o-maverick

There's a terrible problem with this question, as @LogicCurve has consistently pointed out: can "a limited ground incursion" on Lebanese territory by the IDF be considered a declaration of war?

The resolution criteria provided are somehow unclear:

This question will be resolved as “Yes” if Israel declares war on Hezbollah or makes an equivalent statement (e.g., announcing the opening of a new front against Hezbollah or officially authorizing “significant military steps” against Hezbollah similar to the authorization against Hamas). For reference, Israel’s cabinet declared war on Hamas on 8 October 2023

To be honest, it does not seem like a declaration of war in the same terms as the one that took place in Gaza. Especially given that the IDF is being very careful with the words used, avoiding at all costs the term "war" when it comes to Lebanon and Hezbollah.

IDF is currently talking about "small, ‘limited’ raids in Lebanon." (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/30/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-hamas-war-news-gaza/) How are we supposed to work with that? hahah

However, the (likely ongoing) ground incursion that is about to be initiated definitely raises the possibility of actual war with Hezbollah. Especially if the Shiite group manages to restore command and control and go for full-scale retaliation. If they hurt Israel for good, then there might be an unequivocal escalation.

Given that I believe a ground incursion (a "new phase") will likely be very messy and bloody and draw a lot of Israeli resources, I believe it could be considered the "opening of a new front" in the terms used for the question resolution.

Therefore, I'm raising the odds above the 50/50 threshold, but not so much so that it does not mess up so much of my Brier Score. hahaha

And it seems it is about to happen: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/30/israel-says-next-phase-of-war-with-hezbollah-in-lebanon-to-begin-soon 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/30/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-hamas-war-news-gaza/ 

There's a terrible problem with this question, as @LogicCurve has consistently pointed out: can "a limited ground incursion" on Lebanese territory by the IDF be considered a declaration of war?

The resolution criteria provided are somehow unclear: 

• This question will be resolved as “Yes” if Israel declares war on Hezbollah or makes an equivalent statement (e.g., announcing the opening of a new front against Hezbollah or officially authorizing “significant military steps” against Hezbollah similar to the authorization against Hamas). For reference, Israel’s cabinet declared war on Hamas on 8 October 2023

To be honest, it does not seem like a declaration of war in the same terms as the one that took place in Gaza. Especially given that the IDF is being very careful with the words used, avoiding at all costs the term "war" when it comes to Lebanon and Hezbollah.

IDF is currently talking about "small, ‘limited’ raids in Lebanon." (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/30/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-hamas-war-news-gaza/) How are we supposed to work with that? hahah

However, the (likely ongoing) ground incursion that is about to be initiated definitely raises the possibility of actual war with Hezbollah. Especially if the Shiite group manages to restore command and control and go for full-scale retaliation. If they hurt Israel for good, then there might be an unequivocal escalation. 

Given that I believe a ground incursion (a "new phase") will likely be very messy and bloody and draw a lot of Israeli resources, I believe it could be considered the "opening of a new front" in the terms used for the question resolution.

Therefore, I'm raising the odds above the 50/50 threshold, but not so much so that it does not mess up so much of my Brier Score. hahaha

And it seems it is about to happen: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/30/israel-says-next-phase-of-war-with-hezbollah-in-lebanon-to-begin-soon 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/30/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-hamas-war-news-gaza/ 

Recent military actions by Israel targeting Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas—particularly the elimination of key Hezbollah and Hamas leaders—heighten the likelihood of Iran engaging in conflict with another nation in the near future. Iran has publicly pledged retaliation for these strikes, positioning itself as a protector of its allied groups in the region. The absence of a response thus far may indicate strategic patience or diplomatic considerations; however, the ongoing tension and unfulfilled promises of revenge suggest that Iran is preparing for potential escalation. Additionally, the disruption of leadership within influential militant organizations can destabilize the regional balance, prompting Iran to assert its influence more aggressively to maintain its strategic interests and deter further attacks. These factors collectively increase the probability of Iran initiating or becoming involved in a broader conflict soon.

Given the recent escalation in tensions in the region, the probability of an Iranian nuclear/missile facility being targeted has increased. Israel's recent operations against Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas—especially the targeted killings of key leaders within Hezbollah and Hamas—have heightened the regional conflict stakes. Iran, having vowed retaliation for these actions, finds itself under pressure to respond decisively to maintain its credibility both domestically and among its allies. The absence of an immediate Iranian response thus far only amplifies the urgency for action, as Iran seeks to assert its influence and deter future aggressions. Consequently, the strategic calculus suggests that Iranian military facilities could become focal points in this ongoing conflict, as they represent both symbolic and tactical targets.

