geoffodlum

I agree with most colleagues' rationales.  The short time frame remaining until the question closes, along with the arrival of wintry weather, the vulnerability of Russian forces to ATACMs, and most importantly the Kremlin's interest in seeing what favorable negotiating conditions it can extract from the incoming Trump Administration, argue compellingly in favor of Putin not ordering a major gound offensive before the end of the year. 

Dropping to 1% from 2% to reflect the passage of time (12 days remaining before Dec 1), and the Trump team's apparent signals of support to Netanyahu to continue military action to further degrade Hamas prior to a resumption of ceasefire negotiations.  

AFP reported over the weekend that a Hamas political bureau official, Bassem Naim, asserted that Hamas is "ready to reach a ceaefire in the Gaza strip is a proposal is presented and on condition that it is respected by Israel...if it leads to a definitive ceasefire and military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, allowing the return of displaced people, a serious deal for a prisoner exchange, the entry of humanitarian aid and reconstruction."  Unfortunately for the residnts of Gaza, it is almost certain that Netanyahu would reject the condition of military withdrawal from Gaza. 

I'm dropping to 20% because of Trump's election and his apparent desire to have closer relations with Putin.  One side effect of Trump's appeasement of Putin in Ukraine may a decision by Putin to lower the frequency and intensity of Russian cyber attacks against the US and NATO allies, to give Trump a "win" and deepen Trump's vassalage towards Putin.

I would expect to see 80+ German-language disinformation cases originating in pro-Kremlin media between 1 October 2024 and 30 September 2025.

The data shows peaks in disinformation during or near major electoral cycles in Germany, such as in 2021 (78 cases) and 2022–2023 (82 cases). With Germany's federal elections set for 2025, Russian disinformation campaigns will likely intensify, targeting voter trust and key issues like immigration, energy policy, and EU cohesion.

The ongoing Ukraine conflict remains the key driver of Russia’s propaganda efforts. With Germany’s pivotal role in EU sanctions, arms transfers, and NATO support for Ukraine, Germany remains a top target for Kremlin disinformation. I think Russia’s desire to erode German public support for Ukraine-related policies and inflame divisions over energy policy (e.g., reliance on renewables, sanctions on Russian gas) will likely drive the volume of campaigns higher.

It's also worth noting that Russian influence operations are becoming more sophisticated, leveraging deepfakes, AI-generated content, and coordinated narratives across multiple platforms. I would expect to see a spike in tactics like amplification of divisive social issues (e.g., immigration or inflation) and narratives undermining democratic institutions. I would also expect disinformation efforts targeting political parties, candidates, and electoral systems to increase. Germany's proportional representation system is sensitive to public opinion shifts, and vulnerable to Russian actors using disinformation to influence coalition outcomes.

Some Signals I am watching:

Narratives in German-language Media: I’m keeping an eye out for key themes, such as anti-Ukraine, anti-NATO, and EU fragmentation narratives, amplified in pro-Kremlin outlets.

Timing and Targeting: Increased activity around key German political events, such as the election campaign start, debates, or scandals.

Platforms and Tactics: I’m watching for report of growth in AI-generated fake news and more aggressive use of social media platforms like Telegram or WhatsApp, which are widely used in Germany.

German Political Climate: Rising polarization or major controversies (e.g., economic downturns, immigration issues) could serve as opportunities for disinformation campaigns.

I am upping my forecast to a still extremely unlikely 4%, from 1%, stemming from Trump's election win and the foreign policy / Middle East policy wildcard that represents.

I can imagine a scenario where the Trump WH uses a non-traditional mix of coercion (tariff threats, sanctions threats, cutting off countries from the US banking system, cutting off partner countries from US financial or military aid, etc) and opportunistic, transactional incentives (more aid, more trade, advanced weapon systems, promises to buy more Gulf oil and gas, State Visits to DC and Mar-a-Lago, Trump Hotels in their capitals, etc) to convince at least one majority muslim state to normalize relations with Israel before mid-May.    (None of this would happen via normal State Department channels.)  It would have to coincide with a sustained ceasefire in Gaza, but Trump and Netanyahu are already discussing that, and such a ceaefire appears more likely now that the key leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah have been eliminated. 

Raising slightly to 4% given Trump's campaign rhetoric suggesting he would consider direct military action against Iran if targets Israel again.  I dont believe Iran would attack the US directly unless it is in retaliation for a US attack against Iran.  One hopes Trump's military advisors will be able to demonstrate to him, through wargaming outcomes and intel assessments, that an armed conflict directly between the US-Iran would be a strategic disaster for Middle East security and stability. 

Trump's election upends a number of my prior assumptions about scenarios, drivers, and signals related to this question.  The resolution date comes before Trump's inauguaration, so perhaps there wont be any new consideration on Microsoft's part, though it would be strategic malpractice for Satya Nadella not to be recalculating the pros and cons of staying or leaving China and acting before the inauguration to preempt potential tariff costs or sanctions risk.      

Trump's campaign rhetoric about launching a trade war with China, including 60% tariffs on Chinese goods, which would likey provoke Chinese retaliatory measures, suggests bilateral economic and commercial relations may soon start to tailspin.  If this happens, I can imagine concrete collateral damage to US corporations who have a Chinese presence or significant commercial interests in China.  Add to this the incoming Administration's justified concerns about the AI leadership competition with China, plus China's aggressive efforts to steal US technology IP, and surprisingly aggressive recent cases of Chinese disinformation, hacking, and cyber attacks against US media, civil instiutions, and infrastructure, and I can imagine the Trump Administration  -- once it is in place -- strong-arming Microsoft to close its AIRC.   

On the other hand, Xi Jinping knows that Trump is entirely transactional and holds no core policy principles or values,  so there is always the possibility that Trump could be bribed to allow waivers or cutouts for Microsoft or other US companies that Xi wants to remained active in China (eg Tesla). 

Bottom line:  If the question's resolution date was in spring or summer 2025 I would give up to a 35% chance of Microsoft closing the AIRC. But the shortness of time remaining to 12/31/24, 20 days before the Trump Administration comes into office, persuades me to drop my forecast from 10% to 7%

Trump's election and his strangely admiring view of Putin could presage the unlikely-but-not-impossible scenario under which the US leaves or suspends membership in NATO and Trump gives Putin secret (treacherous) assurances that US forces will not invoke Art V to protect one or all of the Baltic states.  It's almost incomprehensible that a US President would betray a NATO ally, but it can no longer be 100% ruled out.