ac2399

The Russian government has successfully framed the war as "us vs them." Russia has successfully utilized propaganda and patriotism education to rally and sustain public support. Many of the methods used by the Russian government can also be found in Imperial Japan during the years that led up to the Pacific War. (https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/02/18/existential-war-putin-steels-russia-for-long-conflict-a80248)

After discussing with my teammate, we agreed that recent developments warrant an increase in our forecasting. However, given the timeframe, I stand by my previous forecast of bumping up only 1%.

Recent developments include Russian official's threat of nuclear war (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-ally-medvedev-warns-nuclear-war-if-russia-defeated-ukraine-2023-01-19/), which is accompanied by Putin's state of the union address, in which he announced that Russia is suspending the New START arms control treaty. In addition, Biden's visit to Kiev may further instigate Russian aggression.

upon discussing with @mjv48 , they pointed out that the West portrays the war in Ukraine as Putin's war but not Russia's war, which is not necessarily the case. They further cited data from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which shows while there are sporadic protests in Russia, there is not a momentum that sustains the protests that would indicate the number breaking the 400 barrier in the given timeframe.

Similar reasons which I used to argue for Putin's approval rate.

- Western sanctions are proving to have limited effect on Russia's economy and civilian life.

- Russian military advancing into Bakhmut.

Furthermore, with the one-year anniversary coming up, Russian government may be putting more efforts into suppressing protests (similar as how the Chinese government increases police patrols during anniversaries of the Tiananmen massacre)

- Russia's economy did not shrink as much as the West anticipated (https://www.bbc.com/news/business-64708832), making less impacts on civilian lives.

- Russian military is performing well in the attack on Bakhmut (https://www.rferl.org/a/zelenskiy-russia-legal-consequences-ukraine/32278037.html).

5th forecast - bumping up my forecast by 1%

- Sky News reported that two Russian missiles came close to hitting a nuclear power plant in Ukraine, which would've triggered a nuclear disaster. Russia's attempted assault on the nuclear power plant may be an indication of escalation, which could incentivize NATO's direct military engagement with Russia. 

- Chechen leader stated that he is planning to establish his own Wagner-like mercenary group. Given his previous threat of attacking Poland (as I posted last week), he may planning to carry out the attack with new team of mercenaries. Since Chechenya is one of Russia's biggest ally in the war in Ukraine, Russia may be forced to back Chechenya's potential invasion of Poland. (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/19/chechen-leader-kadyrov-lauds-wagners-hard-work-in-ukraine)

- Wang Yi's visit to Moscow (https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-visit-to-moscow-showcases-deepening-ties-with-russia-feba99d2) and reports of China contemplating about providing Russia with military aid (https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/18/blinken-china-russia-war-ukraine-00083577) could bolster Russia's aggression.

- A Russian IL-20M Coot-A and two Su-27 Flankers were intercepted near Polish airspace (https://www.politico.eu/article/dutch-jet-f35-intercept-russia-military-aircraft-poland-ministry/).

My teammate noted that NATO-Russia communication lines remain open - lowering the possibility that Russia will strike NATO member state.

Furthermore, my teammate pointed out that since the outbreak of the war, no Russian military operations have resulted in 25 or more NATO fatalities.

Confirming my previous forecast and reasoning. My teammate also noted that Western countries are having a hard time penetrating Russian media, making it more unlikely for Putin's approval rate to drop below 50% in roughly 2 weeks.

History also suggests that wartime leaders usually see an increase in their popularity (https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2020/jan/04/trump-iran-suleimani-president-approval-ratings).

Upon discussing with my teammate, I realized that my original understanding of the question was wrong. ACLED data shows that there were 203 protests/riots in Russia in April, 2022, therefore the highest number of recorded protest/riot will be 203 or up - thus I changed the percentage of "less than 200" to zero.

Given that protest/riot numbers have not surpass 203 since April, 2022, even during September, 2022, when Putin's approval rate dropped due to mobilization, I believe the highest recorded number of protest/riot between the given dates will be in the 200-400 range.

Edited my forecast from last time and put more percentage on less than 200 because Russia is launching a new offensive on Ukraine, and past record has shown that Putin's approval rate rises when Russia launches major military operations (as seen in 2014 and 2022), which we can assume that would lead to a decline in protest number.