Talking with a fellow forecaster, I noticed that we share the same skepticism about the success of the current ceasefire negotiations and the same pessimism about a 30 day pause in the near future. Since the time period is so big, however, we both consider it more likely than not that at some point in 2024 there will be a pause in the Israel-Hamas war. I slightly adjusted my forecast down again.
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Star Commenter - Feb 2024
Why do you think you're right?
Why might you be wrong?
In our conversation, we both agreed that it is impossible to anticipate the unfolding of the war for this long timeframe. This makes the forecast subject of high uncertainty and prevents any clearer picture. It might as well be that the ongoing talks lead to a somewhat stable 30-day pause. However, single "black swan" events like the burning of the U.S. soldier (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-soldier-burns-himself-not-to-be-part-of-israel-s-genocide-in-gaza-anymore/3148120), could have unpredictable ripple effects.
Why do you think you're right?
After consulting with a fellow forecaster, I feel even more confident of the price of oil staying below $90, as we both consider this option more than 75% likely. Thus, I raise the likelihood for the first category even a little more.
Why might you be wrong?
We might both be wrong and the consensus could give me a false sense of security (groupthink).
Why do you think you're right?
The U.S. revealed that it conducted a cyberattack against an Iranian military ship as a response to the killing of three U.S. troops in Iraq by Iranian-backed forces (https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/us-conducted-cyberattack-suspected-iranian-spy-ship-rcna138638). This could indicate that the U.S. has the capability to attack Iranian military targets via cyber and is willing to retaliate should tensions escalate further.
As Iranian-backed Houti attacks in the Red Sea continue to intensify (https://www.iranintl.com/en/202402240295), pressure rises. There also were attacks on Iranian gas pipelines in the past week for which Iran accused Israel of the action (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/21/iran-says-israel-behind-attacks-on-gas-pipelines).
Mutliple sources report that the U.S. will impose new sanctions on Iran, as the Islamic Republic sent ballistic missiles to Russia, which Iran denies (https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/us-to-impose-new-sanctions-on-iran-over-support-for-russia-white-house-101708628603182.html, https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-denies-providing-ballistic-missiles-to-russia-/7500448.html). Iran’s mission to the UN claimed on X that the country is morally obligated to refrain from weapon transactions during the Russia-Ukraine conflict (https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-788546).
All of these developments point toward an increased tension and demonstrate the willingness of both sides to use force against each other. As Ramadan approaches, events are likely to keep unfolding quickly. Thus, I adjusted my forecast by increasing the likelihood by 5%.
Why might you be wrong?
Both the U.S. and Iran still seem to refrain from direct attacks and underscore their willingness to not escalate tensions in the region further, as the statement of the Iranian mission to the UN and of the U.S. DoD show (https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-788546, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3666229/strikes-against-iran-backed-militias-had-good-effects-pentagon-spokesman-says/). This willingness to at least not directly use force might make an attack on an Iranian nuclear- or missile-related facility in the next 6 months more unlikely than I assess it at the moment.
Why do you think you're right?
Yesterday, negotiations on a potential ceasefire in Gaza started in Paris with officials from Israel, the U.S., Egypt and Qatar (https://www.forbes.com/sites/siladityaray/2024/02/23/gaza-ceasefire-and-hostage-deal-talks-begin-in-paris-today-heres-what-to-know/?sh=792294f26a38). While I am skeptical about a successful deal without direct Palestinian involvement in the negotiations, it seems that Egypt negotiates on their behalf. In Cairo, Palestinian leadership met with Israeli officials and head of Egypt’s intelligence service for three days, to negotiate a ceasefire agreement which would involve hostage and prisoner exchanges preceeding the talks in Paris (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/2/23/israels-war-on-gaza-live-local-authorities-report-central-gaza-massacre?update=2727372).
Both Saudi and Israeli sources report a softening of Palestinian demands for a ceasefire deal (https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hamas-said-to-no-longer-be-demanding-complete-idf-withdrawal-from-gaza-permanent-ceasefire-in-truce-talks/). However, the conditions of Hamas’ leadership seem, even if now softened, not compatible with Israel’s security concerns. A release of 500 Palestinian prisoners for every Israeli hostage seems very disproportionate (https://www.palestinechronicle.com/possible-breakthrough-abu-marzouk-discusses-chances-of-ceasefire/).
Furthermore, it does not seem like Netanyahu is very interested in a deal at the moment according to a senior U.S. diplomat (https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/21/politics/israel-hamas-negotiations-ramadan/index.html). The Israeli cabinet will decide on the IDF’s planned ground operation in Rafah with nearly 1.5 million civilians seeking shelter there in the next week (https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/netanyahu-idf-plans-for-rafah-operation-to-be-brought-to-cabinet-for-approval-next-week/).
