I am going up because of uncertainty related to my understanding of the situation (thanks to my friends @ctsats and @DimaKlenchin for helpful comments). I previously assumed that the schedule to check for new matches weekly is something new, something related to the reorganization of HWC in December last year (we saw how they changed the website and the catalog name). But maybe the fact that previous updates changing the number of exoplanets in the catalog happened most often in December and January reflects some pattern of data in the NASA exoplanets catalog being updated more often around this time (adding data from papers that first come out as preprints and were later published during the year). But if that was true, we should at least be seeing most of these papers as preprints already in https://arxiv.org/ database, and I haven't seen them, but my search may be insufficient - some papers confirming new exoplanets may not discuss that they are in habitable zone and I will not be able to find it in the haystack of preprints.
I checked the number of exoplanets meeting the first two out of three criteria of habitability used by HWC (mass and radius) and here are the numbers in the NASA Exoplanets catalog:
2024: 64 (so far)
2023: 126
2022: 122
2021: 302
2020: 108
2019: 75
2018: 163
2017: 66
2016: 1111
2015: 56
2014: 602
2013: 35
2012: 29
So far, we have about 50% of numbers from 2023 or 2022, but there is high variability in the numbers for years before 2022, so it is hard to say anything about the reporting speed based on that. However, in 2023 there were discovered 6 exoplanets which were added to the HWC, and in 2022 there were 5, so we are a bit unlucky with zero exoplanets halfway to getting to their numbers of new exoplanets fitting mass and radius criteria.
As you can see below, historically, HWC was more active during December and January (data from the HWC updates database I created).
But in terms of updates changing the number of total exoplanets, January and July are on the podium, with February, May and June standing on the lower place on the podium together. This includes revisions related to removals.
Here is how it looks when we only look at additions (this question resolution only cares for new planets being added, removals are unimportant for our purposes, but removals likely happened due to new data being published or new methods and models providing more precise answers). We can see that we are already past the time in the year with most updates, but as January next year still counts, it is not that simple.
We should keep in mind that likely over the year situation changes - like with some missions starting and ending and their teams way of reporting being different, or as Christos was informed by the professor running HWC the process has changed over the years, and it is now largely automated. Look at this graph to see changes in time:
To better see the months of updates, here is another version with month number on the y axis:
I am also tagging:
@404_NOT_FOUND @cmeinel @Perspectus @guyrecord @sai_39 @ansantillan @Jim @NoUsernameSelected @JonathanMann @ansantillan @WeirdAwkward @JJMLP @Plataea479 @MrLittleTexas
Why do you think you're right?
I start with 18%, I read some really great comments by other pros. Some ideas that came to my mind:
I read a good argument that they may not need testing since they already tested their nuclear bombs in the past and have something that works. In the last test in 2017 the blast was estimated to be around 250 kilotons. How much is it? For the purpose of calibrating our mental models we can use:https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/ If this will not be too disturbing for you, you can see the blast area for such a nuclear detonation in some cities which you know from your experience (have a mental representation of their size). Examples:
Washington DC: https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?&kt=250&lat=38.895037&lng=-77.036543&airburst=0&hob_ft=0&psi=20,5,1&zm=12
London: https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?&kt=250&lat=51.5073219&lng=-0.1276474&airburst=0&hob_ft=0&psi=20,5,1&zm=11
Seoul: https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?&kt=250&lat=37.5666791&lng=126.9782914&airburst=0&hob_ft=0&psi=20,5,1&zm=12
Warsaw: https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?&kt=250&lat=52.231958&lng=21.006725&airburst=0&hob_ft=0&psi=20,5,1&zm=11
Can we look at North Korean Ballistic Missiles payload capabilities to say something about warheads they intend to carry on them? 38North have estimated payload of North Korean Hwasong-16 ballistic missile payload to be about 2,500 to 3,000 kg,
How many kilotons should we expect per kilogram? This article is great in answering that:
https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2013/12/23/kilotons-per-kilogram/
"all US weapons currently in the stockpile end up, in the 0.1-3 kt/kg range, especially the 2-3 kt/kg range"
So only if we use the absolutely lowest values of this ratio and the lower end of the payload estimate, we will get 250 kilotons, but as some of the nuclear weapons in the US nuclear stockpile were developed in the late 1960s and 1970s https://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Allbombs.html and with the possibility of Russia sharing their nuclear know how along with some other technical expertise with North Korea in exchange for weapons and soldiers, I am not an expert, but I think we can expect that they will be able to achieve better kiloton to kg ratio than 0.1 kiloton/kg. So I think they aim for something bigger than 250 kilotons, especially now, when they may have access to Russian expertise. I may be wrong, since my understanding is limited, but I think they are now likely working on some new design with higher yield, rather than only making more of the current ones.
Another point: other pros were right to point out that the warnings about the test keep repeating and nothing happens. However, as I read some of the warnings from last two years, one (IIRC it was from 2022) was saying explicitly that the test is not imminent but that North Korea is working on the technology and the test is likely in the future, and the one from 2023 said about the test "next year", So maybe some of these were not necessary false alarms, or at least we do not know yet.
One more point that comes to my mind: I love the idea that we would be able to see preparations for the test on the satellite images so if we cannot see them now it will likely not happen in the next two or three months, but I keep thinking - if North Korea is determined to conduct the test (they may want to test improvements, especially if there is/will be know-how transfer from Russia - I assume that they will want to test it, that testing is needed for new designs or at least they will want it to be sure) they may want to try hiding the preparations for the test and avoid international pressure not to do it (I would expect pressure if everyone could read about the preparations). Is it possible? It would be hard, but India was successful. Also, the problem with any open-source intelligence methods which results are published online is that the people whom we observe can access these analyses as well and they will know what to hide from us. As a counter-argument, it is one thing to play this tactic with the West, but they also have to think about their relationship with China, which is against North Korean nuclear tests.
I think the probability slightly increases over time because this is a process that is progressing, and now they may have Russian help. At the same time, I don't think they will do the test that fast. Of course, I may underestimate the importance of political factors here, like nuclear diplomacy with the new US President for example - if Kim Jong Un decide that it may give him political benefits, then testing even the same nuclear bomb as before would be reasonable.
Why might you be wrong?
I wonder if North Korean government affiliated forecasters were asked what would be a result of conducting a nuclear test before the US Elections on their result... This is not impossible.