sk22

Re-adjusting percentages based on the recent Putin's reaffirming state address and potential positive responses.

Lowering my percentage further in response to more evidence for the economic lens discussed during my consultation and as noted in my previous rationales.

Putin's recent state of the nation address was also re-affirming and seemed to have positively received.

Keeping my forecast the same in line with previous rationales. An additional piece of evidence that makes the escalation from Russian side clear (and reaffirms my belief in the 17 percent forecast) is Putin's state of the nation address where he came out and said "They [the West] started the war. And we used force and are using force to stop it." He also said "the longer the range of the Western systems that will be supplied to Ukraine, the further we will have to move the threat away from our borders. This is obvious."

I think, these are clear signs of warning that if NATO continues to be more involved, as we are seeing with Biden gathering the allies for a meeting again, the incentives for striking back and countermeasures will only rise.

I have raised my confidence in the 200-400 range and lowered it in the 0-200 range. My reasoning has not changed much from prior forecasts. ACLED already recorded 203 protests in April 2022 so the threshold has crossed beyond 200, and these protests are on a decreasing trend which suggests that we won't see them go any higher than the 200-400 range.

This article further notes the unprecedented level of repression that Russian authorities have been involved in, which will serve as a disincentive to further mass protests (ACLED has noted similar trends for earlier years).

I am adding two percentage point to my forecast based on new evidence on my previous rationale i.e., the incentives for Russia to strike NATO are on the rise.

In my previous, analysis I noted NATO's ammunition stockpiles depleting, lack of EU and NATO consensus on how to help Ukraine, and the Feb 10 Romanian-Moldovan missile incident.

Adding on a new outside view, I discovered that over time for Russia this war has not just been one against Ukraine/gaining back what it considers it's territory but it's against the West and particularly NATO.  A detailed report by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on the framing of the war by the Kremlin has noted that the narrative being projected is that of fighting against the collective West - a threat to Russian values, culture, and success. In this very manner, any NATO involvement (which at this moment is considerable), will not be taken lightly.

Adding on an inside view, several Russian officials and close advisers to Putin himself have warned retaliation in response to NATO's increased involvement in Ukraine. There are noticeable signs of NATO being aggressive, both on the battlefield and in international forums. In late January of this year, the chairman of the NATO Military Committee said "the alliance is ready to directly fight Russia." At the Munich Security Conference on Feb 17, the NATO Secretary General said "we will not allow President (Vladimir) Putin to win this war." The German Defense minster made similar comments. These comments will only serve to escalate a war that Putin already perceives as a NATO vs Russia based.

In terms of the battlefield, we see similar signs of escalation. Poland has already sounded the alarm of an anticipated attack calling all members to prepare.  The UK has now come out in support of helping countries that would provide F-16s to Ukraine. Late last month, France led combat exercises in Romania to "to test the 30-nation military alliance’s readiness on its eastern flank." On Feb 14, Russian military aircrafts were also intercepted by the Dutch, as they were found to be directly over NATO territory. These are signs of tension events that could be leading to something potentially big as time passes.

While still forecasting in the "highly unlikley" zone (based on the 2015 DNI IC Directive 203), based on these trends it seems that gradually the odds of this event occurring are increasing.

I am keeping my forecast percentage the same as before for a couple of reasons. My outside view rationale is unchanged. Russian leaders' approval ratings have been strongly correlated with the state of the economy (see Buckley 2020, Treisman 2011) and so have more broadly for authoritarian states as well (see Gurlev and Treisman 2020).

Bringing in the inside lens, Russia's economy has survived way better than the West had intended. Another source, this time by The Economist, found Russia at the end of last year to be doing "surprisingly well." This was in addition to other sources I gathered in my previous forecast that suggested similar trends (see CSIS, Forbes, Reuters).

Given that no significant change has occured recently and India and China continue to provide alternative markets for Russian crude, it is unlikely that drastic economic shifts significant to change public opinion will occur in the next month.

Even if one considers, alternative viewpoints that are non-economic based, such as losses on the battlefield, Russia's recent "successful" offense in Bakhmut means that Russia is projecting strength to its citizens. Given his past success with all time high ratings during Crimea, his approval rating dropping below 50 in the next few weeks has none to a very remote chance.

UPDATE: I am further raising my confidence in the above event happening by increasing the forecast percentage by another 2%. I did so based on both my consultation with my teammate who re-affirmed the evidence and rationale I had in my previous forecast as well as the following news events that occurred in the time between this and the last forecast.

On Monday, Feb 13, Russia launched an attack in Bakhmut, which analysts have called the beginning of the Russia's new offense. This aligned with a NATO defense minsters' meeting in Brussels today, where the Secretary General called out Putin for his offensive tactics and showing "no signs of peace." To this the Kremlin has responded by saying that NATO is becoming "more and more involved in the conflict." These words signify that tensions are rising each day and in Putin's perception the incentives to launch a counterattack first and respond are increasing. NATO's ammunition stockpiles have also been reported to be momentarily depleting, which further hints at this being a potential "right time" to attack.