The Israeli government sent a clear message to Iran in April when attacked the radar of a nuclear facility, signaling that they would target it if necessary.

China has traditionally taken a non-interference position in other countries' political affairs. This is a sharp contrast to Western countries, which impose many conditions (such as respecting human rights and democracy) in order to provide assistance (and even so, in limited amounts). Many African countries have gradually come to appreciate China’s noninterference policy. However, as China has become deeply involved in the economies and societies of many African countries, its stance is gradually changing. In the past, China has respected the decisions of regional organizations, such as ECOWAS, based on its principle of "leaving African problems to Africa." But its position is different now. While ECOWAS has taken a hard line on military coups in recent years (particularly in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso), China was critical of the military takeover in Guinea but quiet on Mali. The development of complicating interests seems to force them to respond differently in different cases.

Recently, China’s involvement in Africa has grown much more profound. Its approach to Africa is shifting from focusing on infrastructure and construction to partnership-oriented initiatives, such as strengthening trade and connectivity.

However, there are some relevant aspects to consider when it comes to the military aspect.

As realist thinkers such as John Mearsheimer and Jeffrey Sachs pointed out, China will likely react to the US's constant bullying against them by, somewhere down the road, expanding its blue water capabilities worldwide —which likely means more military bases. This is the expected behavior of an ascending/revisionist power that challenges the current hegemon (the US).  The relevant question here is whether or not this will happen before 2027. 

In my view, 2027 seems too early. China plays a long game, and building a new military base in Africa would be a significant shift in its foreign policy.

I argue that the Chinese military base in Djibouti does not represent a shift in their foreign policy. Djibouti hosts military bases from many different countries, including the US, Japan, Italy, France, and Saudi Arabia. They play a "military base" diplomacy, given their strategic location in the Horn of Africa.

Officially, the Chinese base in Djibouti serves as a support facility for the region's Chinese peacekeeping and anti-piracy missions.

If China decided to build another military base in Africa, it would immediately trigger an anger response and escalation from the West. The US is already actively working to prevent the possibility of a new Chinese military base in the region after speculations of a base in Gabon and Equatorial Guinea have surfaced.

Therefore, I believe China is unlikely to build other military bases in Africa until 2027. Of course, the tides can turn (particularly if the animosities between them and the US increase sharply), but I don't see it happening within a 2-year window (maybe in a 5-10-year timeframe).

Sources:

https://www.gatewayhouse.in/djibouti-military-base-diplomacy/

https://politicstoday.org/djibouti-surrounded-by-military-bases-of-china-us-france-uk-germany-others/

https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/sakane_01.html

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/27/china-building-overseas-naval-bases-across-asia-and-africa-say-analysts

https://bpr.studentorg.berkeley.edu/2024/04/27/controversy-sparks-amid-chinese-military-bases-in-africa/

https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/01/china-eyeing-second-military-base-africa

The "Africa Corps" (AC) is a mercenary force recently established by the Russian Ministry of Defense. It is designed to fill the void left by the Wagner Group, which has been disbanding/reorganized since Prigozhin's death. The Wagner Group began its activities in Africa in 2017, initially seeking commercial profits through military-related contracts. Moscow gradually added the political intention of expanding its aligned partners. 

Beyond the military aspect, the Africa Corps ventures into the lucrative mining sector of the continent. This is a significant revenue stream for Russia, especially amidst the financial strains imposed by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Since the onset of this conflict, Russia has reportedly earned $2.5 billion from gold sourced from African nations.

Since the Cold War, Russia has maintained political and economic ties with various African countries. In recent years, there has been a notable increase in diplomatic relations and military agreements between Moscow and several African nations. These relationships may encompass military cooperation, arms sales, training for local forces, and, in some instances, establishing military facilities. Russia is the largest arms supplier to Africa, accounting for nearly half of all weapons flowing into the African continent. 

Following @Plataea479 's excellent recommendation in his forecast, I checked the PISM report regarding Africa Corps published in May 2024. In it, the Polish authors discuss possible prospects for the future of Africa Corps.

Before delving into it, I must refer to the list of African countries where Africa Corps is active (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Libya) and where they have already operated (Central African Republic, Chad, Mozambique, Sudan, and Mauritania).

