michal_dubrawski

I start with 18%, I read some really great comments by other pros. Some ideas that came to my mind:
I read a good argument that they may not need testing since they already tested their nuclear bombs in the past and have something that works. In the last test in 2017 the blast was estimated to be around 250 kilotons. How much is it? For the purpose of calibrating our mental models we can use:https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/ If this will not be too disturbing for you, you can see the blast area for such a nuclear detonation in some cities which you know from your experience (have a mental representation of their size). Examples:
Washington DC: https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?&kt=250&lat=38.895037&lng=-77.036543&airburst=0&hob_ft=0&psi=20,5,1&zm=12
London: https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?&kt=250&lat=51.5073219&lng=-0.1276474&airburst=0&hob_ft=0&psi=20,5,1&zm=11

Seoul: https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?&kt=250&lat=37.5666791&lng=126.9782914&airburst=0&hob_ft=0&psi=20,5,1&zm=12
Warsaw: https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?&kt=250&lat=52.231958&lng=21.006725&airburst=0&hob_ft=0&psi=20,5,1&zm=11
Can we look at North Korean Ballistic Missiles payload capabilities to say something about warheads they intend to carry on them? 38North have estimated payload of North Korean Hwasong-16 ballistic missile payload to be about 2,500 to 3,000 kg,

How many kilotons should we expect per kilogram? This article is great in answering that:
https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2013/12/23/kilotons-per-kilogram/
"all US weapons currently in the stockpile end up, in the 0.1-3 kt/kg range, especially the 2-3 kt/kg range"
So only if we use the absolutely lowest values of this ratio and the lower end of the payload estimate, we will get 250 kilotons, but as some of the nuclear weapons in the US nuclear stockpile were developed in the late 1960s and 1970s https://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Allbombs.html and with the possibility of Russia sharing their nuclear know how along with some other technical expertise with North Korea in exchange for weapons and soldiers, I am not an expert, but I think we can expect that they will be able to achieve better kiloton to kg ratio than 0.1 kiloton/kg. So I think they aim for something bigger than 250 kilotons, especially now, when they may have access to Russian expertise. I may be wrong, since my understanding is limited, but I think they are now likely working on some new design with higher yield, rather than only making more of the current ones.
Another point: other pros were right to point out that the warnings about the test keep repeating and nothing happens. However, as I read some of the warnings from last two years, one (IIRC it was  from 2022) was saying explicitly that the test is not imminent but that North Korea is working on the technology and the test is likely in the future, and the one from 2023 said about the test "next year", So maybe some of these were not necessary false alarms, or at least we do not know yet. 
One more point that comes to my mind: I love the idea that we would be able to see preparations for the test on the satellite images so if we cannot see them now it will likely not happen in the next two or three months, but I keep thinking - if North Korea is determined to conduct the test (they may want to test improvements, especially if there is/will be know-how transfer from Russia - I assume that they will want to test it, that testing is needed for new designs or at least they will want it to be sure) they may want to try hiding the preparations for the test and avoid international pressure not to do it (I would expect pressure if everyone could read about the preparations). Is it possible? It would be hard, but India was successful. Also, the problem with any open-source intelligence methods which results are published online is that the people whom we observe can access these analyses as well and they will know what to hide from us. As a counter-argument, it is one thing to play this tactic with the West, but they also have to think about their relationship with China, which is against North Korean nuclear tests.

I think the probability slightly increases over time because this is a process that is progressing, and now they may have Russian help. At the same time, I don't think they will do the test that fast. Of course, I may underestimate the importance of political factors here, like nuclear diplomacy with the new US President for example - if Kim Jong Un decide that it may give him political benefits, then testing even the same nuclear bomb as before would be reasonable.

