| Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forecasts | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 |
| Comments | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 |
| Questions Forecasted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Upvotes on Comments By This User | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Definitions | |||||
After discussing with teammate, there is a possibility that Putins speech increases alarm within Russia's borders- however because of the hurdle that must be reached to pass 400, I am keeping my percentage unchanged.
Inside and outside view unchanged
If my forecast is wrong it will be because Putin allows protests or other country's protests spill into Russia.
After team discussion, we both agreed that tensions are increasing on the back of Putin's arms control threat and doubling down on his invasion. Still, I believe the time frame restriction does not warrant the increase in probability.
My previous outside view remains unchanged, my inside view has updated to include increased belligerence.
Source: https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/21/europe/putin-state-of-the-union-threat-analysis-intl/index.html
As stated, the likelihood of conflict spilling into NATO territory os a definite possibility and has increased in the past week.
5th Forecast, 4th Revision
I am bumping up my probability from 4% to 5% based on the incorporation of new information. For one thing, Putin is defending his decision to invade and appears increasingly belligerent. He has issued new nuclear threats and refuses to stand down. This belligerence and stubbornness increases the likelihood that d of war spilling over into NATO territories. However, the time frame is constantly working against this likelihood for this specific question. As such, I merely adjust one percentage point.
https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-update-russias-elite-ukraine-war-major-speech-2023-02-21/
The reasoning below still stands:
I considered the possibility of spill-over into NATO territory as Russian fatalities and Ukrainian fatalities mount. I no longer think this is a very good barometer, but I initially did this under a belief that fatalities on the side of combatants desensitize the hesitancy to spill over to others and the need, perhaps, of NATO countries to step in. Still, it is rather unlikely given time frame and deterrence, Please find more details below.
I have updated my forecast based on group discussion and doing some additional research to better inform and quantify outside and inside views. Need to make sure that I am not anchoring and to also come up with a way to better quantify outside view. Last time, I did additional research on casualties in Russia and Ukraine and attempted to put odds on the likelihood this would spill over. I chose this as an outside view because it was pertinent, but still rather broad. Choosing to do all deaths in recent wars which started in one territory before expansing would be too wide, and fatalities on NATO territory in the past year would be too narrow-- the two polish deaths that were accidental. Thus, I'm using Russian and Ukrainian fatality numbers to approximate likelihood of spillover into Poland or some other border country.
This time I am updating based on the time and also the fact that Putin has made threats (see link below)
As outside view: Ukraine has suffered over 7k fatalities ( i no longer love this as a good outside view for this specific question) (https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293492/ukraine-war-casualties/#:~:text=Number%20of%20civilian%20casualties%20during%20the%20war%20in%20Ukraine%202023&text=The%20Office%20of%20the%20United,Of%20them%2C%20438%20were%20children.)
I think a better outside view is the likelihood of wars spilling over into other territories, but even this is not a great way to quantify, I think the edge here is the inside view that takes into account the things Putin has said about threatening war if Sweden were to join NATO. For this reason I think he has set his own boundary and doesn't want to cross into NATO territory.
Inside view:
Even back in December, before recent escalation NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said the war could become "wider conflict"
2 deaths so far, due to accidental strike. 25 fatalities should a war begin would not be unexpected, so this question is close to being binary.
However, I still put this at a very low probability event because of the risk of escalation into nuclear stand-off should article 5 be invoked.
I have marginally lowered percentage of likelihood to 4% from 5% due to additional research and time. I considered the possibility of spill-over into NATO territory as Russian fatalities and Ukrainian fatalities mount. I no longer think this is a very good barometer, but I initially did this under a belief that fatalities on the side of combatants desensitize the hesitancy to spill over to others and the need, perhaps, of NATO countries to step in. Still, it is rather unlikely given time frame and deterrence, Please find more details below.
I have updated my forecast based on group discussion and doing some additional research to better inform and quantify outside and inside views. Need to make sure that I am not anchoring and to also come up with a way to better quantify outside view. Last time, I did additional research on casualties in Russia and Ukraine and attempted to put odds on the likelihood this would spill over. I chose this as an outside view because it was pertinent, but still rather broad. Choosing to do all deaths in recent wars which started in one territory before expansing would be too wide, and fatalities on NATO territory in the past year would be too narrow-- the two polish deaths that were accidental. Thus, I'm using Russian and Ukrainian fatality numbers to approximate likelihood of spillover into Poland or some other border country.
