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Hezbollah's new leader supports a ceasefire agreement that does not involve a truce in Gaza. Iran is encouraging the initiative.

But he added the group supported the efforts of parliament speaker Nabih Berri - a Hezbollah ally - to secure a ceasefire, for the first time omitting any mention of a Gaza truce deal as a pre-condition for halting the group's fire on Israel. [1]

Western intelligence sources believe Iran would allow Hezbollah to agree to a ceasefire, and perhaps even encourage it, even if the fighting in Gaza does not end. [2]

The proposed 60-day ceasefire has 3 objectives:

1. Wider implementation of U.N. Resolution 1701
2. Establishment of an international mechanism to supervise the area
3. Preventing Hezbollah from rearming

Objectives 1. and 2. would require Lebanon to elect a president beforehand. Objective 3. does not seem particularly attainable, and might be the reason why this attempt at negotiating a lasting ceasefire fails.

Dropping the requirement that a ceasefire deal has to include Gaza implies that a Lebanon-only truce is more likely to happen. In turn, this creates a window of opportunity for the election of a President.

[1] Reuters - Who is Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hezbollah's new leader?

[2] Naharnet - Will there be a 60-day truce in Lebanon?

The historical base rate is low but non-negligible: it can be computed in multiple ways, as outlined by other forecasters below, but anything between a 5-15% probability over 6 months is a reasonable assessment.

It is more complex to decipher whether NK's recent activities imply an increased risk for an event of this type.

Kim Jong Un's recent strengthening of his partnership with Putin is interesting. By sending military personnel to fight alongside Russian troops in Ukraine, NK is putting the lives of its citizens at risk in a war that can't improve NK's situation. What is the goal? 

And as relations with Russia strengthen, Kim reduces the vulnerability that comes with dependence on China, a country whose own relationship with North Korea goes through periods of romance and frostiness. [1]

The NK-Russia partnership is best understood when looking at it in the broader context of their relationship with China, which is not happy with the increased tensions between the two Koreas. 

Although China has been supportive of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the North Korean piece of the puzzle cannot be comforting in the least. For one, China does not like Russia to have so much influence over the North. In addition, if the longer-term ramifications of this cooperation lead to greater DPRK capabilities that invite even more U.S. military presence and allied capabilities in China’s region, that does not benefit China. Thus far, China’s reaction to North Korea’s support of Russia has been caught somewhere between paralysis and incompetence, lacking either the political will or policy ingenuity to create disincentives for either party. [2]

I still need to dig deeper into this issue, but it would seem that China remains in a strong position to disincentivize NK from taking aggressive actions against the South. So while KJU is trying to move away from the Chinese orbit and into the Russian one, it is too early for a more open aggression.

What is instead much more likely to happen is an accident as a result of NK's continuous poking at ROK. The more activity happens in the proximity of the NLL, the more likely this question can be resolved as "Yes". Incursions and live-fire drills from either side are sporadic and far between at the moment, so I don't think confrontations and clashes will happen frequently.

[1] Russia-DPRK Relations: Strategic Partnership or Opportunistic Alliance?

[2] Crossing the Rubicon: DPRK Sends Troops to Russia

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A session for the election of a new President cannot be convened as long as the safety of Hezbollah lawmakers cannot be guaranteed.

in light of Israel's offensive, Speaker Nabih Berri said parliamentary sessions to elect a president cannot happen if Hezbollah's 13 lawmakers are unable to attend these sessions as they are potential targets for Israel. [1]

An election could be feasible only with a ceasefire, or the guarantee that Israel would not target Hezbollah lawmakers during the session.

Berri told Hochstein that “there can be a return to the three-week truce agreement” and that “Lebanon can elect a president in the first week of the truce.”

“The elected president would oversee the implementation of Resolution 1701 and the achievement of a permanent ceasefire,” Berri reportedly told Hochstein. [2]

Despite international pressure, the chance that a ceasefire is agreed is low.

Blinken’s arrival on Tuesday marks his 11th visit to the Middle East since the war in Gaza began more than a year ago. However, it is his first since Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah escalated late last month, and expectations for his attempt to rein in the hostilities appear low. [3]

Iran remains the main obstacle to electing a new president. Hezbollah initially agreed to a roadmap for a quick election.

All parties seemed to agree that it was time to stop blocking elections that had paralyzed the state and revive the process of electing a president. [4]

Iran intervened to ensure that such a process would not start until a ceasefire.

It might be entirely possible that as Hezbollah loses its grip on Lebanese politics, the situation might be unlocked.

