I think a ceasefire is more likely than the community (and more likely to happen earlier). RFI forecasters seem to be considerably skeptical on the prospects of a ceasefire, despite a consensus of reporting indicating mutual desires for a ceasefire from all stakeholders (with the Russians being the most reluctant).
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Questions Forecasted
21
Forecasts
12
Upvotes
Forecasting Activity
Forecasting Calendar
| Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forecasts | 0 | 4 | 21 | 21 | 21 |
| Comments | 0 | 4 | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| Questions Forecasted | 0 | 4 | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| Upvotes on Comments By This User | 0 | 3 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Definitions | |||||
New Prediction
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
6%
1 January 2025 - 31 March 2025
33%
1 April 2025 - 30 June 2025
18%
1 July 2025 - 30 September 2025
13%
1 October 2025 - 31 December 2025
30%
Not before 2026
Why do you think you're right?
Files
Why might you be wrong?
I may be dramatically over-estimating the odds of Putin agreeing to a ceasefire, even in the face of American pressure (both positive and negative).
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
66%
Yes
34%
No
Why do you think you're right?
I'm a decent bit above the community forecast, at 66%. I'm not sure why the community forecast is so low, but other prediction markets are assigning much higher odds. Apart from that meta-level information:
-Trump, Zelenskyy, and Putin all seem to be posturing as though they are willing to agree to a ceasefire in principle, which makes a short ceasefire, even if the conflict ultimately continues, quite likely.
-There is increasing international pressure for a ceasefire due to shifting foreign policy dynamics with decreasing US support and greater European uncertainty, coupled with possibly-growing Chinese-Russian tensions over their engagement with the Trump administration.
-Ukraine is highly motivated to go to the negotiating table due to American threats of withdrawn aid and sabotage.
-Russia is likely facing rising internal pressures to broker an end to the war, and this provides them a very good "out", with a favorable American administration offering them carrots in a form that might not be there in a few months.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Perhaps I am over-estimating Putin's willingness to engage with any negotiation process at the moment, in good faith.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
23%
Less than 30 days
22%
30 days
10%
31-60 days
5%
61-90 days
40%
91 days or more
Why do you think you're right?
I am well under the community that the ceasefire will break within 30 days. I think if the two parties can come to a 1 month ceasefire agreement, it's quite unlikely it will be broken rapidly, especially after seeing the dynamics in recent brokered ceasefires (Gaza, Lebanon, earlier Russian invasions of Ukraine).
I am well above the community on the likelihood of a long-lasting ceasefire 91 days or more, conditional on a ceasefire happening at all. I think that the agreement to a ceasefire, along with the implied international pressures, would indicate a high willingness to see an end to this conflict for at least 3 months.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
I might be misunderstanding the resolution criteria's willingness to view small acts of ceasefire-breaking as a total collapse of the ceasefire. The resolution criteria are more vague on those grounds than I would have liked.
I also might be incorrect about the desired length of the ceasefire to be precisely 30 days. If the agreement is for a 20 day, say, or a 35 day ceasefire, that would dramatically change my odds. I think the inclusion of an explicit "30 day" category leads to me more trying to predict what the length of the announced ceasefire will be, which introduces another degree of forecasting complexity.
Files
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Star Commenter - Feb 2025
Earned for making 5+ comments in a month (rationales not included).
New Comment
I think this part needs some work:
"The ceasefire must result in a significant reduction or complete halt of military operations along all front lines continuously for at least 30 days."
This is overly strict. With basically any ceasefire there will be some violations and some "front-line military activity". Things that should not count, for example, include:
-Militias not formally associated with the goverments continuing minor actions
-Tit-for-tat minor exchanges, such as brief exchanges of fire at perceived troop movements that don't break the ceasefire completely
-Detonating old munitions such as mines
etc
Thus, I think it makes sense to specify in the resolution criteria that this question resolves YES if a consensus of international sources refer to the ceasefire as active, and the two sides act as though a ceasefire is active, even if they criticize the other side for perceived violations.
In the modern area of warfare, this basically ALWAYS happens (Israel-Gaza, Israel-Lebanon, Armenia-Azerbaijan, to cite recent examples), and I think it's very annoying to have to be forecasting how the adjudicators will view minor violations of the ceasefire instead of forecasting something broader. The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire, for example, led to a >95% reduction in military activity, despite both sides claiming multiple violations, and obviously has continued to hold to this day.
Files
Wouldn't the "significant reduction" or part address these issues?
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
8%
Less than or equal to 9%
15%
Between 10% and 19%, inclusive
42%
Between 20% and 29%, inclusive
25%
Between 30% and 39%, inclusive
10%
More than or equal to 40%
Why do you think you're right?
I think the community forecast is dramatically over-confident. I think that the US election and new administration, the potential resolution of the invasion of Ukraine, and several other factors make this hard to predict, and I'm giving a wider distribution than the community forecast by a substantial amount.
Files
Why might you be wrong?
Public opinion could be settled on this matter, with increasing polarization, and thus little movement, leading to a resolution in the 20-29 range.
Files
New Prediction
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
8%
Yes
Feb 26, 2025 to Feb 26, 2026
92%
No
Feb 26, 2025 to Feb 26, 2026
Why do you think you're right?
I'm at 8%:
Scenario 1 (5%)
-Iran encroaches on some red line with nuclear development.
-Israel and Iran enter into a state of war.
Scenario 2 (1%)
-Iran and the US enter into a state of war due to negotiations falling apart and a willingness from the US to initiate hostilities.
Scenario 3 (1%)
-Regime collapse and regime change in Iran leads to war with a surrounding state or regional rival.
Scenario 4 (1%)
-Due to a technicality, such as some state like the new Syrian gov. declaring "war" against Iran or vice versa despite no major, active hostilities
Files
Why might you be wrong?
I could be over- or under-estimating US/Israel/Iran tensions currently.
Files
Why do you think you're right?
Maintaining at 7%, despite lack of activity during the early months of the current administration. Downward pressures include that no signs of escalation have occurred. Upward pressures include that this is a time of turmoil in US foreign policy, which might lead to a higher prob. of tail events, including escalation between US and China which could lead to proxy pressures for NK to conduct a test.
Why might you be wrong?
NK might have suspended its nuclear testing program due to effective pressures from China and/or the US.
Alternatively, NK might be gearing up for a test since they're "due" for one after 7 years of inactivity, avoiding the ~wrong~ moment to do one. This time of higher chaos in the world might be an opportune moment to demonstrate capabilities, in their eyes.