Success thus hinges on the ceasefire talks in Paris and both side’s leadership to make concessions and find common ground. The start of Ramadan on March 10 might increase pressure for a successful deal, but it might also rush negotiators leading to an instable or failed compromise. In the past years, Ramadan has always lead to violent conflict between Israel and Palestine and I do believe that this year things could even be worse. Thus, I adjust my forecast by lowering the likelihood of a successful 30-day pause in the war.
Why might you be wrong?
Negotiations are inherently unpredictable. The current international pressure to reach a deal might lead to a somewhat stable ceasefire or a foundation for a successful deal in the next months. In particular, the U.S. will increase pressure as domestic and international actors demand accountability (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/23/gaza-ceasefire-hopes-hamas-israel-negotiators-paris).
Israeli national security advisor Tzachi Hanegbi mentioned that there is the possibility for an agreement without specifying the character of such a deal (https://www.rte.ie/news/world/2024/0224/1434159-israel-gaza/). In general, news outlets seem more optimistic about diplomatic successes than 2 weeks ago. My skepticism might thus be underestimating the power of negotiations.
Why do you think you're right?
In the past 2 weeks, the Brent crude oil price remained relatively stable below $84 and now declined to $80.75 (https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/future/brn00?countrycode=uk). As our timeframe for the forecast narrows, the likelihood of the price going above $90 decreases.
Deutsche Bank expects the price of Brent crude oil to reach $88 at the end of the year (https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Deutsche-Bank-Sees-Brent-Oil-Price-at-88-by-the-End-of-2024.html). This is consistent with my forecast.
The EIA also expects the price of crude oil to stagnate due to OPEC+ production restraints (https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/BTL/2024/01-brentprice/article.php).
While the Middle East crisis does have an effect on oil prices, the reaction of the market is only moderate (https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/oil-prices-roughly-flat-unclear-demand-scenario-weighed-2024-02-16/).
A comment from a forecaster on my last forecast mentioned, that oil prices react more to traders' expectations about the market in the future. As we approach the spring and no cold waves are currently expected, I see little reason for why the oil consumption in the U.S., as one of the biggest oil consumers, should rise significantly in the next month.
Why might you be wrong?
CNBC reports that the crude oil price might rise further due to a tightening crude oil market. The higher demand inducing price increases is linked to winter weather in the U.S. and India's demand increase. At the same time, OPEC+ cut production. The article also mentions the Middle East crisis as a factor for uncertainty (https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/22/crude-oil-prices-today.html).
While I still believe that this report overestimates the short-term influence of geopolitical trends of the Brent crude oil price, it could explain why the current price drop might be only short-lived.
Why do you think you're right?
While I previously reacted to the price increase in oil by lowering the likelihood of the first category, I readjusted this after talking with another forecaster. The current price of $82 can reasonably be a normal fluctuation of the price and needs not to be related to any political events. We both see it still rather unlikely that the barrel price will exceed $90.
Furthermore, as another week of the observation period passed, the likelihood of the price surpassing the $90 threshold is also logically following lower.
Why might you be wrong?
I might only look at the Middle East as a potential source for oil increases and overlook other causes.
The oil market doesn't really trade on macro events, except in a very short-term and generally limited way.
Much more important are inventory levels, as well as people's perceptions of future demand (i.e. projections of what the economy will look like in a few months).
Currently, it looks like traders are intentionally pushing and pulling pricing into a narrow range, so that they can make a profit each way. I think as we head into the summer, there may be seasonal supply constraints that drive the price higher, but that may be April/May, so out of our timeframe.
I'm personally still betting on a trading-related short-term spike, but I may have to rethink within the next week!
Why do you think you're right?
While Iran just celebrated the 45th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution with US flag burnings and anti-Israel chants (https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/burning-us-flags-and-chanting-death-to-israel-iran-marks-45-years-since-the-islamic-revolution/), the political leadership signaled no further will to escalate the conflict.
Agreeing with another forecaster, I believe there to be no reason for adjusting my forecast as of right now. I still think it is unlikely that there will be a direct attack on Iran.
Why might you be wrong?
The anniversary celebrations might signal the Iranian leadership that the public supports a more direct involvement in Israel which could in turn incentivize Israel or the U.S. to directly retaliate. However, this is but a hypothetical at the moment.
After exchanging ideas with another forecaster, I noticed that we had adjusted our forecasts in different directions on the basis of similar sources. This confirms the ambiguity of last week's statements and events and I readjusted my forecast slightly.
Why do you think you're right?
Despite our different rationales, my conversation with a fellow forecaster did not change my assessment about this question. While I had raised my forecast by 5%, the other forecaster lowered his by 13%. We now have roughly the same numbers. While the main reason for my adjustment was the cyberattack on the Iranian ship, the fellow forecaster took the apparent reluctance of the U.S. to attack Iran directly as a reason to lower his prediction.
Why might you be wrong?
We both are unsure about the risk of a cyberattack on a nuclear- or missile-related facility and thus could both underestimate the likelihood of a direct attack.