The historical base rate is low but non-negligible: it can be computed in multiple ways, as outlined by other forecasters below, but anything between a 5-15% probability over 6 months is a reasonable assessment.
It is more complex to decipher whether NK's recent activities imply an increased risk for an event of this type.
Kim Jong Un's recent strengthening of his partnership with Putin is interesting. By sending military personnel to fight alongside Russian troops in Ukraine, NK is putting the lives of its citizens at risk in a war that can't improve NK's situation. What is the goal?
And as relations with Russia strengthen, Kim reduces the vulnerability that comes with dependence on China, a country whose own relationship with North Korea goes through periods of romance and frostiness. [1]
The NK-Russia partnership is best understood when looking at it in the broader context of their relationship with China, which is not happy with the increased tensions between the two Koreas.
Although China has been supportive of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the North Korean piece of the puzzle cannot be comforting in the least. For one, China does not like Russia to have so much influence over the North. In addition, if the longer-term ramifications of this cooperation lead to greater DPRK capabilities that invite even more U.S. military presence and allied capabilities in China’s region, that does not benefit China. Thus far, China’s reaction to North Korea’s support of Russia has been caught somewhere between paralysis and incompetence, lacking either the political will or policy ingenuity to create disincentives for either party. [2]
I still need to dig deeper into this issue, but it would seem that China remains in a strong position to disincentivize NK from taking aggressive actions against the South. So while KJU is trying to move away from the Chinese orbit and into the Russian one, it is too early for a more open aggression.
What is instead much more likely to happen is an accident as a result of NK's continuous poking at ROK. The more activity happens in the proximity of the NLL, the more likely this question can be resolved as "Yes". Incursions and live-fire drills from either side are sporadic and far between at the moment, so I don't think confrontations and clashes will happen frequently.
[1] Russia-DPRK Relations: Strategic Partnership or Opportunistic Alliance?
Hezbollah's new leader supports a ceasefire agreement that does not involve a truce in Gaza. Iran is encouraging the initiative.
The proposed 60-day ceasefire has 3 objectives:
Objectives 1. and 2. would require Lebanon to elect a president beforehand. Objective 3. does not seem particularly attainable, and might be the reason why this attempt at negotiating a lasting ceasefire fails.
Dropping the requirement that a ceasefire deal has to include Gaza implies that a Lebanon-only truce is more likely to happen. In turn, this creates a window of opportunity for the election of a President.
[1] Reuters - Who is Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hezbollah's new leader?
[2] Naharnet - Will there be a 60-day truce in Lebanon?