DKC

Europe is waking up to the fact that Trump's America doesn't have their backs. And they might be considered woefully unprepared to what they may face in the coming years.

https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-military-struggling-us-donald-trump-nato-report/

FTA:Germany’s military, or Bundeswehr, is shrinking, aging and still lacks essential equipment despite a considerable increase in defense spending following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to a closely watched annual report on the state of the country’s armed forces.  

“The situation is serious,” Eva Högl, the parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces, said Tuesday. “We are still not where we need to be and there is still much to do to improve the conditions for the Bundeswehr.”

Perhaps the Bundeswehr’s greatest problem is its inability to grow despite a concerted recruitment push meant to grow the force to 203,000 troops by 2031. Instead, the Bundeswehr is falling further behind, shrinking by 340 troops to 181,174 at the end of 2024. The force is also getting older to due a lack of young recruits, with the average age rising to 34.

Pulling down on "Other", I'm not seeing any updates on Equatorial Guinea, so either they aren't announcing it and keeping it quiet or it is staying small scale.

Affirming. I believe Putin would like to break NATO. And he will want to capitalize on Trump turning his back on allies. But he will need to disentangle from Ukraine first, and he isn't ready to do that yet. IMHO

Dropping a point on Moldova and Georgia based on Putin's dismissing the ceasefire. This will take a bit longer, than I thought to resolve in Ukraine. But I think it is clear Trump won't stand up Ukraine, and Europe will try. But not sure how successful they will be. After this resolves the way Putin wants, he will move on to break NATO, IMHO.

He is healthy and in the catbird's seat IMHO

Affirming at less than .05% chance, based on update by @AlexAlbertine  that it has been pushed another month later at least.

Thanks to Boz's US Policy in Latin America Risk Report from yesterday. It appears Maduro may be getting whiplash from Trump decrees. IMHO, that will continue for some months. And until then Maduro may be concerned about having to sell the oil he has at a discount. And setting up sanction avoidance. I'm thinking it will be difficult to do that and plan an attack or invasion at the same time.

https://open.substack.com/pub/boz/p/us-policy-in-latam-10-march-2025?r=a0t0&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=false

FTA: The big surprise from Trump’s announcement was not his flip-flop on Venezuela policy but that he is only giving 30 days for companies to wind down operations. Everything this administration does is at a sprint rather than a marathon. That one month deadline means companies are being forced into fast decisions and the Maduro regime is panicking. Losing Chevron will lead to a loss of production. Reviving sanctions evasion networks is not a particularly easy task, meaning they will face challenges selling what they have and it will need to be sold at a discount. Even if they think they can get a new deal in place with Trump in the coming months, this will be disruptive to their finances.

Moving higher on 'Other..." based on recent post by @belikewater  on Russian and Equatorial Guinea. Thanks for bringing that to my attention.

Here are some additional sources on this:

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c30pjv8vp80o

And this source sounds like it may already have resolved, though not sure this is considered open-source news:

https://defence-blog.com/russia-deploys-mercenaries-to-equatorial-guinea/

Europe in general is lining up on Ukraine's side. I'm not sure they would do that without popular support.

FTA: The announcement by Merz that Germany would reform its much-fetishized, constitutionally enshrined debt brake to exempt military spending above 1 percent of GDP from its fiscally restrictive provisions on new debt is one of the most significant economic and security announcements in Europe in a decade. 

The move—a stunning reversal from his own party’s campaign rhetoric and decades of German fiscal orthodoxy—could allow for major investments in closing defense capability and readiness gaps, provide long-term certainty for defense-industrial capacity, and bring Berlin’s defense spending closer to 3 percent of GDP. The announcement combines with a shift in Berlin’s posture in supporting von der Leyen’s joint borrowing proposal for a 150 billion euro EU defense fund and a relaxation of EU debt and deficit rules for defense spending purposes—both long anathema to Germany’s fiscal hawks.

This Zeitenwende 2.0 moment matters not only for Berlin but also Europe. Merz’s moves show that the likely next chancellor has understood the unprecedented geopolitical moment Germany and the continent are in—under threat from adversaries in Moscow and Beijing, and at risk of desertion from its ally in Washington. The framing and timing of these policy shifts a few days before the extraordinary European Council summit also suggest a new type of German leadership in Europe after years in which Germany was largely missing in action.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/how-european-leaders-are-responding-to-trumps-approach-to-ukraine-and-europe/

And here is this. Salt to taste, this survey comes from Kyiv:

https://kyivindependent.com/majority-of-germans-support-military-aid-to-ukraine-survey-shows/

FTA: The representative survey found that 67% of Germans back Germany’s military support for Ukraine. Within this group, 27% favor increasing military aid to Kyiv, while 40% believe Germany should maintain its current level of support. Meanwhile, 27% of respondents called for a reduction in weapons deliveries to Ukraine.