update
-0.205314
Relative Brier Score
33
Forecasts
5
Upvotes
Forecasting Calendar
Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Forecasts | 3 | 6 | 34 | 25 | 228 |
Comments | 0 | 5 | 12 | 9 | 102 |
Questions Forecasted | 2 | 3 | 24 | 19 | 111 |
Upvotes on Comments By This User | 0 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 60 |
Definitions |
Why do you think you're right?
Lowering my forecast given the ceasefire impasse and Israel's bold attack on Beirut. Netanyahu said early in Sep 2024 that a deal is not even close in what seems like a direct rebuke of the Biden administration's efforts. Many opinions I'm reading now don't think this will happen during Biden's term in office: https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/05/middleeast/israel-netanyahu-hamas-agreement-intl/index.html
Why might you be wrong?
As of 9/18/24, Politico is reporting that US administration officials are still pursuing other ideas to break the ceasefire impasse, so there is still a slight chance this may happen this year. https://www.politico.com/news/2024/09/18/us-officials-gaza-ceasefire-options-00179749
Why do you think you're right?
Bumping up the forecast given Israel's strikes in Beirut. Striking Beirut seems to show that Israel is preparing for a broader war with Hezbollah as a retaliation is expected. https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/lebanon-explosions-hezbollah-israel-09-20-24-intl-hnk/index.html
Why might you be wrong?
External pressures may help to de-escalate tension, but it's looking like political motivations are converging in a way that make it likely Netanyahu and Iran proxies will drag out and even expand the war.
Active Forecaster
Why do you think you're right?
Updating my forecast to be higher than the current crowd estimate due to several factors: Israel's pager attacks on Hezbollah this week is bound to bring on retaliation from Hezbollah and further escalation, Israel expanding its war goals to include bringing back Israelis at Lebanon's border, and the continued failure of ceasefire negotiations between Israel-Hamas.
Why might you be wrong?
Recent escalations may be biasing my longer term forecast, or Israel-Hezbollah may continue with attacks as an undeclared war as @inferno616 pointed out.
Active Forecaster
I think a lot of Maduro's aggression has been to show strength ahead of the presidential elections. But, with the election results now being disputed by the opposition and other countries, an attack by Maduro would put securing the presidency at risk.
An attack would rally US, UK, French , and other international support for Guyana, incite heavier sanctions on an economically fragile Venezuela, and would weaken Maduro's overall hold on power. There isn't enough oil in Guyana or interest for Russia and China to risk supporting Maduro.
Other reason why a ground invasion is unlikely: "a full-scale ground invasion is not practical, experts say, since much of the Essequibo frontier with Venezuela is near-impenetrable rain forest and swamps. That leaves the faint possibility of an air or marine assault." (LA Times)
An attack on Guyanese oil wells also seems unlikely, but perhaps logistically more probable.
I don't think that Venezuela will relinquish claim or that Guyana agrees to cede on Essequibo unless prompted by some form of an attack that precedes negotiations.
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