Between pages 32 and 42, PISM lists possible subsequent developments for ACs, namely Chad, Sudan, Algeria, Mauritania, Togo, Congo (DRC), and Ghana.

Regarding Togo, the report says:

"[...] other possible directions of AC expansion are worth noting. In February this year, Ukraine’s National Centre of Resistance, a structure of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine that operates within the framework of information warfare, published an analysis of AC’s development indicating—presumably based on intelligence—that it was planning to send a military mission to Togo. There, the Russians would provide support to that country’s president, Faure Gnassingbé. Such an action would be in line with the well-tested model of making leaders with weak legitimacy (such as Bashar Al-Assad and Touadera) dependent on Russian support. In March, Gnassingbé staged a constitutional coup by abolishing universal presidential elections, thereby creating conditions in which the risk of a military putsch against his rule, and hence his need for protection, increases. [...] Nevertheless, the prospect is possible in which AC services are claimed by leaders unsure of relying on their own strength in moments of political upheaval (as in Togo) or, for example, wanting to carry out a succession of power within the family (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Uganda)."

Besides that, this report also suggests that the Russian-Togoleses security partnership will likely expand in the following months.

Sources:

https://issafrica.org/iss-today/russias-africa-corps-more-than-old-wine-in-a-new-bottle

https://areferencia.com/africa/russia-cria-novo-exercito-mercenario-na-africa-substituindo-o-wagner-group/

https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-01-31/wagner-forces-under-a-new-flag-russias-africa-corps-burkina-faso
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-01-31/wagner-forces-under-a-new-flag-russias-africa-corps-burkina-faso

https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/mundo/sob-o-comando-de-putin-grupo-wagner-e-remodelado-e-inicia-nova-fase-na-africa/

https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/12/17/africa-corps-russia-s-sahel-presence-rebranded_6352317_124.html

After a period of relative calm between 2013 and 2020, the number of coups in Africa has sharply risen, particularly in West Africa and the Sahel region (the area between the Saara Desert and the tropical forests). Some analysts call it the "Coup Belt." It is the longest corridor of military rule on Earth, stretching over 6000 km between the Atlantic and the Red Sea.

The military takeovers were successful in eight countries:  Gabon (2023), Niger (2023), Burkina Faso (2022), Sudan (2021), Guinea (2021), Chad (2021) and Mali (2020-21). Other countries (such as Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Congo) have suffered from coup attempts in 2024 but managed to suppress them. 

Most of these countries were former French colonies. They experienced strong anti-french sentiments fueled by a perception of a remaining colonial French presence as seen in (1) the alignment of local authoritarian regimes with Paris, as well as (2) the monetary unions under French control (the CFA) and (3) French (and European) military presence in the region, whether directly with stationed troops or indirectly with regional organizations such as ECOWAS, perceived by some as a puppet of the French/West.

Another source of anger that played a central role was the local authorities' inability (and, by extension, the French and the West) to repel Islamist militant violence (i.e., ISIS and its like-minded groups). This aspect is critical to understanding what is happening there.

All this sentiment grew amid dire economic conditions (especially after the COVID crisis and the authorities' responses, which some saw as draconian). 

Local military leadership (notably young officers) channeled the dissatisfaction into seizing power - in many cases, without casualties. 

Often, the local population perceived the overthrown rulers as corrupt and authoritarian. They had changed their constitutions, manipulated elections, and suppressed or eliminated opposition to collect or retain power by all means possible. Many of them had been in charge for decades. It is not by chance that many of these coups did not elicit visible public opposition. In fact, in many cases, the downfall of the incumbent governments was greeted by widespread celebrations on the streets.

Soon after, coup leaders made new allies,  seeking support from either Russia (and its Wagner Group, now Africa Corps) or Turkey (given Erdogan's dreams of a return to the "Ottoman Empire"), to fight jihadist groups. It is important to remember that these alliances with Russia date back to 2020 (so before the invasion of Ukraine, which took place in February 2022).

Initially, Russia aimed to pursue commercial profits through military-related contracts, but Moscow gradually added the political intention of expanding its aligned partners. Now, Russia is the largest arms supplier to Africa, accounting for nearly half of all weapons flowing into the African continent. 