I am going up because of uncertainty related to my understanding of the situation (thanks to my friends @ctsats and @DimaKlenchin for helpful comments). I previously assumed that the schedule to check for new matches weekly is something new, something related to the reorganization of HWC in December last year (we saw how they changed the website and the catalog name). But maybe the fact that previous updates changing the number of exoplanets in the catalog happened most often in December and January reflects some pattern of data in the NASA exoplanets catalog being updated more often around this time (adding data from papers that first come out as preprints and were later published during the year). But if that was true, we should at least be seeing most of these papers as preprints already in https://arxiv.org/ database, and I haven't seen them, but my search may be insufficient - some papers confirming new exoplanets may not discuss that they are in habitable zone and I will not be able to find it in the haystack of preprints. 

I checked the number of exoplanets meeting the first two out of three criteria of habitability used by HWC (mass and radius) and here are the numbers in the NASA Exoplanets catalog:
2024: 64 (so far)

2023: 126

2022: 122

2021: 302

2020: 108

2019: 75

2018: 163

2017: 66

2016: 1111

2015: 56

2014: 602

2013: 35

2012: 29

So far, we have about 50% of numbers from 2023 or 2022, but there is high variability in the numbers for years before 2022, so it is hard to say anything about the reporting speed based on that. However, in 2023 there were discovered 6 exoplanets which were added to the HWC, and in 2022 there were 5, so we are a bit unlucky with zero exoplanets halfway to getting to their numbers of new exoplanets fitting mass and radius criteria.

As you can see below, historically, HWC was more active during December and January (data from the HWC updates database I created). 

But in terms of updates changing the number of total exoplanets, January and July are on the podium, with February, May and June standing on the lower place on the podium together. This includes revisions related to removals.

Here is how it looks when we only look at additions (this question resolution only cares for new planets being added, removals are unimportant for our purposes, but removals likely happened due to new data being published or new methods and models providing more precise answers). We can see that we are already past the time in the year with most updates, but as January next year still counts, it is not that simple. 

We should keep in mind that likely over the year situation changes - like with some missions starting and ending and their teams way of reporting being different, or as Christos was informed by the professor running HWC the process has changed over the years, and it is now largely automated. Look at this graph to see changes in time:


To better see the months of updates, here is another version with month number on the y axis:



I am also tagging:
@404_NOT_FOUND @cmeinel @Perspectus @guyrecord @sai_39 @ansantillan @Jim @NoUsernameSelected @JonathanMann @ansantillan @WeirdAwkward @JJMLP  @Plataea479  @MrLittleTexas  

I am increasing because while I think it would be very dangerous for Israel to assassinate Ali Khamenei in terms of Iran's likely response, I think it is now more likely than it was a month ago.

There may be some hopes for a Gaza case fire deal after Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was killed by IDF (see this article: "Israel’s killing of Hamas’s leader should mean an end to this war. It probably won’t" and this article: "Mossad chief heads to Qatar Sunday to try to restart Gaza talks; Hamas team in Cairo") But this doesn't seem to be realistic. This article from Haaretz says:

"The killing of Yahya Sinwar, that came in a chance encounter with fighters from the IDF's training unit for squad leaders and an armored unit, immediately raised hopes for renewed progress in the negotiations over a hostage deal.
His end is indeed an expression of the severity of the military rout sustained by his organization. Eighty percent of Hamas' senior leaders, including most of the people who were in on the plans for the October 7 attack, have been killed in the course of the war. At this point, however, it's hard to see how his death could bring a quick breakthrough toward a deal for a cease-fire and the return of the hostages.

The reasons for this are split between both sides of the divide. Israel justifiably set the killing of Sinwar as a major goal of the war, since the death of senior figures marks Israel's determination to hold to account anyone who was involved in planning the massacre.
At the same time, it was clear that this would weaken the organization's decision-making apparatus. Sinwar, even during the year in which he was fleeing from Israeli forces, set the organization's policies and managed to control it even when communications between him and the outside world were sporadic.
Hamas now has no obvious leader, and any successor will find it difficult to control terrorists who are spread out across the Gaza Strip, and to navigate the organization's steps in war and negotiations.
The situation is even worse regarding the hostages. Most of them are being held by Hamas, but there are some living hostages and bodies that are being held by Islamic Jihad, local clans and crime families across the Gaza Strip.