While still highly unlikely in the present moment, I think that the above event is gradually moving toward the more worrisome "realistic probability."

UPDATE: My teammate pointed out that the question specifically asks for ACLED recorded protests, and not just whether those protests will occur in those numbers or not. Given that ACLED has already recorded 203 in April 2022, it would reasonable to raise confidence in the 200-400 range (hence the re-adjustment). I still forecast 6% for the 0-200 based on my past rationale that still seemed relevant.

Reasoning Prior to Consultation: I have adjusted the above probability in two directions: I have lowered my confidence in the 200-400 range but still forecasted a "likely" scenario, and I have raised my confidence in the 0-200 category based on both a reassessment of the data and recent news events (although still kept this in the highly unlikely category).

First, yes while it is true that ACLED reported 203 protests in Russia in April 2022 but based on this number alone, especially given its closeness to 200 itself, one cannot be so sure of its credibility and go ahead with forecasting in the 200-400 range. There is always room for miscalculations based on the ground situation. And also one must be aware that since September 2022, the situation has been calmer and protests have consistently been under 50 per month.

Given that Putin's approval has been steadily high since the war, he is projecting confidence in the media, and the economy adjusting to sanction shocks, Russian population has weak incentives to protest on a large scale. Hence, protests reaching the 600+ categories in one single month have almost none to a remote chance. The 200-400 category is the most reasonable forecast.

I realize that the 20% forecast in the 0-200 category is alarming, but given that recently protests have been met with excessive force (68% of all since 2021), there are active disincentives to protesting beyond the base level fear of being arrested (on top of positive incentives for not doing so).

UPDATE: After consultation with my teammate, I have decided to keep my forecast the same. A notable additional rationale that re-affirmed this percentage for me via our dicussion, was the discovery of this Washington Post article. The article notes the historic level of mass exodus and emigration from Russia post its Ukraine war. This means that a lot of the subsets of population who either oppose the war (and indirectly Putin) or are afraid of their safety will not be a part of the new approval rating survey population. So while in reality, his approval may be low, it is safe to assume that those currently inside are unlikely to change their opinion by over 32 percentage points (current rating is at 82%) in the next few weeks.

Reasoning Prior to Consultation: Previously forecasting this I noted past approval trends for Putin such that an unprecedented drop as asked by this question was improbable. Adding onto those insights, I'm further lowering the probability of this scenario.

From a generic outside view, it is widely noted in the academic literature, both recent and old, that for authoritarian regimes approval ratings correspond a lot with economic performance, or at least the perceptions of it. Going one step deeper, multiple scholars studying the Russian context closely and surveying their demographic space have found this to be the case as well.

Now looking at the Russian economy post Ukraine war, it cannot be denied that there have been dents and damages as this EU report highlights. However, studying closely these damages are not too significant or beyond control. In fact, some measures such as the Moscow Exchange Index (MOEX) have already begun to rise. Dr. Sergey Aleksashenko (a Russian economist and Member of the Board of the Free Russia Foundation) further noted at a recent talk hosted by Center for Strategic Studies (a U.S bipartisan think thank), Russia's expansion in military expenditures and subsequent adjustments to local companies is allowing Russia to sustain the damages. Insert recent reports on China's "under the table" military aid to Russia and Putin's reaffirmation in the economy going as far as saying "Nothing (in Russia) has collapsed and nothing is falling apart," evidence is pretty strong for forecasting the above.

Based on these insights, it seems that the Russian economy is re-adjusting for the better and Putin's constant public reaffirmations in Russia's strength will only work to raise public confidence than lower it. For these reasons, my forecast is 2 percent.

I have adjusted the above probability in two directions: I have lowered my confidence in the 200-400 range but still forecasted a "likely" scenario, and I have raised my confidence in the 0-200 category based on both a reassessment of the data and recent news events (although still kept this in the highly unlikely category).

First, yes while it is true that ACLED reported 203 protests in Russia in April 2022 but based on this number alone, especially given its closeness to 200 itself, one cannot be so sure of its credibility and go ahead with forecasting in the 200-400 range. There is always room for miscalculations based on the ground situation. And also one must be aware that since September 2022, the situation has been calmer and protests have consistently been under 50 per month.

Given that Putin's approval has been steadily high since the war, he is projecting confidence in the media, and the economy adjusting to sanction shocks, Russian population has weak incentives to protest on a large scale. Hence, protests reaching the 600+ categories in one single month have almost none to a remote chance. The 200-400 category is the most reasonable forecast.

I realize that the 20% forecast in the 0-200 category is alarming, but given that recently protests have been met with excessive force (68% of all since 2021), there are active disincentives to protesting beyond the base level fear of being arrested (on top of positive incentives for not doing so).