After a period of relative calm between 2013 and 2020, the number of coups in Africa has sharply risen, particularly in West Africa and the Sahel region (the area between the Saara Desert and the tropical forests). Some analysts call it the "Coup Belt." It is the longest corridor of military rule on Earth, stretching over 6000 km between the Atlantic and the Red Sea.
The military takeovers were successful in eight countries: Gabon (2023), Niger (2023), Burkina Faso (2022), Sudan (2021), Guinea (2021), Chad (2021) and Mali (2020-21). Other countries (such as Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Congo) have suffered from coup attempts in 2024 but managed to suppress them.
Most of these countries were former French colonies. They experienced strong anti-french sentiments fueled by a perception of a remaining colonial French presence as seen in (1) the alignment of local authoritarian regimes with Paris, as well as (2) the monetary unions under French control (the CFA) and (3) French (and European) military presence in the region, whether directly with stationed troops or indirectly with regional organizations such as ECOWAS, perceived by some as a puppet of the French/West.
Another source of anger that played a central role was the local authorities' inability (and, by extension, the French and the West) to repel Islamist militant violence (i.e., ISIS and its like-minded groups). This aspect is critical to understanding what is happening there.
All this sentiment grew amid dire economic conditions (especially after the COVID crisis and the authorities' responses, which some saw as draconian).
Local military leadership (notably young officers) channeled the dissatisfaction into seizing power - in many cases, without casualties.
Often, the local population perceived the overthrown rulers as corrupt and authoritarian. They had changed their constitutions, manipulated elections, and suppressed or eliminated opposition to collect or retain power by all means possible. Many of them had been in charge for decades. It is not by chance that many of these coups did not elicit visible public opposition. In fact, in many cases, the downfall of the incumbent governments was greeted by widespread celebrations on the streets.
Soon after, coup leaders made new allies, seeking support from either Russia (and its Wagner Group, now Africa Corps) or Turkey (given Erdogan's dreams of a return to the "Ottoman Empire"), to fight jihadist groups. It is important to remember that these alliances with Russia date back to 2020 (so before the invasion of Ukraine, which took place in February 2022).
Initially, Russia aimed to pursue commercial profits through military-related contracts, but Moscow gradually added the political intention of expanding its aligned partners. Now, Russia is the largest arms supplier to Africa, accounting for nearly half of all weapons flowing into the African continent.
As the situation develops, the 'coup season' seems far from over. A few factors push me to increase the likelihood of a new successful coup from above the 50/50 threshold:
- According to Powell and Thyne, from the Cline Center University of Illinois, 49% of the coup attempts in Africa from 1950 to 2023 have succeeded (109 successful out of 220 attempts). However, the "success rate" among the 2020-2023 coup attempts is approximately 65% (The graphics are below: https://projects.voanews.com/african-coups/).
- Succeeding in taking over power does not mean succeeding in remaining in power. Poverty, political instability, systemic corruption, violent extremism, and internal divisions make the region continent unstable and conflict-prone.
- Russia has increased its power and influence in the region, while France and other Western countries are still battling to keep their local alliances. Besides that, there's an ongoing battle of information regarding multiple actors. Whether for one side or the other, the likelihood of a successful attempt to overthrow power is high.
- Recent coup attempts (in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Gabon) show that such events will likely continue.
- Many African countries, such as Senegal, Libya, and Sudan, have question marks over their political future.
- Coup leaders in the Sahel are learning from and supporting each other. The military putschists of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea recognize each other as potential allies and know that they can rely on the support of other juntas in the region, as seen in the recent creation of the Sahel States Alliance (AES).
