of those who will likely surround Trump once he returns to the Oval Office on 20 January 2025.
“Because the Trump team is made up of Iran hawks, they are likely to push back against Trump's desire to pull US troops out of Syria. Robert Kennedy Jr is on record saying that Trump wants to pull troops out of Syria, but almost everyone else says that they are critical to the US mission in the region, which is to thwart Iran and help Israel,” noted Dr Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, in a TNA interview.
Dr Nabeel Khoury, former deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Yemen, made a similar argument.
"US troop presence and [the] US role in the Middle East will experience the push and pull of various domestic and international voices and forces in the next administration: [the] ideological bent of Trump supporters is at once both isolationist and interventionist. The isolationist trend will however have to give way to strong voices - not the least of which will come from Israel - to keep Iran in check, in Syria, Iraq, and the broader Middle East region,” he told TNA.
Specifically in Syria, “the pull of watching over Iranian and allied militia movements and potential ISIS revival will keep US military presence in place for the foreseeable future,” holds Dr Khoury.
According to Dr Quilliam, the situation in Ukraine will have an impact on how the second Trump administration approaches Syria and the future of US-Russia geopolitical competition in the war-torn country. As he told TNA, if Moscow is willing to agree to, what Washington would see as, a “sweeter deal” on Ukraine, the Trump team would be willing to make more concessions to the Kremlin in Syria.
“After all, the US has never considered Syria to [be] under its sphere of influence, or of a direct national interest. It is easy to argue that developments in Syria do affect the US national interests, but that has not been reflected in policy. Under these circumstances, one can envisage US troops being withdrawn from Syria. Irrespective of developments between Russia and Ukraine, it is difficult to imagine Trump keeping US troops for the duration of his policy unless there is an obvious transactional benefit to the US [or] the president, himself,” explained Dr Quilliam.
A sensitive question is, what will the next administration’s policies be towards the YPG?
If the US assesses that it has less interest in keeping US special forces in Syria, Washington’s relationship with the YPG stands a good chance of being severed shortly.
Another factor to consider is how Trump’s second administration will approach Assad. There is good reason to consider the possibility of Trump moving in the direction of some EU member-states such as Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Slovakia, which have officially or unofficially “legitimised” the Damascus government through high-level meetings and re-establishing diplomatic ties, chipping away at Assad’s reputation as a ‘pariah’ in the West’s eyes. If this is how Trump approaches Syria, his administration may come to see less of a need to sponsor the YPG.
“It will come down to a cost-benefit analysis and whether the YPG continues to serve US interests. It will take time for a Syria policy to emerge and given Trump's key appointments, which include an 'all sorts' mixture of characters with irreconcilable approaches to policy positions, allies, and adversaries. However, Trump's policy instincts suggest that he will eventually follow the European slide towards working with the Assad regime and, if that is the case, then he would likely abandon the YPG, even if those around him advise him strongly not to do so,” holds Dr Quilliam.
The next US administration, like past ones, will have to make decisions about the YPG with Turkish interests and positions in mind. As always, moves that distance Washington from the militant group bode extremely well for the US-Turkey relationship. Perhaps the second Trump administration will see Washington’s standing in Ankara as far more important than any US interest that can be advanced through the YPG, prompting Trump’s White House to cut off the PKK-affiliated organisation.
However, Dr Landis believes that Trump’s team will remain committed to supporting the YPG if the incoming US administration sees the Kurdish militia as useful to weakening Iran’s position in the Middle East and/or strengthening Israel’s. “The US will try to work through its proxies in the region, whether that is through Israel or the Kurds to hurt Iran and protect Israel,” he told TNA."
If Trump pulls out the troops, I am not sure if his administration will keep supporting the SDF, even with funds and weapons. I think such a move would likely result in the loss of control of at least some territories they currently control.
There were reports suggesting that even Biden administration was looking for a way out to evacuate the US troops from Syria: https://syrianobserver.com/foreign-actors/syria-today-a-new-u-s-plan-for-northeast-syria.html
"The Pentagon has proposed a plan suggesting that the Syrian Kurdish allies, involved in the campaign against the Islamic State (ISIS), consider forming a partnership with the Syrian regime. This proposal is part of a comprehensive reevaluation of the United States’ Syria policy, currently in progress at the State Department. (...)
The sources declined to comment on the elephant in the room, which is whether the meetings presage an eventual withdrawal of an estimated 900 US Special Forces currently deployed in northeast Syria, which the Biden administration has repeatedly stated both publicly and in private conversations with the SDF leadership is not in the cards, even as the State Department carries out a fresh review of its Syria policy. To be sure, there are growing indications that a withdrawal may be inevitable if not imminent amid escalating tensions between Iran-backed forces and the United States in the wake of Hamas’ Oct. 7 assault on Israel, analysts say."
As I understand it, the huge problem with such a plan is Assad's relationship with Iran.
Also, if this recent report is true, Assad would have to accept SDF administration over the controlled territories for SDF to join his forces. That is at least what seems to be stated now, at least. Their negotiating position may get worse under Trump.
Additional articles:
https://warontherocks.com/2024/02/leave-syria-keep-fighting-the-islamic-state/
https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/u-s-troops-in-syria-are-critical-for-multiple-missions-keep-them-on/