Sinwar's successor, with some assessments pointing to his younger brother Mohammed, will find it difficult to enforce his authority over these factions and families and to dictate a common policy in the indirect talks held with Israel. It's possible that the tough minimum conditions for a deal set by Sinwar before his death will largely bind the next group of Hamas leaders.
On the Israeli side, Netanyahu, at least until his house in Caesarea was damaged by a drone strike, seemed a bit giddy with the achievement of Sinwar's killing. His supporters are trying to present this as proof that he has been conducting a calculated strategy the entire time.
His refusal to accept a cease-fire and his insistence on continuing to battle on all fronts are what they believe led to the killing of most of the leaders of the radical axis in the Middle East – Sinwar and his partners Mohammed Deif and Ismail Haniyeh, as well as Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and his short-lived successor Hashem Safieddine, and Hezbollah's acting chief of staff Fuad Shukr.
It appears that Netanyahu was operating for a long time with restricted maneuvering room due to the unholy alliance he forged with his ultra-right coalition partners. His refusal to compromise has contributed to the death of dozens of hostages in recent months, some of them murdered by their Hamas captors and others apparently dying from the harsh conditions of their captivity.

The killing of Sinwar is not expected to make the position of the government's extremist partners more flexible. On the contrary, ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir rushed to release calls for continuing the fight with Hamas, along with a demand to refrain from making compromises in any negotiations.
The Americans can continue putting a positive spin on the new situation. In practice, there is no sign so far of Israel becoming more flexible after Sinwar's death, or of a sense of regret among surviving Hamas leaders, despite the calamity they have inflicted on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip."

I think the end of this escalation cycle is the less probable outcome, since I think for the Israeli government this is now a confrontation with Iran, which is likely seen as a mortal enemy and a real threat to Israel's existence. As Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amir Avivi told Newsweek: he believes that "Israel won't let Iran become nuclear and sees this war as a historic opportunity to deal with the big challenge of Iran becoming a nuclear power." 

Many Hezbollah and Hamas leaders were assassinated by Israel or killed by IDF (for example see this list or this list), the most well known are Ismail Haniyeh (the political leader of Hamas, who was assassinated in the Iranian capital Tehran by an apparent Israeli attack.), Yahya Sinwar, and Hassan Nasrallah. Israel has also killed some senior commanders in Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

I also think that the recent drone attack on Benjamin Netanyahu's residence shows that the Iran is willing to target Israeli government top officials. One may say it was Hezbollah who was likely responsible, but there was this earlier report of Iran being behind another assassination plot. Netanyahu called this drone attack an assassination attempt on him as his wife and while he was not at home at the time, I think it is accurate, based on this description from Wikipedia:

On October 19, 2024, Benjamin Netanyahu’s home in Caesarea was targeted by one of three drones, believed to have been launched from Lebanon. The attack came amid heightened tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, with several rockets and drones fired toward areas in northern Israel. The attack did not result in any injuries, and Netanyahu was not at his residence at the time. Two other drones launched to the area were intercepted. The drone cracked a bedroom window but failed to penetrate further due to reinforced glass and additional protections, while debris landed on a swimming pool and in the yard.

This Jerusalem Post article from two days ago is interesting: "Will Israel assassinate Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei? - opinion":

The image of Israeli assassination targets recently shown on Israel’s Channel 14 and picked up by the BBC featured several figures allegedly wanted by Israel but did not include the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Those listed included Iraqi Shi’ite cleric Ali Al Sistani, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar (killed by the IDF last week), Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem, Yemeni Houthi leader Abdul-Malik Al Houthi, and Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani.
However, recent strikes and intelligence breaches targeting Iranian security institutions and their affiliated proxies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon, make the scenario of assassinating Khamenei highly plausible. 

This possibility is compelling Iranian security agencies to exercise extreme caution. The situation is especially critical given the collapse of the tacitly agreed-upon rules of engagement and conflict boundaries between Iran and Israel.
Several factors place Khamenei within the scope of potential Israeli targets, even if his name was absent from the publicized “assassination list.”

