geoffodlum

I share @cassandra 's forecast of 6%.  I'm looking at:

1. Health:  Considering actuarial tables for a Russian 71-year old male, with persistent rumors of Putin's health problems but conversely with access to world-class healthcare, I assess Putin having around a 4% chance of dying of unpreventable natural causes in the coming 10 months.

2. Palace coup / assassination:  Putin has neutralized or neutered eliminated every foreseeable political rival, and has instituted draconian personal security measures (50' long conference tables, food tasters, several body doubles, etc) that make it nearly impossible for an internal coup (ie from his personal bodyguard) or assassination attempt to succeed. Maybe 1% chance.

3.  Ukraine war fallout: Some overlap with previous scenario, but this would look more like a popular or oligarch-driven systemic overthrow, after Russia reaches an economic and social tipping point that yet another year of economic decline and military failure could trigger.  Russian propaganda has so far been successful at masking from the population the extreme degree of long-term, comprehensive, cross-sector damage that Russian's invasion of Ukraine has caused, but cracks in the propaganda wall coupled with more Ukrainian battlefield advances in 2025, could sow enough discord among oligarchic elites, mid-level military officers and intelligence agents, and common Russians that a coup attempt -- accompanied by significant violent clashes between anti-Putin forces and pro-Putin loyalists - could succeed.  Maybe 4% chance of this.

Collectively I feel like this generates, for now, a 6% probability of resolving yes by 7/1/2025.

gdrcould

Raising my forecast to 5% from 1% given the missile and rocket fire of the past several days and high potential for further escalation.

It's likely that Hezbollah has asked Iran for more direct military support against Israel. As we've seen, Iranian leaders are wary of the risks of direct military conflict with Israel given Israeli capabilities to penetrate Iranian airspace, but I believe that an ongoing, escalatory military exchange between Israel and Hezbollah would prompt a steadily increasing chance of forcing Iran's hand, especially if Israeli action against Hezbollah rises to the level of becoming an existential threat to Hezbollah's existence.

The massive massive fighting that's killed 500+ people in the past two days definitely should look like a war to any reasonable observer, even if neither the Israeli Govt nor the USG are actually using the word "war" in an official or legal sense.

White House Deputy National Security adviser Finer told the media yesterday that airstrikes and rocket attacks between Israel and Hezbollah are likely to escalate.  So the US goal is no longer to try to prevent more rocket and missile exchanges; the goal now is to prevent an Israeli ground invasion of Lebanon and deter Iran from intervening and supporting Hezbollah.

I agree with @cmeinel and others that the resolution criteria are a bit fuzzy. Would an Israeli ground invasion of Lebanon resolve as "yes" even if Israeli doesnt refer to it as a war in its official declarations?

I expect to see Israel and Hezbollah continuing and even escalating rocket, missile, drone attacks and sabotage efforts against each other in the coming month. Hezbollah's leaderships and comms channels are in disarray now but as soon as they reorganize, they will probably feel a reputational necessity to retaliate against Israel. The question is whether Israel will announce it and treat it from legal and policy standpoints as a declaration of war.  I'm at 40% because Israel can continue and escalate attacks against Hezbollah without taking such an explicit and declaratory policy step.

Dropping to 3% likelihood following Israel's sabotage attack using 1000s of Hezbollah pagers yesterday and today. Apparently Israel was planning to detonate the pagers as the first stage of an all-out future attack against Hezbollah, but they decided to do it now because they feared Hezbollah might discover the tampering. 
I can't imagine that this won't prompt a severe Hezbollah reaction, as well as force Iran to support Hezbollah with their own actions against Israel, which is not the direction Iran was planning to go.

Obviously this will also preclude Hamas from being able to take any meaningful steps towards a workable ceasefire in the foreseeable future.

While I agree with the sentiments and analysis of teammates that this outcome is extremely highly unlikely, it's imprudent to ever forecast 0% likelihood on any event, especially an event that depends on a decision made by Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei (or a possible successor).  With a reformist President now in office, who has appointed several JCPOA negotiators to the MFA, Iran has a team of foreign policy officials who are far more oriented towards engaging with the P5 to discuss JCPOA renewal than was the case under President Raisi, and who understand the history and intricacies of the negotiations that secured JCPOA agreement in the first place (which were surprisingly dynamic).