As the situation develops, the 'coup season' seems far from over.  A few factors push me to increase the likelihood of a new successful coup from above the 50/50 threshold:

• According to Powell and Thyne, from the Cline Center University of Illinois,  49% of the coup attempts in Africa from 1950 to 2023 have succeeded (109 successful out of 220 attempts). However, the "success rate" among the 2020-2023 coup attempts is approximately 65% (The graphics are below: https://projects.voanews.com/african-coups/).
• Succeeding in taking over power does not mean succeeding in remaining in power. Poverty, political instability, systemic corruption, violent extremism, and internal divisions make the region continent unstable and conflict-prone.
• Russia has increased its power and influence in the region, while France and other Western countries are still battling to keep their local alliances. Besides that, there's an ongoing battle of information regarding multiple actors. Whether for one side or the other, the likelihood of a successful attempt to overthrow power is high. 
• Recent coup attempts (in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Gabon) show that such events will likely continue.
• Many African countries, such as Senegal, Libya, and Sudan, have question marks over their political future.
• Coup leaders in the Sahel are learning from and supporting each other. The military putschists of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea recognize each other as potential allies and know that they can rely on the support of other juntas in the region, as seen in the recent creation of the Sahel States Alliance (AES).

Sources:

https://projects.voanews.com/african-coups/

https://warontherocks.com/2024/02/africas-coup-calamity-what-happened-to-deterrence/ 

https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-niger-burkina-faso-sign-sahel-security-pact-2023-09-16/ 

https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/the-evolution-of-coups-in-africa 

https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/9/22/africas-coup-epidemic-has-democracy-failed-the-continenthttps://aje.io/zwgajk

https://www.statista.com/chart/30532/number-of-coups-per-year-in-africa/

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/info/infographic/35064

https://www.channelstv.com/2023/08/30/africa-seven-coups-in-three-years/

https://www.idea.int/blog/two-more-coups-africa-similarities-differences-and-what-comes-next

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NS4aF11yWVQ

https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/sakane_01.html

https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/11/what-does-africa-need-most-now-russian-arms-sales-or.html

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/factbox-recent-coups-in-africa/2979254

https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/from-fighting-jihadists-to-fighting-juntas-explaining-the-recent-resurgence-of-military-coups-in-africa-and-how-to-prevent-recurrence/

https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/mta-joint-futures-05-coups-in-africa

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00219096231224680

https://www.africanews.com/2023/08/30/africa-the-7-military-coups-over-the-last-three-years/

https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/04/13/understanding-africas-coups/

https://jonathanmpowell.com/coups/

Considering Russia's existing constitutional structure and political climate, the likelihood of Putin relinquishing his position as president within the next 12 months is extremely low. Having been re-elected for a fifth term in 2024, and given the government's influence over media and the political landscape in Russia, he is likely to pursue a sixth term in 2030, provided his health remains stable. No new information suggests any illness that could significantly impact his health.

While there have been occasional media reports speculating about Putin's health, these claims appear to be unsubstantiated. Moreover, even if his health were to decline, he has access to the most advanced medical care available. Putin maintains a firm grip on power and continues to enjoy popularity among a significant portion of the Russian population.

The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) have been members of NATO since 2004. From this moment forward, there's nuclear deterrence to prevent a Russian invasion since it would immediately trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. I don't see why Russia would want that—they already have their hands full with Ukraine. Also, I don't see why they would want the Baltic states back, given that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania hold a strong anti-Russian sentiment. It's a lot of trouble to manage.

The one thing that could make Russia invade any of those countries is the possibility of them joining NATO. However, I do not see this as a real possibility for any of these nations, at least in the short term. 

Moldova: Russia has stationed troops in Transnistria. There is no urgency in annexing it to Russia's territory (especially considering that there is a large chunk of "unconquered" Ukrainian territory between them). In any case, I believe it is more advantageous for Russia to keep Moldova as an allied/tampoon country (like Belarus) rather than annex it.

Georgia: Georgia applied to become a NATO member in 1994, but as we know, after the Russo-Georgia War in 2008, the membership process did not advance. With this war, Russia has made it unequivocally clear that it will not accept Georgia becoming a NATO member. I believe the Georgian politicians have understood the message.

Armenia: Armenia has many problems of its own to deal with. And it doesn't seem to want trouble with Russia. Plus, it will never join NATO as long as Turkey is a member of the alliance.

Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan's strategy is to get the most benefits from all the players in the table. I don't see them looking for trouble with Russia or joining NATO. 

Beyond all that, Russia has its hands full with Ukraine. This is their main concern.