Indeed, this very omission could be considered an indicator of purposeful misdirection and deception. Such tactics are highly likely in these circumstances.
A list that included Sistani
FIRST, THE list was not limited to military leaders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iranian proxies. It also included Sistani, a Shi’ite religious authority of stature.
This is noteworthy because Sistani does not carry the same weight as Khamenei in managing the conflict with Israel.

He also lacks the authority to direct Iran-aligned proxies to participate in the so-called “axis of resistance.” While Sistani’s political and ideological views are akin to those of Khamenei, he lacks authority over the militant Iraqi Shi’ite organizations.
These groups receive orders directly from the IRGC. It can be said that Sistani’s relationship with these groups is limited to the spiritual aspect, particularly in terms of Shi’ite unity from Iran to Lebanon and beyond.

(...)

Khamenei enters the circle of Israel's potential targets
SECOND, THE current geopolitical climate – which Israel considers unique – pushes Khamenei into the circle of potential Israeli targets.
This is true in terms of the successive victories Israel is achieving in weakening Iran’s power and its regional proxies; it is also applicable to the current international and regional support for Israeli military operations to neutralize the Iranian threat.
It is evident that the succession and escalation of Israeli assassination operations against prominent Iranian leaders or Iran loyalists has not resulted in any significant cost to Israel; the reaction of the Islamic Republic did not exceed verbal threats and the firing of antiquated missiles – which were intercepted by Israel and its allies – to satisfy the psychological needs of the pro-Iranian public.

These minimal consequences will encourage Israel to target Iran’s top leaders, including Khamenei himself.
It turns out Israel’s successive and escalating assassinations of prominent Iranian or pro-Iranian leaders have not, as of now, resulted in a cost that would compel the Israeli security establishment to discontinue of these bold operations, even if they hit the head of the Iranian regime.
What are the strategic assessments?
THIRD, THERE are strategic assessments that view the scenario of targeting Khamenei as potentially the least costly and most impactful.

This scenario would have implications for disrupting the calculations of Iranian regime leaders and igniting conflict within the narrow circle of power. It could also create the conditions to spark popular unrest among those already primed to challenge the regime.
This is being fueled by deteriorating economic and security conditions and the country’s preoccupation with ongoing external confrontations and conflicts.
The scenario of the assassination of Khamenei has become a genuine Iranian concern. It is no longer dismissed by the security apparatus there, especially after the series of targeted attacks by Israel against Nasrallah – and reportedly against Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Doubts and unanswered questions surrounding the death of Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi, when his helicopter crashed in May, have also contributed to this concern.
This explains reports confirming the rush to move the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader to a secure location after receiving news of Nasrallah’s assassination.
The depth of Israeli intelligence penetration of IRGC security agencies and its proxies has become apparent. This makes the possibility of reaching the head of the Iranian power hierarchy a real concern for many, especially for the leaders of the IRGC.
The decisive factor in all of the above hinges on the assessment by Israeli decision-makers of the cost-benefit analysis being conducted during this period, which aims to maximize Israel’s strategic gains from the turbulent regional scene.
In my opinion, the idea of assassinating the supreme leader may recede slightly in favor of more vital targets. These could include Iran’s nuclear and missile program facilities.
This depends on Israel’s operational capability to carry out an effective strike against these facilities without the risk of facing a second strike. It also depends on the IRGC’s capability to retaliate against the potential Israeli attack. In this case, the scenario seems open to all possibilities, including all-out war.
Subjecting Iranian nuclear and missile capabilities to a failed or limited-impact strike could compel the IRGC to use all available offensive capabilities against Israel. They might do so without restraint or political calculations.

Good comments by @404_NOT_FOUND here and @TrishBytes here. 

