geoffodlum

Following the research and rationale by @michal_dubrawski, and encuraging other colleagues to check out his most recent comment and fill out his google poll.

I assume Kim Jong Un is eager to (re)start relations with the Trump Administration on a positive footing, which means suspending any plans for nuclear testing for now. That does not mean suspending work on the nuclear weapons program, which I assue is progressing apace and perhaps even accelerating a bit with Russian technical assistance.  If things go badly for Kim with the Trump Admin in the first few months of 2025 -- which is quite possibly given Marco Rubio's and Michael Walz's more traditionally conservative views of North Korea as a pariah state-- my forecast for a DPRL nuclear test would rise alot.

Dropping from 35% to 28%.  From Bloomberg financial news:

Nvidia delivered a revenue forecast today that failed to meet the highest expectations, arguably showing that its dizzying AI-fueled growth run has its limits. Fiscal fourth-quarter sales will be about $37.5B, the company said Wednesday. Though the average analyst estimate was $37.1B, projections ranged as high as $41B. Nvidia investors bid up the shares nearly 200% in 2024, turning it into the world’s most valuable company, but the chipmaker has had trouble keeping up with demand for its products and struggled with production snags this year."

Doubling cautiously to 4% because this week the IAEA is holding its Board of Goverors meeting in Vienna. Apparently there are active discussions between the IAEA Director General and Iran's diplomatic team about Iran committing to cap its stockpile of uranium entiched to 60%, and IAEA inspectors suggest they've seen evidence Iran may be preparing to do so. If so that's a promising steps that should lower tensions and set the table for future talks about Iran committing to capping future enrichment at 5%.  

BUT... the obstacles are many, and the variables that will influence Iranian leadership decision-making are varied and complex, including:

--- Will the US/UK/FR/GE drop their current efforts to press the DG to issue a report by next spring on the unresolved issue of Iran's nuclear weapons package testing (which Iran stopped in 2003); and if they do move forward with this demand, how will Iran react? 

-- What quid pro quo does Iran expect to receieve for capping its stockpile at 60%?

-- What additional incentives will Iran demand for capping its enrchment level at 5%? Probably something big like full US sanctions relief.  

-- Will the Trump administration (which has preferred "maximum pressure" on Iran despite the poor track record of success) be willing to give Iran some portion of the concessions or incentives its seeking?

-- Will China and Russia play constructive or unhelpful roles on this?

I believe all sides want to lower tensions, and the IAEA BOG is an idel venue to explore how to do that since all the right players are there, with the IAEA DG able to act as an honest broker.

So, lots of signs to watch for, but enough for me to raise to 4% from 2%, and ready to raise higher if progress is made in coming days and weeks. 

I am reversing direction and raising to 35% after seeing in the past several days that (1) two submarine internet cables in the Baltic Sea were disrupted in an apparent sabotage operation, (2) a cable between Lithuania and Sweden was cut on Sunday, and (3) a Finnish  cables that connects Finland and Germany was disrupted.  All signs point to Russia as the saboteur, which strongly suggests Russia is more willing now (perhaps tied to Trump's election) to use kinetic action against NATO member state communications infrastructure. If Russia concludes that it can get away with actions like these w/o serious repercussions, one can easily imagine future Russian cyber operations against NATO energy or transportation infrastructure that cause kinetc damage.

I agree with most colleagues' rationales.  The short time frame remaining until the question closes, along with the arrival of wintry weather, the vulnerability of Russian forces to ATACMs, and most importantly the Kremlin's interest in seeing what favorable negotiating conditions it can extract from the incoming Trump Administration, argue compellingly in favor of Putin not ordering a major gound offensive before the end of the year. 

Dropping to 1% from 2% to reflect the passage of time (12 days remaining before Dec 1), and the Trump team's apparent signals of support to Netanyahu to continue military action to further degrade Hamas prior to a resumption of ceasefire negotiations.  

AFP reported over the weekend that a Hamas political bureau official, Bassem Naim, asserted that Hamas is "ready to reach a ceaefire in the Gaza strip is a proposal is presented and on condition that it is respected by Israel...if it leads to a definitive ceasefire and military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, allowing the return of displaced people, a serious deal for a prisoner exchange, the entry of humanitarian aid and reconstruction."  Unfortunately for the residnts of Gaza, it is almost certain that Netanyahu would reject the condition of military withdrawal from Gaza. 

I'm dropping to 20% because of Trump's election and his apparent desire to have closer relations with Putin.  One side effect of Trump's appeasement of Putin in Ukraine may a decision by Putin to lower the frequency and intensity of Russian cyber attacks against the US and NATO allies, to give Trump a "win" and deepen Trump's vassalage towards Putin.

I would expect to see 80+ German-language disinformation cases originating in pro-Kremlin media between 1 October 2024 and 30 September 2025.

The data shows peaks in disinformation during or near major electoral cycles in Germany, such as in 2021 (78 cases) and 2022–2023 (82 cases). With Germany's federal elections set for 2025, Russian disinformation campaigns will likely intensify, targeting voter trust and key issues like immigration, energy policy, and EU cohesion.

The ongoing Ukraine conflict remains the key driver of Russia’s propaganda efforts. With Germany’s pivotal role in EU sanctions, arms transfers, and NATO support for Ukraine, Germany remains a top target for Kremlin disinformation. I think Russia’s desire to erode German public support for Ukraine-related policies and inflame divisions over energy policy (e.g., reliance on renewables, sanctions on Russian gas) will likely drive the volume of campaigns higher.

It's also worth noting that Russian influence operations are becoming more sophisticated, leveraging deepfakes, AI-generated content, and coordinated narratives across multiple platforms. I would expect to see a spike in tactics like amplification of divisive social issues (e.g., immigration or inflation) and narratives undermining democratic institutions. I would also expect disinformation efforts targeting political parties, candidates, and electoral systems to increase. Germany's proportional representation system is sensitive to public opinion shifts, and vulnerable to Russian actors using disinformation to influence coalition outcomes.

Some Signals I am watching:

Narratives in German-language Media: I’m keeping an eye out for key themes, such as anti-Ukraine, anti-NATO, and EU fragmentation narratives, amplified in pro-Kremlin outlets.

Timing and Targeting: Increased activity around key German political events, such as the election campaign start, debates, or scandals.

Platforms and Tactics: I’m watching for report of growth in AI-generated fake news and more aggressive use of social media platforms like Telegram or WhatsApp, which are widely used in Germany.

German Political Climate: Rising polarization or major controversies (e.g., economic downturns, immigration issues) could serve as opportunities for disinformation campaigns.