JonathanMann

Jonathan Mann
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-0.603605

Relative Brier Score
112232005101520253035
Questions Forecasted
1120440051015202530354045
Scored Questions

282

Forecasts

59

Upvotes
Forecasting Activity
Forecasting Calendar
LessMoreDecJanFebMarSuMoTuWeThFrSa
 

Past Week Past Month Past Year This Season All Time
Forecasts 11 15 194 41 784
Comments 8 10 48 36 210
Questions Forecasted 11 14 45 22 112
Upvotes on Comments By This User 2 4 40 10 158
 Definitions
New Prediction
JonathanMann
made their 1st forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
0%
Less than or equal to 9%
7%
Between 10% and 19%, inclusive
75%
Between 20% and 29%, inclusive
17%
Between 30% and 39%, inclusive
1%
More than or equal to 40%
Why do you think you're right?
Mentally, I'm modeling this as something of a random walk governed by 2 correlated inputs. In these sorts of situations, I expect the walk to end up near its starting point, but with a bias gradually pulling it toward the pre-war mean.  
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Why might you be wrong?

A shock (as happened after the invasion) shows that the numbers can shift substantially over a short time period. I'm operating under the assumption that these kinds of shocks are rare, but it's hard to know. 

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New Prediction
Why do you think you're right?
In the main, I agree with my fellow forecasters, but the risk of contagion across these markets is the primary reason I'm a little bit higher than the median. A default by one nation could trigger investor risk reassessment, leading to capital flight, higher borrowing costs, and reduced willingness to roll over existing debt for remaining countries. This contagion effect creates correlation in default probabilities, as investors might view these markets through a similar risk lens ( in spite of their economic / political differences).  
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Why might you be wrong?

The willingness of multilateral institutions to provide emergency support could provide a countervailing force to the spillover effect I was concerned about, but I'm still going to remain relatively higher to bias in the direction of uncertainty. 

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New Prediction
JonathanMann
made their 1st forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
55%
Less than 30 days
5%
30 days
15%
31-60 days
8%
61-90 days
17%
91 days or more
Why do you think you're right?
I suppose 30 days is the most likely time frame for the ceasefire, but, given a ceasefire, 30 days won't necessarily be the target, so I think the crowd is too high on that. As others have pointed out, it seems likely that the outcome will be either a quick return to fighting where both sides accuse each other of breaking the deal or a more durable agreement resulting in higher probabilities at the extremes. 
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Why might you be wrong?
I don't think this is likely, but one way I could imagine being wrong is if there are strong incentives (e.g. sanctions relief) just to hit a ceasefire target length. 
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Plataea479
made a comment:

Thanks so much. Having personally viewed the famous Irpin bridge and lived in both St. Petersburg and Buccha which was an extremely pleasant place to live in 2021 before the general war, I can tell you that Russians Germans Poles and their predecessors have waged war over what is now recognized as Ukraine for at least 400 years. The Poland which was partitioned out of existence  3x by Catherine the Great constituted most of today's  Western Ukraine.

Then Poland was reinvented at Versailles in 1919 out of the same land. And Trotsky was at the gates of Warsaw  later that year. Next the Poles and their Ukrainian allies captured Kiev in 1921  Prompting the inauguration of the  Soviet Union with the current Ukraine as a supposedly autonomous  Socialist Soviet Rwpublic.

After splitting this land with Hitler, Stalin got all of it at Yalra.  He forced FDR to move Poland 300 miles  west.

Crimea was never part of Ukraine until Khruschev added it to the SSR in 1952 in recognition of its sacrifices in the Holidmor and Nazis.

Common theme outside powers including Germsny  the US and Russia have fought and will fight  over  this land to the last dead Ukrainian. Over 20 millions Ukrainians killed just in the lsst 100 years.  Over 20 millon Ukrainians killed displaced in the last 2 years.

Hence the outside view is general war every 20 years 

But one must understand thst biology and genetics and environmental feedback loop that for 400 years  created a culture of absolutism becsuse of fear since Ivan  the Terrible of instability.

That same loop made Ukrainian resist absolute authority in religion and politics for 400 years.

https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-sapolsky-culture-and-behavior-20140803-story.html

The inside story is that time 400 years and the repeated real traumas of war and genocide have created 2 distinct Russian and Ukrainian cultures  which actually render a common psychological result.

