0.002118
Relative Brier Score
10
Forecasts
0
Upvotes
Forecasting Calendar
Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
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Forecasts | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
Comments | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
Questions Forecasted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
Upvotes on Comments By This User | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Definitions |
Most Active Topics:
International Diplomacy & Conflict,
Russia-Ukraine War
Why do you think you're right?
Why might you be wrong?
If the show of determination turned into a show of real actions, my forecast would be wrong as a nuclear attack will easily cause 25 fatalities and more. Nevertheless, it will likely also cause material damages and massive fatalities on the Russian side. Therefore, the viability of the case, given the currently available information, remains low.
Why do you think you're right?
I chose to not change my forecast after consulting with Sandeep because the new research we've done showed no signs of growing protest/movement. However, Russia' s announcement to halt participation in New Start, a nuclear arm control treaty with the US could lead to consequences that would trigger mass protests, such as the increasing risks of domestic nuclear accidents and using it on Ukraine.
Why might you be wrong?
As the one year mark of Russia's invasion has just passed, both Russia and Ukraine are gearing up rhetorically despite the currently "seemingly calm" state. For instance, Russia's embedded bureaucracy in its military system increases the risk of mismanagement in storing the weapons. And such a domestic nuclear accident could lead to increasing protests and riots. However, the information and the stage of the development so far is insufficient to changing the forecast.
Why do you think you're right?
I deceased my forecast to 1% after consulting with friends who are currently in Russia and re-examining materials from last week. The chance of event(s) occur insofar that Putin's approval rating will drop below 50% is very likely impossible given the currently stable domestic political state and the insufficient external factors to disrupt Putin's regime effectively.
Why might you be wrong?
Unless Putin experiences extremely unlikely domestic political upheaval in the next month, otherwise his approval rate will stay afloat/
Why do you think you're right?
I increased my forecast by 1% slightly due to a few new developments. Nevertheless, the chance of the scenario above remains low. According to report (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/14/russia-ukraine-war-latest-updates/), Dutch fighter jets intercepted three Russian military aircraft in early February which is concerning regarding the Russian force potentially attack NATO territories.
The recent Nord 2 explosion could also trigger Russia to seek retributions since it suspects "the west" to be behind it and demanded NATO to further investigate. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-nato-should-hold-emergency-summit-over-nord-stream-blasts-2023-02-12/
However, the threat of Russian security forces causing large fatalities in NATO territories remain low because so far Russia has been mostly all talk no action.
Lastly, it is important to keep in mind that incidents or rogue act could happen without much escalation.
Why might you be wrong?
If Russia decides to take drastic different approach and exhibit willingness in negotiating with Ukraine and takes steps back from its current position, the probability will likely decrease.
Why do you think you're right?
According to https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard, from 23/03/2022-24/04/2022, between the first and second months mark of Russia's invasion, in total 22 protests and riots occurred, up by 61.5% from the monthly average of the same time period in 2021 .
From 23/08/2022-25/09/2022, between the 6th and 7th months of invasion mark, 40 events occurred which was up by 83.6% from a year ago.
Taken the median of the two (31) and times by 12 we get 372. In addition, since the one year mark of Russia's invasion into Ukraine is coming up, waves of protests are expected. According to Moscow Times, the anti-war "flower protest" has been rising, spreading to over 60 cities in Russia. Since the start of the movement in Jan 2023, at least seven people have been reportedly arrested. Therefore, I increased the probability of "More than or equal 400 but less than 600" by 5% and lowered the previous category by 55.
Why might you be wrong?
If the Russian authority ramp up its arrests on "flower protest" participants, increase government intervention in war-related protests or intensify the political prosecution of dissents, the ordinary anti-war Russians might stay silent to avoid prosecutions.
Why do you think you're right?
From an outside view, Putin's approval rating, according to Levada-Center, has never dipped below 65% since he took power in 1999. As he tightened control on media in the recent years, which has effectively eliminated alternative and oppositional voices, his approval rating has been trending upwards even post-pandemic. Furthermore, the pools of alternative candidates have also diminished significantly as many were jailed, murdered or exiled. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that Putin's approval rating drop below 50% in the coming months
Why might you be wrong?
The event is possible if the general population could be mobilized protest against Putin's regime on a national-level, and if some of Putin's key oligarchs are willing to abandon him, especially in the media sector. Additionally, due to the current trustworthy international survey organization's lack of access to Russia, if the situation reverses where more discontent could be voiced or surveyed, Putin's approval rating might drop below 50%.
Why do you think you're right?
The likelihood of Russia security forces intentionally result in such significant fatalities in NATO territories is extremely low. Nevertheless, due to the long duration of the war so far, which could create fatigues among soldiers and decision-making officials, and Russia's inability to make imperative gains, could lead to miscalculation or miscommunication resulting in fatalities in NATO territories. There's also a low chance that individual officials might conduct actions leading to the result above out of desperation due to failure to progress or defend.
Why might you be wrong?
If Russia opts to use nuclear weapons or if it suffers significant loss of its occupied territories of Ukraine, Russia will be more likely to attempt attacks in NATO territories but less likely to involve heavy fatalities give that Putin is aware of the probable consequences.
Why do you think you're right?
Why might you be wrong?
If the two scenarios I mentioned happen before the end of this month and there will be sufficient material and human support to conduct, and to publish an approval survey; I might be wrong.