I am reducing based on several factors:
1. I initially adjusted my probability for some not that significant event happening which would nonetheless trigger this broad resolution criteria (the part about "testing or developing equipment with O-RAN standards, or making financial or resource commitments.". However, I was not able to find something like that in the past and O-RAN was founded in 2018 (Huawei in 1987). I am not saying I am sure it has not happened or even that it has not been announced, but the fact that I cannot find it makes it less likely it happened and was announced and if I cannot find it in web search it is possible that even if this will happen remaining time (almost a year) we will still miss it. From the Huawei point of view even if they commit any resources at evaluation or testing of O-RAN (IIRC @404_NOT_FOUND mentioned in the past that they may have access to O-RAN through other Chinese companies which are in O-RAN), they are disincentivised to state anything publicly if they are not willing to join O-RAN. At the same time, on the other hand, we now have a group of forecasters regularly reading articles related to Huawei and Open RAN, so someone may still notice something not obvious which will fit the resolution and report it to the RFI Team (even possibly acting against their personal score). Still, I think that taking it all together, it leads me to decrease.

 2. Part of my initial reason to go higher were reports from Huawei clients in Germany about talks of Huawei joining O-RAN to be allowed to stay in Germany. But we now see that Germany is not willing to ban Huawei equipment and force its network providers to use O-RAN anytime soon.  From the lightreading.com article from today:

A minority of European Union (EU) countries and NATO members have enacted measures against Huawei. Even the UK, which quit the EU in 2020, has allowed Huawei to retain a shrinking presence until the end of 2027. Money from UK telcos will flow into Huawei's account until it is evicted for good. Worse, Germany, Europe's biggest economy, has effectively done nothing to curb Huawei. Amid signs the company is now growing again outside China, Germany and its telcos are lobbying other EU governments to adopt a scheme that would confer a kind of settled status on Huawei and allow it to remain indefinitely, Light Reading has learned. 

The suspicion will be that Germany has hoodwinked the EU. In the run-up to July, Huawei had been the subject of vigorous debate in the German press and political circles following a stern rebuke in June last year by Thierry Breton, a former EU commissioner. While 23 member states had drawn up laws about the use of "high-risk vendors," as the EU calls Chinese suppliers in its "5G toolbox" guidelines, only seven had imposed restrictions, said Breton. "This is not enough," he railed. Undoubtedly foremost in his mind, Germany had to show compliance. 

But the fix signed off by German politicians this summer, in collusion with telcos, will leave barely a scratch on Huawei. Rather than ordering the complete removal of all Huawei's radio access network (RAN) products, as UK authorities did, Germany's government has focused solely on the management system that controls updates and changes to this RAN. And contrary to earlier reports, it does not even require the full dismantling of this management system, said two separate sources with knowledge of the matter. Instead, it wants to see the removal of elements that would allow China to switch off 5G networks from afar, said one of those sources, disputing the very existence of such a failsafe button.

Also from this article already quoted by @404_NOT_FOUND "Deutsche Telekom's 'open RAN' plan slips after Huawei reprieve":

Open RAN, the mobile network version of building a PC from different parts instead of buying one intact, looks behind schedule at Deutsche Telekom, Europe's biggest operator and a fan of the concept. Back in early 2022, Abdu Mudesir, Deutsche Telekom's chief technology officer, was eyeing a "significant" urban investment the following year, he told Light Reading at Mobile World Congress (MWC). Since then, there has been much talk and little obvious progress. And slides produced for Deutsche Telekom's capital markets day (CMD) in Germany this week show the open RAN plan has slipped further.

Until this week, Deutsche Telekom's stated goal was to have 3,000 open RAN (radio access network) sites in operation by the end of 2026. It had previously tried out an assortment of vendors in the picturesque medieval city of Neubrandenburg, rechristened "O-RAN Town" by the telco for the purposes of its trial. Then, in February 2023, it identified Nokia and Fujitsu as the suppliers for a commercial open RAN deployment in Germany. The commitment to 3,000 sites in 2026 followed in December. This week, it was changed to an "ambition" for "2027e," where the "e" means estimate.

(...)