This time I am updating based on the time and also the fact that Putin has made threats (see link below)
As outside view: Ukraine has suffered over 7k fatalities ( i no longer love this as a good outside view for this specific question) (https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293492/ukraine-war-casualties/#:~:text=Number%20of%20civilian%20casualties%20during%20the%20war%20in%20Ukraine%202023&text=The%20Office%20of%20the%20United,Of%20them%2C%20438%20were%20children.)
I think a better outside view is the likelihood of wars spilling over into other territories, but even this is not a great way to quantify, I think the edge here is the inside view that takes into account the things Putin has said about threatening war if Sweden were to join NATO. For this reason I think he has set his own boundary and doesn't want to cross into NATO territory.
Inside view:
Even back in December, before recent escalation NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said the war could become "wider conflict"
2 deaths so far, due to accidental strike. 25 fatalities should a war begin would not be unexpected, so this question is close to being binary.
However, I still put this at a very low probability event because of the risk of escalation into nuclear stand-off should article 5 be invoked.
April 1 is still a month away and the war continues to increase in its scope.
Same reasoning as previously that I might be wrong - As stated in my inside view, spill-over into NATO territory is a real possibility. In addition, mistakes should perhaps be weighted more heavily than can be predicted.
Escalation is always a non-zero probability An accidental strike or a perceived insult could cause fighting which would lead to casualties to spill into such territory. Putin could perceive the up-tick in NATO support as already having crossed the line and act accordingly.
I am keeping my forecast the same
I have done some additional research and considered heuristics that may be holding back a more clear forecast, but have decided to stand pat
This article was very informative about why there likely will not be more than 400 protests in the given span of time. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-changed-lives-0fb016f9eb055b189b2b46e282867168
5th Forecast/4th revision
Making sure not to fall into the conjunction fallacy. -- adding information does not mean that we can assess probability better, but we know that this is not necessarily true.
So I have done some additional research to better inform and quantify outside and inside views, but I have decided not to update score by more than 1% out in the curve, because I think that though I have more to think about, the probability has not shifted. Adding onto the class discussion, the group discussed the material that we used to assess the likelihood of a a large amount of protests. I am drawing on much of the same sources as I did for the question about Putin's approval rating, which I see as intimately linked.
New articles consulted:
https://unherd.com/2023/02/do-ordinary-russians-support-putins-war/
"The West is fixated on the idea that “Putin’s war” is not Russia’s, and that the Russian people only support it because they have been “zombified” by a totalitarian regime. But this is missing the wood for the trees."
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/23/world/europe/moscow-flowers-protest-ukraine-war-dnipro.html
"Amid Russia’s crackdown on resistance to the war in Ukraine, some have dared to lay bouquets and other offerings at a statue of a Ukrainian poet, protesting the recent Russian strike on civilians in Dnipro."
Outside view: For outside view, looked beyond the research offered by ACLED. looked to https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/protest-tracker to get a better sense of size and frequency of protests globally and in Russia more specifically in recent years.
Inside view: Looking at ACLED stats, it seems as if the first bucket has been breached, hence the 0%, though I am. going to adjust slightly higher out the curve because I think I was too focused on the shortened time. Looking at statistics on the links above, when protest did break out in. large numbers, there was infrequently a lead up. Protests occurred in Russia at the outbreak of the war, and to a certain extent continue in pockets, but these are relatively large numbers to reach given the short time frame.
Restating some unchanged views that with Putin's approval rating quite high and approval with the war shared among many Russians, there will be more physical and social pressure against any groundswell of such protests. Russian police are adept and handling protestors and even if they weren't the elongation of the conflict and tedium of a protracted war lower the visibility and thus outrage needed to spark mass protests.
It is possible that Putin's decision to stand by his invasion and defend it could spark some protests, but I think more than 400 is exceedingly unlikely.
7th forecast, 6th revision
Initial update: refreshing for time (7 days) down to 0% (in actual fact it is a fraction of 1 approaching zero because there is a non-zero probability, but I want to express the unlikely nature of this result. In addition, Putin has effectively deployed the "us-vs.-them" mentality in Russia (similar to how Franco played European economic pressure against Spain by blaming Europe rather than him and retained high support). For this reason and confirming my previous research, I update down to 0%.