[1] Lebanon to elect president only after war ends: Speaker Berri

[2] Report: Berri tells Hochstein president can be elected in 1st week of 3-week truce

[3] Blinken arrives in Israel amid missiles in bid to revive ceasefire push

[4] How the Elimination of Hizbullah’s Hassan Nasrallah Is Affecting Lebanese Politics

Increasing the probability after reading the following CSIS assessment which highlights how the nuclear testing facilities remain well maintained, so preparations for a test could be arranged quickly, and potentially in secrecy.

A satellite image of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Testing Facility acquired on October 4, 2024, a few days before the rapid escalation of tension, shows that the facility continues to be well maintained. While no new dramatic activity is observable at the test site, the actual timing between a decision to test and the test itself may be relatively short as most preparations have already been completed and those that aren’t can easily be accomplished at night or under periods of inclement weather that would obscure satellite imagery.

The decision to conduct the seventh nuclear test remains entirely in the hands of Kim Jong-un. There may be no significant indications prior to a new test unless Kim wishes to provide such indications. [1]

There is also a note about a correlation between testing activity and proximity of US Elections.

CSIS studies have found a correlation between increased North Korean testing of missiles and nuclear devices and U.S. presidential and mid-term election years. Both the Trump and Obama administrations, for example, experienced North Korean nuclear tests shortly after being elected [1]

[1] Update on Punggye-ri Amid Increased Tension

NK conducted 6 nuclear tests in the past 18 years. This translates to a base rate forecast of 15% for the next 6 months.

But one does not simply detonate a nuclear device. An increase in activity at certain military sites signals an impending test. The following table summarizes how early in the past preparation for a test was detected.

TEST DATE	SAT IMAGE DATE	DAYS	SOURCE
09/03/2017	04/13/2017	143	North Korea preparing for nuclear test, satellite images suggest
09/09/2016	07/05/2016	125	Satellite images point to North Korea's imminent nuclear test
01/06/2016	12/02/2015	35	North Korea building new tunnel at nuclear test site, satellites show
02/12/2013	12/27/2012	47	Preparations for a Possible Third Nuclear Test Continue; Complications from Water Buildup?

On average, the first indications that a test might happen soon are detected 3 months in advance. As of today, there is no credible report that NK has increased activity on its nuclear sites. In practice, the real base rate is about 7-10%.

Recent news, on the other hand, hints at escalating tension with SK. In the past few weeks, KJU showed the world NK's nuclear facilities [1]. Now they are blowing up the roads leading south and KJU is raising the specter of nuclear conflict [2]. The president of SK has recently suggested NK might stage a nuclear test as a major provocation [3].

But all of the above sounds purely rhetorical. NK hasn't conducted a test in 7.5 years, despite seeming more than once to be on the brink of doing so. No activity around potential nuclear test sites was detected recently, and it is reasonable to assume that there would be plenty of people working around the site before a test. 

Further reading: A satellite view of North Korea's nuclear sites

[1] What to know about North Korea’s unveiling of its uranium enrichment facility

[2] North Korea again raises the specter of nuclear conflict

[3] South Korea warns of possible North Korea nuclear test before US election

My original intuition about this question was quite far from the crowd's consensus, so I weighed more heavily the opinions of others. Now that other forecasters have adjusted their forecasts down, I'm moving closer to what was my original forecast. 

Trying to contain my cumulative forecast within a more reasonable boundary. There's definitely not a 1/3 chance that Russia will attempt something on another country in the next 2.5 years.

There's so much happening in Georgia. The next few months might be determinant for this question:

• Russia offered Georgia a withdrawal of its military from the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions [1]. The broader intent would be to strengthen its influence on the Georgian government
• The withdrawal of troops from the breakaway regions might be a promise as empty as the military bases are currently there. Yet it could be possible that personnel could be used to provide support to the pro-Russian government were problems emerge after the elections.

The fear of political violence, especially if the election becomes a tight race, does not appear unfounded.

In late August, Sergey Narshkin, the head of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, made veiled threats of Russian intervention should the pro-Russian GD party not come out on top. [2]

Moldova is the victim of similar threats as it faces one of its most consequential elections that might set joining the EU as a constitutional target. The tension is high, particularly in the autonomous region of Gagauzia which is controlled by a pro-Russian party [3]. It is not completely implausible to see the situation precipitate there following the vote [4]. 

[1] Russia could do deal with Georgia over occupied regions, hints foreign minister

[2] Georgia's elections: Will voters lean to the EU or Russia?

[3] Dispatch from Moldova: With elections approaching, Moscow is taking aim at Chișinău’s pro-European pat
[4] Will Gagauzia Become Moldova’s Second Breakaway Region?