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The IAEA just released a new report, in which it is confirmed that in the period between August and October Iran increased its stockpile of Uranium enriched up to 60%. 

•  182.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+17.6 kg) [1]

This is almost certainly the last report of the year. 

[1] Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

September data is out.

MoM there's a small dip vs August. There might be a seasonal component as September has a spike in Asia Pacific revenue also in previous years, but it could also be random.

What matters is that the Americas share is well above the 28.0% threshold.

PERIOD	SHARE
Last month	31.1%  📉 ( -1.4% )
Past 3 months	31.1% 📉 ( -0.1% )
Past 12 months	28.8% 📈( +0.4% )
2024 so far	29.4% 📈 ( 0.2% )

Confirmed previous forecast

The passage of time without any relevant news implies it's quite likely he will remain in charge.

What is driving NVIDIA's stock price so high? Increasing demand for graphic processors.

Why did the demand for graphic processors increase? It is required to train and operate LLMs

It would seem therefore obvious that our insatiable hunger for better-performing AI models will continue to pump the value of Nvidia higher and higher. 

Here's a problem:

OpenAI's next flagship artificial-intelligence model [Orion--Ed] is showing smaller improvements compared with previous iterations, The Information reported, in a sign that the booming generative-AI industry may be approaching a plateau. [1]

This was bound to happen. Here are two reasons for it:

• There is a finite amount of high-quality training data available online
• The available computing power is also finite. At a certain point, it poses limitations to training.

Sure, the scarcity of computing power is what is currently driving Nvidia's value.

Here is another way to interpret the current situation: through the lens of the law of diminishing returns.

The industry has so far achieved great improvements by picking the low-hanging fruits. Now the effort demanded to achieve small incremental improvements is growing at an accelerated pace.

This is also proved by the ever-shrinking difference in capabilities between competing models.

If the difference between newer and older models becomes only marginal, the price premium customers are willing to pay for new releases will be lower.

There will be a point, in the not-so-distant future, when the cost to obtain such marginal improvements will skyrocket. At such a time, aggressively accumulating raw processing power might not be a good strategy to remain competitive.

[1] OpenAI is reportedly struggling to improve its next big AI model. It's a warning for the entire AI industry.

Biden is trying to hail Mary a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. The exclusion of Gaza from the negotiation implies a higher chance it might be successful.

It appears Israel is not interested in prolonging the efforts in Lebanon, with its sole stated goal of implementing Resolution 1701.

U.S. officials said Netanyahu indicated to the Biden administration that he wants to end the war in Lebanon within weeks. [1]

President Biden's senior adviser Amos Hochstein said he believes "there is a shot" of securing a ceasefire deal in Lebanon soon [2]

It remains to be seen if any solid proposal would emerge, and if Hezbollah will make concessions.

Berri, endorsed to negotiate by Hezbollah, told Asharq al-Awsat newspaper that Lebanon had not been informed officially of any new proposals for a ceasefire, which several rounds of U.S.-led diplomacy have failed to secure over the last year. [3]

Once again, whatever the provisions of an agreed ceasefire, it would likely require Lebanon to elect a President for it to be properly implemented.

[1] Trump and Netanyahu envoy met about Middle East wars

[2] Biden envoy says "there is a shot" of ceasefire in Lebanon soon

[3] Lebanon awaits truce proposals after US envoy expresses hope

@Rene makes a great point here: increased uncertainty. 

It seems quite clear that Trump intends to drastically alter the US approach to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The US has been the single greatest supporter of the Ukrainian military effort, so Ukraine might soon be forced to accept conditions on a ceasefire or risk losing further territory. A military disengagement becomes more likely in the next few years and, even if by a small extent, increases the possibility that freed Russian military capacity could be used elsewhere. 

I'm not raising my forecast, as I believe a 3% cumulative chance that Russia could engage in the Baltic states is already sufficiently high.

It might have been better to have a single question on the likelihood of invasion of any of those countries, and then a separate conditional question on the most likely victim of such invasion.

• Down 1% due to the passage of time
• Down another 1% due to the shrinking risk of non-natural death/removal

The arrival of NK troops that will fight alongside Russia reliefs at least some pressure from the constant need for the conscription of new personnel. 

The election of Trump will likely cause Ukraine to lose one of its most important lifelines. The better the war goes for Russia, the less likely Putin could face internal discontent. 

Again great points from @Rene here about how a Trump administration would allow Russia to increase pressure and influence over all of the listed countries. 

We know Putin likely dreams of building a new Russian Empire, including a wide range of countries from what he defines as "historical Russia", so here's a thought experiment.

Assume that in his lifetime Putin will attempt to conquer as much of this alleged historical Russia as possible. To do so, he needs military power. As of today, most of Russian military capabilities are engaged along the border with Ukraine. If a Trump Presidency makes an earlier ending of the conflict with Ukraine more likely (at least in terms of reaching a lasting ceasefire), then one could hypothesize that Putin might divert the freed military capacity elsewhere.

One of the recurring themes in the rationales is along the lines of: Russia is already struggling to maintain its overextended army in Ukraine, it is therefore unlikely Putin will engage elsewhere until the conflict is not resolved. A Trump administration might weaken this argument.

Temporarily maintaining my forecast at 1%.

Missile strikes hit both Kharkiv and Odesa recently, and some news outlets speak about a possible intensification of the effort to control Kharkiv. 

It remains unlikely that a large-scale offensive will start before the end of the year. There are no signs of any ongoing preparation for an operation of that size.

 If Putin believes that under Trump the US will halt the flow of weaponry to Ukraine, then it might be best to wait a later moment to initiate an offensive. 

[1] Overnight Russian attacks across Ukraine kill one, wound more than 30