Dave-Bath

The Ankara attack by PKK (interestingly in a suburb once known as "Kazan") has increased Turkey's anger against the Kurdish elements of the anti-government forces in Syria that are largely viewed as a Western proxy by many in the region.

This combination of Turkish anger, increasing Turkish alignment with BRICS countries, and the ability by countries like Iran others to see SDF as a useful target to strike, sending a message to Israel and the US, without directly provoking either, especially if Assad officially asks for help (and thus the attacks are in line with UN conventions), would both increase friction within the SDF group, and decrease control of the regions. 

The SDF presents an opportunity for the anti-west members of the BRICS and "BRICS-adjacent" grouping (Iran, Syria, Iraq, etc, backed by Russia and perhaps others) to show their support for Turkey in a practical military way - especially as it would be awkward for Turkey to take more direct action on SDF units that might be more likely to have embedded or visiting western personnel - yet these may be the units that are better armed and potentially more troublesome to Turkey.

The relatively muted attack by Israel a few days ago pointed to only the first wave of a multi-wave attack being used - the first aimed at destroying Iran's air defence system, and the second to be Israeli bombers flying over Iran, taking advantage of Iran's lack of air defence systems.

Israeli aircraft did not fly over Iran in a second wave, suggesting that Israel believed those aircraft would be at too much risk - although what levels of losses would be a prohibitive military or prohibitive propaganda problem I cannot say.

It is possible that even the probability of a second wave, without loss of aircraft, but causing too little damage to Iran to be spun as effective, would have been enough to call off the second wave.

This all suggests Iran has a highly effective air defence network - detection and/or interception - more than Israel/USA believed possible.

Either detection or interception systems may have been supplied by Russia in recent weeks.

While the S-300 may have been updated with the missiles used in S-400s, it is possible-to-likely that senior Russian officials in Teheran signed off on shipments of advanced kit like S-400s, and Russian operators.

So, the considerations are slightly different, but the forecast remains approximately the same.

Bringing down as time decreases.

1. Russia will be very averse to causing damage to the VERY Russian city of Odesa, and thus unlikely to launch a ground attack unless there is virtually no resistance possible.

2. Russia has been remarkably conservative in the damage caused to the bulk of Ukraine - drawing Ukrainian forces to a relatively small area for attrition, and those areas subject to terrible destruction.  But, Kyiv, etc, still has a nightlife, everything but military and dual-use facilities (power, transport) left untouched.  Attacks on Kharkiv are more likely to be by missiles hitting more dual use targets, or decapitation attacks on government buildings and bunkers to force capitulation, if there is a major move before the end of 2024.  Ground forces are more likely to encircle and lay siege rather than enter a city with complex high-rise buildings where Russians would expect high numbers of Russian casualties (problems at home) and high numbers of civilian casualties (problems with BRICS allies).

Putting the levels back up after Ali Khamenei's speech calling for a measured response.

Israel is also not giving any sign of de-escalating elsewhere in the region that would give cause for Iran to de-escalate.

The spiralling escalation continues.

I was unreasonably hopeful before.