Related questions. This question is part of a cluster that includes U.S. exports of semiconductor chips to China, U.S. exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China, and Chinese imports of semiconductor chips. A version of this question was previously issued for 2021. You can view those forecasts here. That question has not yet resolved. The mean crowd forecast for that question -- made before 2020 data was available -- is $33 billion.

Context. The semiconductor manufacturing process has many components manufactured through complicated, highly globalized supply chains. China's ability to produce advanced semiconductor chips is particularly dependent on U.S., Japanese, and Dutch imports of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) -- i.e., the tools used by chip factories to make chips. Although China is building up its chip manufacturing capacity using imported SME, it is still reliant on imports for most of the semiconductor chips it consumes. China is especially reliant on the United States, Taiwan, and South Korea for imports of the most advanced semiconductor chips. Therefore, export controls on chips could reduce China's access to them. If China cannot import SME, it will remain dependent on imports for chips. This question focuses on SME. The United States is considering a number of actions that would reduce the export of SME to China. 

Data and resolution details. This question resolves based on United Nations Comtrade data. We classified imports as SME if they have any of the following Harmonized System (HS) codes 8486, 903082, 903141, 854311, 901041. 

The data underlying the graph is here.

This question is a metric for the following scenario:

• Four Possible Scenarios for U.S.-China [De]Coupling in the Semiconductor Industry

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