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GuilhermeRenno

Guilherme Rennó
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0.003515

Relative Brier Score

6

Forecasts

3

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New Prediction

I believe it is more likely that China will not build another military base in Africa. This point of view is defended because of the strong pressure that the USA applies on African countries to avoid it. The American government is especially concerned because if China established a base in Equatorial Guinea, for example, it could be a vulnerability for the East Coast, through the Atlantic Ocean, 

Nevertheless, many African countries have adopted pragmatic ethos, negotiating and winning from both parties. Djibouti is the perfect example since it hosts both, Chinese (Naval) and American (Camp Lemonnier) military bases.

That being said, it is important to notice that Djibouti holds the status of a “comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation" with China. This situation is shared with 11 other African countries. This is relevant because for China this is the 3rd strongest diplomatic bond and enough to establish military bases. More than that, China only has this level of relationship with 18 countries in the world, which means that 66% of them are African countries. 

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PeterStamp
made a comment:
We´ve got more than two years left for the question, and China only started seriously caring about that part of the world 25 or 30 years ago. And when it comes to power/pressure there, they should be at least eaual with the US. Base rate (1 case in Djiboutu) is much higher than your 5% . Considering growing interest in Africa for resources, trade and geopolitical role-playing I´d say, that even 10% as an absolute minimum would just look about fair. Just saying. Your post is good, but I disagree with the percentage.
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Why do you think you're right?

The election results came out today (07/29), indicating a 51% victory for Maduro. Crowds rallied and protests erupted across Venezuela, with the opposition alleging fraud and evidence of irregularities starting to pile up.


The regime's isolation has never been stronger, with only a handful of authoritarian countries recognizing Maduro’s victory. Conversely, the opposition has never been so organized and supported internationally. Brazil's change in attitude is particularly emblematic. Amnesty for Maduro and his inner circle is a common ground for both the opposition and the U.S., which holds drug trafficking and other accusations against him.


This scenario may create the perfect storm to nudge Maduro into relinquishing power while addressing the accusations. A very similar situation occurred in 1958 when a fraudulent election led to the ousting of Marcos Pérez Jiménez from a long dictatorship. The coming days and weeks will be crucial in determining the future of Venezuela and its people.

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Why might you be wrong?

Maduro may have a stronger grip to power than most people calculate. If that’s the case, he will hold power until the democratic momentum ceases and return to misery administration as sanctions, isolation and migration increases again.

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Probability
Answer
3%
Yes
97%
No
Why do you think you're right?

Compared to the 50 years of the military regime that ruled Myanmar since its independence in 1938, the deposed democratic regime was simply a short 10 years' experience.


Even though the national elections of 2020 revealed a crushing public preference for the democratic candidates over the military-related ones (80% x 20%), the military is still used to be in power, and it is a hard problem to solve. 


Since the allegation of fraudulent elections by the Junta is a scapegoat, the real motivation for the Coup d'État remains unclear, which indicates that the goal may simply be a return to power for as long as possible. 


The census postoning explanation given by the Junta is both: a new scapegoat to gain time and another way to map out the opposition. The population seems to be uncooperative to the censors, so it doesn't look like this could be solved fast, especially considering the reasonably large size of the country, its expressive population, and poor infrastructure. 


Finally, the armed opposition seems to be gaining momentum against the Junta forces at the same time that China and Russia, the most expected allies of the current government, aren't acting so cooperatively. 


This draws a scenario in which the opposition may try a decisive solution, meaning bringing down the Junta for good, which, by no means, would be simple or fast. 


Considering the scenario above, I believe it is implausible that Myanmar holds national elections before 1 July 2025 (3%). 


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Why might you be wrong?

China and the USA may change this scenario relatively quickly if this, for some reason, enters their agenda, especially if as a common goal. 

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This forecast expired on Aug 24, 2024 12:23AM
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
10%
Yes
May 24, 2024 to May 24, 2025
90%
No
May 24, 2024 to May 24, 2025
Why do you think you're right?

The Iranian Supreme Leader succession has been debated for the last months for many reasons. The main one is because of Khamenei's brittle health, after 83 of age and 35 years as Ayatollah 

However, after May 19,  the debate became even more urgent since Iran's President, Ebrahim Raisi, suddenly died in a helicopter crash. Raisi was the favorite candidate for Khamenei's succession as Supreme leader which brings uncertainty about who is going to be the 3th Ayatollah. The second favorite was Khamenei's son, Mojtaba. However, it finds significant resistance since this would perpetuate a family in power, which would go against the Iranian Revolution principles. 

I believe that the succession will be accelerated in order to be done before Khamenei's death, avoiding more internal turmoils, since Iran is already facing many simultaneous challenges (Israel, economic crisis, nuclear issue). Therefore, I believe there is a 10% chance of this being decided (ceasing Khamenei to be the Supreme Leader) within the next 12 months. 

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Why might you be wrong?

Probably because the debate led to a paralysis and/ or the political system decided to wait for Khamenei's natural death (and surely, if he lives over 12 months from now). 

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According to the ACLED, since 24 February 2022, Russia has caused Ukrainians in Kyiv 129 kills and 511 injured people, meaning 640 victims in total. This represents approximately 24 victims in Kyiv per month. 


The possibility of a larger attack from Russia that increases that number to 100 in a single strike, in the next 30 following days (before June 1st ),  is not absurd.

Ukraine has had an increasing vulnerability since the Middle East conflict became a priority to the West (USA and UE), after the Hamas attack against Israel (7 October), and even more after the drone and missile strikes from Iran against Israel (14 April).

If that situation escalates, it might represent an opportunity for Russia to impose even more pressure on Ukraine through larger strikes over Kyiv and try to impose a partial victory faster.


However, the time span is considerably short (30 days), therefore the chances are lower. In a larger period (e.g., 12 months) an attack with over 100 victims in Kyiv may even be the most likely scenario. 

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