Yet Deutsche Telekom has never been very eager to replace Huawei. This raises the possibility that open RAN, as first envisaged, was just a back-up plan in the event of government restrictions. Those seemed likelier after Thierry Breton, the former EU commissioner for the internal market and services, complained in June 2023 that too few countries had followed EU advice to ban Chinese vendors. But Germany's response now limits the opportunity for Nokia, Fujitsu or indeed any other supplier.

Rather than ordering telcos to rip out Huawei, as the UK did years ago, German authorities are insisting only on a replacement of its core network products and management systems. The edict is partially moot because all three of Germany's big telcos – Deutsche Telekom, Telefónica and Vodafone – already now use other core network vendors. And Deutsche Telekom also believes it can substitute its own in-house technology for Huawei's RAN management system without having to replace any of Huawei's basestations, software included. In its CMD slides, it is presenting this as an O-RAN solution to the problem of "critical vendor risk."

It is an obvious blow to Nokia and Fujitsu, which would secretly have hoped for a tougher government policy. The best they can hope for is that it proves unworkable or meets with resistance from the EU, which has had little to say about the scheme following Breton's resignation last month.<>
From an open RAN perspective, it would be a technical fudge. Products from Huawei do not comply with open RAN specifications, meaning it would have to work on achieving interoperability with Deutsche Telekom's management system, generally referred to as service management and orchestration (or SMO) in the open RAN world. This hardly sounds like the clampdown Breton sought. Nor would it prevent Huawei from slipping malicious code into basestation software, say technical experts, although evidence of these "backdoors" has never been found.

Open RAN, Huawei style

Nevertheless, the 3,000 O-RAN sites could now conceivably have a totally different complexion. Rather than featuring Nokia's baseband equipment and Fujitsu's radios, they could pair Huawei's RAN with Deutsche Telekom's SMO platform and still qualify as open RAN sites, as far as the German operator is concerned. For the avoidance of any doubt, when Deutsche Telekom issued its response to the government measures in July, its 500-word statement included ten references to open RAN. Its approach, it said, "will help us to press ahead with our open RAN strategy, which is already being implemented."

3. Even if Huawei would consider joining O-RAN in the future the question for them is if they will be able to stay or will the O-RAN survive in the current form possible future tensions and escalations between China and the US. This old article from September 2022 shows what happened to Russian companies participating in O-RAN after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine:

The group behind the specifications for open RAN, a much-discussed technology concept, appears to have struck the names of MTS, a Russian operator, and Skoltech, a university in Moscow, from its membership page.
It would seem to leave Yadro, a server maker, as the only remaining Russian member.

Russian participation in a group headquartered in Germany, with dozens of US members, has always looked strange while Vladimir Putin wages war on Ukraine. The West continues to buy Russian gas but has otherwise gone to extreme lengths to cut Russia out of economic and other affairs.

(...)

Nervousness about working in the O-RAN Alliance alongside sanctioned companies spurred Nokia to pause its technical contributions last year.

The Finnish vendor appeared worried about three Chinese members subject to one US restriction or another. But it resumed work after the O-RAN Alliance made a series of organizational changes aimed at improving transparency.

Presumably, Nokia received some assurance from US authorities that it was not at risk of prosecution.

(...)

The apparent delisting of MTS and Skoltech – just weeks after the US introduced rules making O-RAN Alliance participation safer for Western firms – raises questions.

Have the Russian companies been ejected and, if so, on what grounds? It is not inconceivable that MTS and Skoltech decided to quit the organization. "The logos shown on the O-RAN website reflect the currently active members and contributors of the O-RAN Alliance," was all the group would say when approached by Light Reading. It is enough, at least, to confirm MTS and Skoltech are out.

The bigger question is whether groups such as the O-RAN Alliance, and even official standards bodies like the 3GPP, can survive the geopolitical rifts developing between the West on one side and China and Russia on the other.

Not everyone will be happy that Yadro, a Russian company now designing its own chips, can effectively leverage US and European technology expertise to advance Russian interests.  

  

I did some quick research and I don't see signals for changing the forecasts. I keep thinking how North Korea troops if sent to Russia and Ukraine in large numbers could affect the big picture. 