Ukrainians and  Russians actually  disgusted by each other 

As a result Russians hate Ukrainians.and vice versa.  Almost every Russian including post grads and security oligarchs like Lavrov think Ukrainians are ungrateful uncooperative fraudsters who don't really exist as a nation. And this attitude exists among 80 percent of all Russians.

85 percent of Ukrainians think Putin is like Hitler and Russians are all slaves and accessories to genocide

https://www.thetimes.com/article/9da07f48-ec3d-4b1c-9d8f-9d5eee1599bf?shareToken=8d5a5416378c7cbdf770d35a8fee8ba8

Children that is the wedge issue Putin cannot concede. He claims Russia rescued 750000 and most if not all Russians believe him. Prisoners. Putin just convicted and incarcerated the only survivors of the Asov Battalion as terrorists.

And the Ukrainians believe Putin and most Russians steal children and violate Geneva. For what it's worth so does the ICC. So do I. Yet most Russians deny events like Buccha ever happened.

So there may be some short symbolic sham cease fire by Putin just to satisfy Trump but only because the campaign season is over after October.

Putin will not agree to a cease fire until Ukraine has sufficient precise mass force. Until US and EU arm Ukraine enough to  overcome Russia 4 to 1  advantage and start pushing Putin back and protect Ukrainian cities, this version of the war may last until Putin dies or loses power.

Far more likely is no agreement and lower intensity attacks on the LOC and Ukrainian cities and a frozen conflict.

Putin and Lavriv protest that Russian does not want a frozen conflict. They both protest too much.

As I rate anything other than a 2025  Gaza type cease fire extremely unlikely like 85 percent, it's impossible to predict a contingent low frequency result.

So i agree with you but decline to forecast. 


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New Prediction
Confirmed previous forecast
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New Prediction
JonathanMann
made their 2nd forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
1% (0%)
Venezuela conducts a ground invasion of Guyana
2% (0%)
Venezuela attacks offshore Guyanese oil wells
0% (0%)
Venezuela relinquishes its claim on Essequibo
0% (0%)
Guyana agrees to cede some or all of Essequibo
Confirmed previous forecast
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New Prediction
JonathanMann
made their 1st forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
1%
1 January 2025 - 31 March 2025
33%
1 April 2025 - 30 June 2025
21%
1 July 2025 - 30 September 2025
15%
1 October 2025 - 31 December 2025
30%
Not before 2026
Why do you think you're right?

Based on the question criteria, I think this is actually relatively likely to happen and quite plausibly to happen soon. It might be that they start with a shorter ceasefire to try to "build trust" and it seems like even attempting this would resolve the question positively. This seems like something where the incentives (at least from the current administration) are a priority and pushing toward at least an attempt.

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Why might you be wrong?
Fighting is the status quo and previous attempts at a ceasefire have failed, so this is by no means overwhelmingly likely.
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New Prediction
JonathanMann
made their 2nd forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
0% (0%)
Yes
100% (0%)
No
Confirmed previous forecast
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New Prediction
Why do you think you're right?

For any other company in a similar relative position, I'd probably be around 4%, but NVIDIA has an added dimension of AI-driven volatility, so I'm adding 2 percentage points of extra uncertainty. 

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Why might you be wrong?

Although I wouldn't put a lot of weight on this impacting NVIDIA to the point where the question resolves as true, sudden policy reversals and even unexpected subsidies could push stock prices around quite a bit and seem within the realm of possibility for the current administration,.

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New Prediction
Why do you think you're right?

The clock ran out on this one. I should have been lowering every week for the past few weeks, but this one slipped off my radar.

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Why might you be wrong?
If there's something I haven't heard about, but all web searches I made indicate no new activity.
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New Prediction
JonathanMann
made their 11th forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
6% (-2%)
Moldova
1% (0%)
Armenia
3% (0%)
Georgia
1% (0%)
Kazakhstan
Why do you think you're right?

Lowering on Moldova. I appreciate the comments here that Putin's ambitions might be limited to Ukraine, but, while that seems possible, it isn't clear it me that it's true and I still think it a bit more likely that if Putin got a free hand, he would try something with Moldova. However, as the war in Ukraine is looking more likely to continue on, it seems starting another operation, or even worse, if there isn't a ceasefire, opening another front would be less likely.

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Why might you be wrong?

There is still a chance for a ceasefire that comes in time to start an operation in Moldova. There is also a very narrow possibility that Putin could open another front before a ceasefire is reached in Ukraine.

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