harjanim

Adjusting my forecast downwards on a "yes" answer to align with the crowd forecast.

Most evidence points to Huawei staying out of O-RAN as part of a broader strategy to maintain Chinese influence over the technology (via China Telecom's participation in the O-RAN Alliance) without engendering American attention.

However, as I pointed out in the comments for my latest forecast on a related question, there's a possibility that Huawei may embrace O-RAN as a way of staying in certain key markets in a compromise that would see it relegated to a role in less sensitive aspects of network infrastructure.

Adjusting my forecast.

I've reduced the probability for 3GPP adopting and integrating O-RAN Alliance specifications due to a lack of news on this front.

I've increased the probability for the O-RAN Alliance continuing to develop specifications independently. This tallies with most of the news related to this from the O-RAN Alliance, such as this recent press release: https://www.o-ran.org/press-releases/o-ran-alliance-global-plugfest-fall-2024-to-continue-supporting-the-open-ran-development

Lastly, I've reduced the probability of the O-RAN Alliance stopping development of its specifications to zero. This is because there is very little / no evidence to suggest they have any incentive to do so nor do they appear to be facing any obstacles in this regard.

Maintaining my forecast.

I did not come across any developments that suggest an announcement is imminent.

One interesting possibility, however, is that Huawei may prefer to remain a vendor in less sensitive aspects of the overall network infrastructure as part of an open RAN approach rather than being excluded completely in a "rip and replace" scenario.

Should Huawei go for this strategy, it would then make sense for it to announce a collaboration with the O-RAN Alliance and officially come on board. However, there isn't any solid evidence suggesting Huawei is even considering this approach at the moment, so for now it remains a possibility to discuss and consider.

Slight downward revision for the probability of a "yes" in my forecast, based on the following report from Rest of World which discusses voluntary relocations offered by Microsoft to its AI engineers based in China.

https://restofworld.org/2024/microsoft-china-ai-engineer-relocation/

This points to some contingency planning on Microsoft's part should there be circumstances beyond its control rather than suggest that a complete relocation is imminent.

Maintaining my forecast. Nothing to suggest that Putin is under any immediate threat, barring the usual caveats about his own health.

One interesting development has been the reaction to Ukraine's attacks within Russia. Military blogger Yegor Guzenko's criticism of Putin in video posts on his Telegram channel earlier this month suggests that cracks are developing among those who support the war with Ukraine in Russia.

https://www.newsweek.com/russian-miltary-blogger-slams-putin-traitors-kremlin-1950611

Reducing the probability of my forecast further.

Nvidia suffered a significant loss of market cap - US$279 billion - reducing its share price by nearly 10% in early September 2024.

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/business/nvidia-share-price-market-value-loss-wall-street-4584336

As investors become more skeptical about the payoffs from the significant investments in AI that many rushed into over the past 12-18 months, it's likely that Nvidia's ability to attract further investor interest will slow down.

That said, Nvidia remains neck-to-neck with Apple and Microsoft, although that not so much a causal factor as it is an observation regarding the rankings of companies by market cap.

Maintaining my forecast. There's no evidence or signals to suggest that the PLA will act against Taiwan in the next 6 months.

There have been some interesting recent developments that still merit a close watch, though:

1) The PLA conducting its first publicly acknowledged trial of an ICBM in the Pacific Ocean on 25 September 2024. This is a shift away from its preferred approach of testing missiles in Inner Mongolia.

https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/china-says-test-launched-icbm-into-pacific-ocean

2) Shifts in PLAN tactics that are aimed at undermining Taiwan’s maritime defense capabilities - e.g., increased deployment of PLAN vessels to put strain on Taiwan's naval fleet

https://pacforum.org/publications/pacnet-67-pla-navy-adjusts-operations-to-further-undermine-taiwans-defensive-capabilities/

Slight downward adjustment (-3%) to my forecast's probability for "no", which is nevertheless significant given that it was previously at 95%.

Radio Free Asia has reported that the election will be held in November 2025: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/election-2025-08262024083618.html

However, there does not yet appear to be any official announcement backing up RFA's report. 

Nevertheless, the junta has also announced that a census will be held next month - this is one of the conditions it had previously attached to conducting an election: https://apnews.com/article/election-census-min-aung-hlaing-military-government-faacdf0a89b36182ae3f7fb3977cb572

Maintaining my forecast.

No evidence to suggest there will be a change on this front unless the conflict in Gaza is resolved.

There's a helpful timeline available here: https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/decoding-the-aftermath-of-the-hezbollah-israel-escalation-182844

The main country to watch regarding normalisation is of course Saudi Arabia, and the parameters for progress are quite clearly tied to the conflict in Gaza.