Interesting article about a recent wargaming exercise / military planning for Russian invasion conducted in Lithuania: https://mil.in.ua/en/news/planning-the-russian-attack-on-lithuania-estonia-and-latvia-are-already-occupied-but-the-attack-will-be-fought-off/ 
There is also this video (you can watch it with autotranslated subtitles on youtube): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NB61JEbElaQ&t=321s

Another good recent article on topic by The Hill: https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4936930-the-baltics-are-preparing-for-a-future-russian-invasion/

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed an agreement in January to create a joint Baltic defense line against future Russian attacks. Last week, Lithuania announced it had deployed mines and anti-tank obstacles such as metal “hedgehogs” and concrete “dragon’s teeth” on bridges connecting the nation to Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave. Lithuania plans further deployments of counter-mobility equipment around the nation, including at three airports.
Leaders in the region worry that Russia, with its economy on a war footing and the obvious insufficiency of the sanctions regime against it, will reconstitute its military forces far more quickly than the rosy projections some American intelligence sources promoted in early 2023. Recent Estonian intelligence estimates see Russian looking to station 40,000 troops near their border as soon as it is able.
(...)

The geographic reality of the Baltic nations, connected via land to the rest of NATO only via the 65-mile long Suwalki Gap on the Lithuanian-Polish border, leads many to believe they are the logical place for Putin to strike if he decides to invade a NATO member state.
Although the risk should not be understated, such an invasion would be challenging. Much of the Baltics’ borders with Russia and client state Belarus consists of swamps, bogs, lakes, rivers and thick forests, obstacles that would surely slow a Belarusian or Russian advance.
Furthermore, Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO has improved Baltic security. Defending and reinforcing the Baltic states in the event of a future war would be far easier now than it would have been just a couple of years ago.
The ongoing build-out of the Baltic states’ defense line is the next iteration in their beefed-up border security. It reflects a grim recognition that allowing Russia to seize any of your territory and citizens comes at a considerable humanitarian and physical cost. Falling back to buy time is no longer a feasible option. The further east Russian forces can be stopped, the better.
The Baltics have been upgrading their border infrastructure since well before Putin’s second invasion of Ukraine. Persistent smuggling concerns and the hybrid warfare strategy utilizing migrants by Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko spurred an ongoing installation of new fences, razor wire, cameras and sensors along the border beginning in 2017.
The Baltic defense line will augment these efforts, helping to slow any future ground assaults by Russian or Belarusian troops. In practice, this means amassing obstacles, reinforcing existing fences, digging ditches and building defensive bunkers.
By investing in defense, Lithuania is looking to ensure that Putin recognizes the country does not merely have pointy teeth but can breathe fire as well. Last month, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda stated he believed the country would look to further increase defense spending to beyond its current 3 percent of GDP.
Likewise, Estonia has ramped up its spending to 3.43 percent and Latvia to 3.15 percent, the second- and fourth-highest defense spending totals in NATO on a per GDP basis.

I confirm my previous forecast of 1%, with slightly more than 2 months until the forecast window end date. As @PeterStamp mentioned here they are still recruiting new people.

Some news: "Microsoft closes Azure subscription for individuals to access OpenAI in mainland China"
https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3283259/microsoft-closes-azure-subscription-individuals-access-openai-mainland-china - my understanding is that this is due to Chinese regulations

The action taken by Microsoft means the “only legitimate method” for individuals to access OpenAI’s API in China has been blocked, according to JetSquirrel.cloud, a user of social media platform Xiaohongshu, where he shared the email about the Azure restriction.

He could still use Azure for work via his enterprise account, but his personal AI research would have to rely on domestic alternatives, which are “cheaper and have faster web connection”, the user wrote.

Another independent developer said workarounds to the Azure restriction include certain third-party platforms that do not require personal identification and simply going to the OpenAI website to get the API by using a virtual private network, a foreign phone number and a foreign bank card.