I realized that there are instances where Putin might even have pro-war sentiment that argue he is being too soft. This is highly unlikely, but might occasion some protests on the other side, so that is something I hadn't considered--protests on the other end of the spectrum. Also re-adjusting for time so I am staying with 1% as I thought I misunderstood the time length, but then clarified that it is indeed over at March 1st; the discussion also motivated additional research and assessment of possible confirmation bias in my first attempts.
Outside view would be support for leaders during a war. Additional filter could be approval rating of Russian leaders during conflict. The text "Spin Dictators" puts forth a hypothesis that modern authoritarian leaders (including Putin, which would move this into the realm of inside view) have perfected spin and no longer trade so much in fear as they do manipulation. Accordingly, it is unlikely that this effective strategy would change in the next three weeks.
Inside view:
New insights, one of the new articles I read (published 2/14) argued that the west was far too focused on the idea that Russians are brainwashed rather than the fact that they support the war. While this would seemingly make the approval rating less likely to drop lower, I think it actually might make it slightly more likely for protests to occur, if they think the war is actually just, instead of just ignorant or brainwashed, there is a higher chance they can recognize that they are incorrect. a bit of a stretch, but possible.
Retained insights: the approval rating of this leader, Putin, during this war, has not come close to 50%. Most recent numbers show the number to be around 80%. Given Putin's proven ability to control domestic messaging and to pit his country's woes as us vs. them, this level of approval is unlikely to change at home. Given the observation that his approval rating actually increased following his invasion of Ukraine, it is highly unlikely that anything in the context of that war will see the rating dip below 50% in the next three weeks.
New articles consulted:
https://unherd.com/2023/02/do-ordinary-russians-support-putins-war/
"The West is fixated on the idea that “Putin’s war” is not Russia’s, and that the Russian people only support it because they have been “zombified” by a totalitarian regime. But this is missing the wood for the trees."
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/23/world/europe/moscow-flowers-protest-ukraine-war-dnipro.html
"Amid Russia’s crackdown on resistance to the war in Ukraine, some have dared to lay bouquets and other offerings at a statue of a Ukrainian poet, protesting the recent Russian strike on civilians in Dnipro."
Previous articles consulted:
By all accounts, Putins support remains robust at home in Russia. According to statista, his approval rating was below 50% only at the start of his tenure as leader, but in the past decade it has not dipped below 59% (May 2020) and has climbed since the invasion.
This article argues that Russians have largely shifted toward support or indifference with respect to the war and a drop in approval would require a stronger negative sentiment.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-russians-learned-stop-worrying-and-love-war
Other citations:
https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/
Updated to 0% from 1%; There is a silent flower protest in Russia which might point to a lower approval rating. (https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/23/world/europe/moscow-flowers-protest-ukraine-war-dnipro.html)
Also, there could be some unforeseen circumstance (avoiding WYSIATI)
6th forecast, 5th revision
After discussing with group, I initially updated from 1% to 2% , but going back to 1%. I realized that there are instances where Putin might even have pro-war sentiment that argue he is being too soft. This is highly unlikely, but might occasion some protests on the other side, so that is something I hadn't considered--protests on the other end of the spectrum. Also re-adjusting for time so I am staying with 1% as I thought I misunderstood the time length, but then clarified that it is indeed over at March 1st; the discussion also motivated additional research and assessment of possible confirmation bias in my first attempts.
Outside view would be support for leaders during a war. Additional filter could be approval rating of Russian leaders during conflict. The text "Spin Dictators" puts forth a hypothesis that modern authoritarian leaders (including Putin, which would move this into the realm of inside view) have perfected spin and no longer trade so much in fear as they do manipulation. Accordingly, it is unlikely that this effective strategy would change in the next three weeks.
Inside view:
New insights, one of the new articles I read (published 2/14) argued that the west was far too focused on the idea that Russians are brainwashed rather than the fact that they support the war. While this would seemingly make the approval rating less likely to drop lower, I think it actually might make it slightly more likely for protests to occur, if they think the war is actually just, instead of just ignorant or brainwashed, there is a higher chance they can recognize that they are incorrect. a bit of a stretch, but possible.