Iran's foreign policy team understand very well both the technical and policy implications of committing to 5% enrichment, and to allowing IAEA inspectors the access to verify that commitment.  There is a slightly better than 0% chance that this could happen, especially if Iran is able to secure quid pro quo concessions from the P5 that would effectively secure the regime's survival and future for the long(ish) term in exchange for a 5% enrichment commitment.  For example, a significant lifting of UN, EU, and US sanctions, plus a P5 reiteration of Iran's NPT-enshrined, sovereign right to enrichment, plus a 5- or 10-year sunset provision to this enrichment restriction, plus a clear pledge that the US/UK/France will not interfere in Iran's internal political affairs, plus initial steps to allow Iran to re-enter the international banking system, could theoretically be enough to persuade Khamenei to instruct Pezeshkian to accept such a grand bargain.  In my mind, 4% (a one in 25 chance) of this happening in the next 6 months feels about right.

I will be keeping a close eye on signals that might suggest discussions could be moving in this direction, like seeing P5 foreign ministers  scheduling in-person meetings in the coming month or two with FM Aragchi (like at next week's UNGA), and/or seeing Iran start to subtly lower its anti-US rhetoric, or Iran continuing to delay carrying out its threat of direct retaliation against Israel.

I'm a bit higher in my forecast than the consensus range of most of my teammates, for several reasons:

1. Age and life expectancy:  According to WHO data published in 2020, the average life expectancy for a male is 75.7 years, and leading causes of death are coronary heart disease, stroke, and hypertension.  Khamenei has had serious health issues in the past, including bowel obstruction surgery in 2022, prostate cancer in 2014, carcinoma in 2013, and chronic pain and a partially paralyzed right arm resulting from the injuries he sustained in the assassination attempt against him in  1981, which is also linked to rumors of significant opioid dependency.  Even given the world class health he receives as a head of state, his health is a mess, and the constant stress and paranoia he must experience in his position doesn't help.

2. Regime unpopularity and risk of instability: Although Iran's political situation has stabilized somewhat with the election of President Pezeshkian following former President Raisi's death in a helicopter crash, the regime's deep unpopularity leaves it vulnerable to sudden eruptions of public protest virtually anytime.  The wave of nationwide protests and violence following the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022 could easily be repeated, especially as repression of women continues in Iran and as new reports emerge of other protesters being tortured and killed in prison (e.g. Sara Deldar).  The regime crushed dissent brutally, but faces the risk of a tipping point if its brutality goes too far.

3. IRGC's claims to power and role in succession planning:  If Khamenei succeeds in forcing the system to accept his son Mojtaba as his successor despite Mojtaba's lack of sufficient religious credentials, the IRGC may feel that its own its preferred candidate(s) have been disregarded and potentially that its lucrative control of Iran's black markets could be in jeopardy. I dont rule out the IRGC deciding to orchestrate a leadership succession that preempts Khamanei's succession orchestration.

A 15% probability accounts for the possibility of unexpected health issues or a sudden, dramatic shift in internal power dynamics, while also reflecting the regime's demonstrated ability to maintain control and the lack of immediate, overwhelming threats to Khamenei's position.

CIA Director Bill Burns has publicly stated that the US IC knows "as a matter of intelligence" that Xi has ordered his military to be ready to conduct an invasion of Taiwan by 2027. Although China's military is expanding and developing new capabilities rapidly, it does not currently have the capability to guarantee a successful invasion and occupation of Taiwan.  Moreover, I've seen a number of China experts assess that Xi's strategy between now and 2027 is to apply enough political, economic, military, and psychological pressure on Taiwan's government and population to coerce them to agree to take steps towards reunification peacefully.  The only scenario I can imagine in which China attacks Taiwan militarily before March 9, 2025 would be a scenario involving systemic miscommunication and egregious human error at a number of levels in China's military hierarchy. 

https://www.reuters.com/world/cia-chief-says-chinas-xi-little-sobered-by-ukraine-war-2023-02-02/