The Azure restriction marks a further tightening to OpenAI access on the mainland, which opens a path for local developers to increasingly adopt local large language models (LLMs) for their projects. LLMs are the technology underpinning generative AI services, such as ChatGPT.

On July 9, OpenAI started restricting access to its API in mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau. Other unsupported markets include US-sanctioned states such as Iran, North Korea and Russia.

Another interesting articleuseful  for broader understanding of the topic: "China’s AI Industry: Government Support, Key Players, Talent, and Chips" https://medium.com/@don-lim/chinas-ai-industry-government-support-key-players-talent-and-chips-ab0d5df56892

I slightly reduce because I believe that we should be seeing these discoveries in preprints first before most of them will be added to the data in NASA exoplanets catalog, which is the main data source for HWC (five of six exoplanets discovered in 2023 had preprints published in https://arxiv.org/as you can see in my comment here). I spent many hours today and yesterday searching for preprints about such discoveries, with no luck. It is not a definitive answer (I will continue) but this makes me update a bit.

So, thanks to the RFI Team, we now have a confirmation of something I suspected before (see here or here)  - that the lack of new additions is the result of no new discoveries and lack of new data about past discoveries since March. What is more, we now know that "new exoplanets are discovered and analyzed for potential habitability every week." (see latest clarification to this question).

I looked at the database of updates to the catalog, which I created using Archive.org (Google sheet, my comment). We can see that since 2016-12-05 we had about 40 additions, and since 2020-01-16 we had about 15 additions. Clarification to the resolution criteria makes it clear that only additions to the catalog count even if some exoplanets were removed. Since my database shows that in the past some exoplanets were also removed from the catalog it is possible that a number of additions is, in fact, a bit higher in that period since there were not that many updates per year and if before 2024 in any update there were both additions and removals of exoplanets from the catalog the total number of exoplanets in the archive would not show this - you can see that removals happened in the past (data about exoplanets is being updated with new observations and new calculations - this can lead to removal or addition of previously discovered exoplanet like with K2-3 d which was added to the catalog this year but was discovered in 2015) . 

I used Poisson distribution to calculate the probability of 4 or more exoplanets being added using these two rates of additions from my database mentioned above at least 40 since the end of 2016 and at least 15 since January 2020. That gives us approximately 6.30%  (if we use the end of 2016 rate) or approximately 1.35% if we use the rate since January 2020.
We should also have in mind that most of the discoveries are announced in scientific articles (in case of some teams they may be added to the databases like NASA archive at the same time). I previously tried to establish if there is any irregularity of publications of these articles, and academic holidays, and especially August may be a time when fewer articles are submitted to the scientific papers in general. Another such period may be December (for example see this data).  At the same time I also checked submission dates of preprints of articles about exoplanets discovered in 2023 which were added to the catalog this year, and it is not like most of them were from January (assuming I found the right papers for each of them) - however 2 are from January:
TOI-700 e - Submitted 9 January, 2023; originally announced January 2023 (url)
TOI-715 b - Submitted 10 May, 2023; originally announced May 2023. (url)
HN Lib b - Submitted 31 May, 2023; originally announced May 2023. (url)
Wolf 1069 b - Submitted 2 February, 2023; v1 submitted 6 January, 2023; originally announced January 2023. (url)
TOI-904 c - Submitted 23 October, 2023; originally announced October 2023. (url)
GJ 367 d - Received 2023 February 16; revised 2023 June 15; accepted 2023 June 21; published 2023 September 14 (url)

This is a very small sample (we could check the articles for all of the 70 planets in the catalog if someone has more time (I may do that in the next forecast), but as of now I only wanted to confirm that it is not like all are published in January or in Q4.
Looking at publication dates of preprints about other articles may be a good idea, but I already spent 6 hours on this question today, and I also worked on it in the last week of so before the clarification came. I created a python script for getting data from NASA catalog and checking for new candidates - I am still not satisfied with my calculations being confirmed as right, but this time it got 4 of 6 right added this year and discovered in 2023 right - unfortunately NASA exoplanets archive is the main but not the only source of information they use, so my data is not the same as the data used by HWC).