Retained insights: the approval rating of this leader, Putin, during this war, has not come close to 50%. Most recent numbers show the number to be around 80%. Given Putin's proven ability to control domestic messaging and to pit his country's woes as us vs. them, this level of approval is unlikely to change at home. Given the observation that his approval rating actually increased following his invasion of Ukraine, it is highly unlikely that anything in the context of that war will see the rating dip below 50% in the next three weeks.
New articles consulted:
https://unherd.com/2023/02/do-ordinary-russians-support-putins-war/
"The West is fixated on the idea that “Putin’s war” is not Russia’s, and that the Russian people only support it because they have been “zombified” by a totalitarian regime. But this is missing the wood for the trees."
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/23/world/europe/moscow-flowers-protest-ukraine-war-dnipro.html
"Amid Russia’s crackdown on resistance to the war in Ukraine, some have dared to lay bouquets and other offerings at a statue of a Ukrainian poet, protesting the recent Russian strike on civilians in Dnipro."
Previous articles consulted:
By all accounts, Putins support remains robust at home in Russia. According to statista, his approval rating was below 50% only at the start of his tenure as leader, but in the past decade it has not dipped below 59% (May 2020) and has climbed since the invasion.
This article argues that Russians have largely shifted toward support or indifference with respect to the war and a drop in approval would require a stronger negative sentiment.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-russians-learned-stop-worrying-and-love-war
Other citations:
https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/
Updated back to 1% from 2%; group discussion pointed out that protests could pop up organically and that there is a silent flower protest in Russia which might point to a lower approval rating.
(https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/23/world/europe/moscow-flowers-protest-ukraine-war-dnipro.html)
4th Forecast/3rd revision
Making sure not to fall into the conjunction fallacy. -- adding information does not mean that we can assess probability better, but we know that this is not necessarily true.
So I have done some additional research to better inform and quantify outside and inside views, but I have decided not to update score by more than 1% out in the curve, because I think that though I have more to think about, the probability has not shifted. Adding onto the class discussion, the group discussed the material that we used to assess the likelihood of a a large amount of protests. I am drawing on much of the same sources as I did for the question about Putin's approval rating, which I see as intimately linked.
New articles consulted:
https://unherd.com/2023/02/do-ordinary-russians-support-putins-war/
"The West is fixated on the idea that “Putin’s war” is not Russia’s, and that the Russian people only support it because they have been “zombified” by a totalitarian regime. But this is missing the wood for the trees."
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/23/world/europe/moscow-flowers-protest-ukraine-war-dnipro.html
"Amid Russia’s crackdown on resistance to the war in Ukraine, some have dared to lay bouquets and other offerings at a statue of a Ukrainian poet, protesting the recent Russian strike on civilians in Dnipro."
Outside view: For outside view, looked beyond the research offered by ACLED. looked to https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/protest-tracker to get a better sense of size and frequency of protests globally and in Russia more specifically in recent years.
Inside view: Looking at ACLED stats, it seems as if the first bucket has been breached, hence the 0%, though I am. going to adjust slightly higher out the curve because I think I was too focused on the shortened time. Looking at statistics on the links above, when protest did break out in. large numbers, there was infrequently a lead up. Protests occurred in Russia at the outbreak of the war, and to a certain extent continue in pockets, but these are relatively large numbers to reach given the short time frame.
Restating some unchanged views that with Putin's approval rating quite high and approval with the war shared among many Russians, there will be more physical and social pressure against any groundswell of such protests. Russian police are adept and handling protestors and even if they weren't the elongation of the conflict and tedium of a protracted war lower the visibility and thus outrage needed to spark mass protests.
the likelihood of protests spiking is non-zero probability and could be occasioned by unforeseen circumstances and a devastating economic downturn at home or in the conflict that directly impacts the common Russian that would participate in such protests. In addition, as mentioned in the Putin approval rating question, Putin could actually support some unrest home to support a twisted logic if political survival.
Why do you think you're right?
After team discussion, I am bumping up from 0% back to 1%. This is on the back of our consideration about internal protests or the escalation of Putin's rhetoric.
Source: https://www.afr.com/world/europe/putin-rails-against-west-in-ukraine-war-speech-20230221-p5cmet
Outside view remains the same. Inside view updated after talk and Putin's speech.
Why might you be wrong?
I could be wrong about the probability being so low since it is not unprecedented historically to have approval drop in the middle of a war.
Reference: Vietnam and the LBJ administration