GenericRooster

The consensus at 1% seems a bit too low.

•  Israel and Saudi Arabia very probably both want a deal, in principle. The US would also like a deal; and specifically, Trump likes the announcement of deals, which is what matters for this question.
• It appears that negotiations on normalisation are ongoing, at least indirectly via the US. The two parties just don't want to publicly acknowledge this at present. Recent public denial of a breakthrough is evidence that negotiations are happening, even if it's only "talks about talks".
• Gaza: a deal on Gaza is a precondition for full normalisation talks, and is uncertain but plausible (maybe 20%-50%?). Some reporting sounds quite optimistic, suggesting substantial progress e.g. https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-gaza-ceasefire-cef24afd0e206c4b18d89ea870193188 - although there remains a core problem that Netanyahu wants to be able to continue the war.
• If there's a deal on Gaza, MBS gets domestic cover to acknowledge publicly that there are talks, provided he's clear that normalisation would require agreement on the future of the Palestinians.

So using point estimates: 25% Gaza peace * 80% meaningful talks * 50% public acknowledgement = 10%. But I'm nervous that six months isn't long enough for the sequence of required steps, so I'll halve that to 5%.

Time; and a lack of clear, specific evidence of a major Russia buildup near Kharkiv.

Russia's approach has increasingly been to advance by creating salients / pincers rather than just grinding forward directly. So even if Kharkiv city were a priority objective and Russia were making progress nearby, they might not reach the city proper by the end of 2024.

Although it's not clear what precisely was agreed between SNA and SDF, in the past day or so there appears to have been fighting at both of the main river crossings in the area. And ISW's notes (https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-10-2024) include a link indicating that SNA reached the river about halfway between those two river crossings, at Qal'at Najm, https://t.me/Dawn_of_Freedom1/268. The Euphrates is an obvious boundary.

Additionally, for whatever it's worth, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights apparently believes the deal is to "relocate entirely to the east of the Euphrates". (https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/814838/syrian-observatory-sdf-to-withdraw-east-of-euphrates-amid-ceasefire-agreement)

Limited time. Syria. Slow progress by Russia in Kursk.

Kharkiv: still in contention. A mistake or bad luck for Ukraine could allow a Russian attack.

Kyiv: lack of time, resources, or priority for Russia.

Odesa: limited time, and no (known) substantial forces within striking distance. Unless the Russians have sneaked large forces into Transnistria, they lack the resources there. An attack from the Dnipro direction would take too long (for 2024 resolution). I'm unsure if a seaborne attack could count for resolution, but it might be entirely impractical anyway.