Sources:
https://projects.voanews.com/african-coups/
https://warontherocks.com/2024/02/africas-coup-calamity-what-happened-to-deterrence/
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-niger-burkina-faso-sign-sahel-security-pact-2023-09-16/
https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/the-evolution-of-coups-in-africa
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/9/22/africas-coup-epidemic-has-democracy-failed-the-continenthttps://aje.io/zwgajk
https://www.statista.com/chart/30532/number-of-coups-per-year-in-africa/
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/info/infographic/35064
https://www.channelstv.com/2023/08/30/africa-seven-coups-in-three-years/
https://www.idea.int/blog/two-more-coups-africa-similarities-differences-and-what-comes-next
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NS4aF11yWVQ
https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/sakane_01.html
https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/11/what-does-africa-need-most-now-russian-arms-sales-or.html
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/factbox-recent-coups-in-africa/2979254
https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/from-fighting-jihadists-to-fighting-juntas-explaining-the-recent-resurgence-of-military-coups-in-africa-and-how-to-prevent-recurrence/
https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/mta-joint-futures-05-coups-in-africa
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00219096231224680
https://www.africanews.com/2023/08/30/africa-the-7-military-coups-over-the-last-three-years/
https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/04/13/understanding-africas-coups/
The "Africa Corps" (AC) is a mercenary force recently established by the Russian Ministry of Defense. It is designed to fill the void left by the Wagner Group, which has been disbanding/reorganized since Prigozhin's death. The Wagner Group began its activities in Africa in 2017, initially seeking commercial profits through military-related contracts. Moscow gradually added the political intention of expanding its aligned partners.
Beyond the military aspect, the Africa Corps ventures into the lucrative mining sector of the continent. This is a significant revenue stream for Russia, especially amidst the financial strains imposed by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Since the onset of this conflict, Russia has reportedly earned $2.5 billion from gold sourced from African nations.
Since the Cold War, Russia has maintained political and economic ties with various African countries. In recent years, there has been a notable increase in diplomatic relations and military agreements between Moscow and several African nations. These relationships may encompass military cooperation, arms sales, training for local forces, and, in some instances, establishing military facilities. Russia is the largest arms supplier to Africa, accounting for nearly half of all weapons flowing into the African continent.
Following @Plataea479 's excellent recommendation in his forecast, I checked the PISM report regarding Africa Corps published in May 2024. In it, the Polish authors discuss possible prospects for the future of Africa Corps.
Before delving into it, I must refer to the list of African countries where Africa Corps is active (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Libya) and where they have already operated (Central African Republic, Chad, Mozambique, Sudan, and Mauritania).
Between pages 32 and 42, PISM lists possible subsequent developments for ACs, namely Chad, Sudan, Algeria, Mauritania, Togo, Congo (DRC), and Ghana.
Regarding Togo, the report says:
"[...] other possible directions of AC expansion are worth noting. In February this year, Ukraine’s National Centre of Resistance, a structure of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine that operates within the framework of information warfare, published an analysis of AC’s development indicating—presumably based on intelligence—that it was planning to send a military mission to Togo. There, the Russians would provide support to that country’s president, Faure Gnassingbé. Such an action would be in line with the well-tested model of making leaders with weak legitimacy (such as Bashar Al-Assad and Touadera) dependent on Russian support. In March, Gnassingbé staged a constitutional coup by abolishing universal presidential elections, thereby creating conditions in which the risk of a military putsch against his rule, and hence his need for protection, increases. [...] Nevertheless, the prospect is possible in which AC services are claimed by leaders unsure of relying on their own strength in moments of political upheaval (as in Togo) or, for example, wanting to carry out a succession of power within the family (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Uganda)."
Besides that, this report also suggests that the Russian-Togoleses security partnership will likely expand in the following months.
Sources:
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/russias-africa-corps-more-than-old-wine-in-a-new-bottle
https://areferencia.com/africa/russia-cria-novo-exercito-mercenario-na-africa-substituindo-o-wagner-group/
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-01-31/wagner-forces-under-a-new-flag-russias-africa-corps-burkina-faso
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-01-31/wagner-forces-under-a-new-flag-russias-africa-corps-burkina-faso
https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/mundo/sob-o-comando-de-putin-grupo-wagner-e-remodelado-e-inicia-nova-fase-na-africa/
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/12/17/africa-corps-russia-s-sahel-presence-rebranded_6352317_124.html